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WATCHING THE WATCHDOG:
SECURITY OVERSIGHT LAW IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA
Christopher A. Ford*
This Article attempts to assess the experiences of post-apartheid South
Africa in the realm of national security law by examining key issues
from constitutional, statutory, and policy perspectives. It observes
that South Africans now have a great "window of opportunity" that
allows them to establish the habits and mores necessary to a working
security oversight regime, and argues that the way in which South
Africa strikes a balance between the requirements of national security
and the preservation of personal liberties is of enormous importance
to the Republic's future. It further contends that South Africa's
choices in this arena could have significant implications and/or hold
important lessons for other democracies around the world. The Article
concludes by making recommendations for the proper role of the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches in South African security
oversight law.
IN TRO D U CTIO N ................................................................................. 59
I. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES ................................................ 62
A . A New South Africa ................................................................... 62
1. Political System in Flux .................................................. 62
2. An Ignominious Past ....................................................... 63
3. The Challenges of History ............................................... 67
4. The "Core Tension" of National Security Law ............. 71
5. The Peculiarities of National Security Law .................. 74
a. Specificity vs. Generality: The Problem of
Shifting Equilibria ....................................................... 74
b. The Role of the Courts ................................................ 80
c. Law as "Social Process?" ........................................... 82
d. Finding the Balance ..................................................... 83
B. South Africa's Challenges .......................................................... 85
1. Third World Problems ..................................................... 85
2. First World Problems ....................................................... 89
a. Uncertain International Responsibilities ..................... 90
* The author served as Assistant Counsel to the Intelligence Oversight Board at
the White House in 1996 and is presently Counsel for Special Investigations at the
Governmental Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate. He is grateful to his former
colleagues at the law firm of Shea & Gardner for their support and encourage-
ment. Above all, he is grateful to his wife Jennifer Davis-Ford for the boundless love,
kindness, and patience she has shown him during the preparation of this Article. The
views expressed herein are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Board,
the Committee, or any of their staff members.
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
b. Domestic Military Roles .............................................. 93
c. The SANDF's New Roles and Civil-Military
Relations ....................................................................... 95
3. Uniquely South African Challenges ................................ 100
a. Transforming the Military ............................................. 100
b. Problems in the Police Force .......................................... 106
c. The Entrenched Civil Service ......................................... 109
d. Domestic Political and Religious Groups ....................... 110
e. Cross-border Problems: Aliens, Weapons, Drugs,
and Theft ......................................................................... 115
f. A Continuing Internal Security Role for the Military... 116
C. Lessons from the U.S. Experience? .............................................. 118
D. The Challenges of Security Oversight ......................................... 121
1. A Taxonomy of Oversight Law and Policy .................... 121
2. Setting the Security-Oversight Mold: Now or
Perhaps N ever ..................................................................... 122
II. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA ............. 126
A . Executive O versight ..................................................................... 126
B. Intra-Institutional Oversight ....................................................... 135
C. Popular Accountability ................................................................ 139
D . Legislative Oversight ................................................................... 143
1. The Current Legislative Scheme ...................................... 144
2. The Structural Weakness of Legislative Oversight
in South A frica .................................................................... 146
3. The Power of the Purse ...................................................... 152
4. The Legislature as an Oversight Organ ......................... 155
E. Judicial O versight ........................................................................ 157
1. A Tradition of Judicial Independence Squandered ........ 159
2. Reinventing the Judicial "Jealous Eye?" ................... 162
3. A Case Study: Domestic Intelligence Surveillance ......... 163
4. An Inevitable Judicial Role in Oversight Issues .............. 168
III. THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY OVERSIGHT? ................ 173
A . Recom m endations ........................................................................ 173
1. Legislative Oversight Issues ............................................. 173
2. The Surveillance Court ...................................................... 174
3. Other Oversight Organs .................................................... 176
4. The Role of the Judiciary ................................................... 177
a. A New Jurisprudence of "Warning?" .................. 177
b. A CIPA Analogue? ........................................................ 180
c. The Concept of "National Security" ............................. 181
CONCLUSION: A PARTING WORD ................................................. 182
[VOL. 3:59
Watching the Watchdog
Madness in great ones must not unwatch 'd go.'
INTRODUCTION
South Africa's tortuous journey to majority rule has long been a
subject of enormous concern to scholars, public officials, and
concerned citizens around the world. For years, perhaps no country
symbolized .the divisions and the controversies of the post-war
world as much as did the Republic of South Africa. Indeed, a
person's position with respect to the efforts of the South African
people to overcome apartheid became, for observer and participant
alike, a litmus test of that person's role in any number of broader
struggles of enormous magnitude, struggles involving: racial equality,
international communism, democratic self-rule, imperialism,
liberalization and economic development, or class oppression. Most of
all, however, South Africa grabbed the attention of the world
because of race. In most of the other struggles that its tumultuous
post-war history seemed to illustrate and embody, South Africa
remained to foreign observers one arena among many. With respect
to race relations, however, South Africa inhabited a symbolic and
political plane entirely its own. For the severity of its racial
polarization, for the enduring character of its struggle for majority
rule, and for the audacity of the White government's claims to have
found in apartheid's racial oppression a liberating ideal -of race-
autonomous "self-determination," 2 South Africa was as compelling
as it was appalling-an almost irresistible subject for the world's
fascination and deep passions.
As the fruits of this dramatic journey, the Republic's present-
day efforts to bring democracy, human rights, economic
development, and civil order to its polarized society continue to
fascinate much of the world. In the United States, however, the
challenges and opportunities of the post-apartheid era are still seen
almost exclusively through the lens of race, and are studied
principally for the lessons about equality they may offer to other
societies.3 It is the assumption of this Article that while the bare facts
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1.
2. See generally Christopher A. Ford, Challenges and Dilemmas of Racial and Ethnic
Identity in American and Post-Apartheid South African Affirmative Action, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1953, 1991 (1996) [hereinafter Ford I] (discussing National Party's racial ideology
of "separate development" or "separate freedoms" as being distinctive gloss upon
traditional racial segregation, as well as leading to some of the worst abuses of the
apartheid era).
3. This author has hitherto been no exception. See Christopher A. Ford,
Administering Identity: The Determination of 'Race' in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L.
REv. 1231, 1276-79 (1994) [hereinafter Ford II]; see also Ford I, supra note 2, at 1960.
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of race-and the history of race relations in South Africa-provide a
context without which that country's affairs cannot properly be
understood, to keep such an exclusively race-based focus would be
to forego an opportunity to learn from the post-apartheid state's
experiences with other important issues and themes powerfully
implicated in contemporary South African events.
Specifically, this Article attempts to assess the implications of
post-apartheid South Africa's experiences in the realm of national
security law by examining key issues in this arena from a
constitutional, statutory, and policy perspective, and attempting to
draw broader lessons therefrom. This is not to suggest that the
challenges and opportunities of national security law and oversight
are the only (or perhaps even the most important) issues facing
contemporary South Africa beyond the obvious challenges of
economic development and racial equality. What is clear, however,
is that the way in which South Africa strikes its balance between the
requirements of security and the preservation and advancement of
liberty in a democratic and rights-governed society will be of
enormous importance to the Republic's future-and may offer
important lessons to those of us in other parts of the world keenly
interested in achieving a proper balance in our own societies.
I. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
A. A New South Africa
1. Political System in Flux
South Africa is, of course, in an extraordinary state of transition,
having enjoyed its first fully democratic elections in history in April
1994, and having been ruled for the past three years by a coalition
government headed by Nelson Mandela-once the world's most
famous political prisoner-and his formerly outlawed African
National Congress ("ANC'). For most of this period, an "interim
Constitution" adopted in 1994 has provided South Africa's basic
governmental structure,5  but the country's final constitutional
document-the framework of ultimate law by which the post-apartheid
4. The ANC won 62.7% of the popular vote in the 1994 balloting, which gave it
252 seats in the 400-seat multi-racial National Assembly elected at that point. See
generally Stephen Ellmann, The New South African Constitution and Ethnic Division, 26
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 5, 6 n.2 (1994) (citing Final Returns from South Africa, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1994, at A8).
5. Kenneth B. Noble, South African Parliament Adopts New Constitution, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1993, at A3 (recounting parliamentary vote of December 22, 1993).
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state is to be governed-was adopted in May 1996 and took effect at
the beginning of 1997.' South Africa, in other words, has only very
recently acquired its fundamental law. It now faces the long process
of developing a workable statutory and regulatory scheme to
structure governance and order civil society within the new
constitutional framework, and an even longer process of learning
how to live with the dramatic changes recent years have brought.
2. An Ignominious Past
With respect to issues of national security law, one does not
have to look far back into South African history to find powerful
illustrations of the need for proper accountability and oversight of
the security bureaucracy, particularly now that this bureaucracy
must carry out its functions within a system of constitutional rights
and democratic values. The last comprehensive attempt to structure
South Africa's national security system-the White minority
National Party government's establishment of a "National Security
Management System" ("NSMS") under the supervision of a "State
Security Council" ("SSC") to coordinate the operation of all facets of
the security apparatus in its efforts to suppress anti-apartheid
resistanceT--amounted to little more than "a secret junta of military,
police and government officials whose sweeping powers enabled it
to bypass Parliament."8 As Johan van der Vyver put it, the apartheid
state thus almost "inevitably culminated in state absolutism because
the law enforcement agencies of the state were entrusted with
powers that were not made subject to the rule of law and
furthermore disregarded the procedural directives of the due
process of law."9
Lacking meaningful accountability or oversight, the White
government's security bureaucracy ran wild, pursuing real and
6. S. AFR. CONST. § 244(1) ("This Act... comes into effect on a date set by the
President by proclamation, but no later than 1 January 1997.").
7. See generally Kevin Fedarko & Peter Hawthorne, The Silence Cracks, TIME, Nov.
4, 1996, at 59; Truth Commission Hears ANC on Camp Discipline, "Legitimate Targets,"
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library,
BBCSWB File [hereinafter Camp Discipline] (discussing NSMS' anti-apartheid
violence); James Selfe, South Africa's National Security Management System (1988)
(unpublished monograph, on file with the author) (describing establishment of
"parallel, militarized bureaucracy promoting the co-ordination of state security
action").
8. Fedarko & Hawthorne, supra note 7, at 59.
9. Johan D. van der Vyver, Comparative Constitutionalism: Constitutional Options
for Post-Apartheid South Africa, 40 EMORY L.J. 745, 751 (1991) (citing A. Mathews, The
South African Judiciary and the Security System, 1 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 199, 199-201
(1985)).
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perceived opponents with deadly force both at home and abroad. As
the findings of South Africa's former "Goldstone Commission"' and
the ongoing proceedings of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission ("Truth Commission") n have made agonizingly clear,
South African Police ("SAP") officials were deeply involved in all
variety of "dirty tricks" against apartheid's domestic opponents that
went far beyond their all-too-public role in the brutal suppression of
domestic discontent in the country's impoverished Black'2
10. The Goldstone Commission was a government commission, headed by
Supreme Court Justice Richard Goldstone, that played a dramatic role in the early
1990s in uncovering involvement in intergroup violence by the South African security
forces. See generally Bronwen Manby, South Africa: Minority Conflict and the Legacy of
Minority Rule, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 1995, at 45.
11. The "Truth Commission" is a government body established principally as a fact-
finding organ for the investigation of "gross violations of human rights" committed in South
Africa between 1960 and 1993, and empowered to offer amnesty to perpetrators on the
condition that they publicly acknowledge their crimes. See generally Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, South Africa; Tutu Issues Appeal for Amnesty Applications,
Africa News, Dec. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFRNWS File; All
Things Considered (Nat'l Pub. Radio Broadcast, Dec. 13, 1996).
12. Given the sensitivity of all racial labels in the context of South Africa's long
history of de jure racial segregation enforced by means of race-classifying personal
identity documents--the infamous "passes" that formed the documentary backbone of
apartheid-era segregation, see generally ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA: THE
REAL STORY 377-78 (Dougie Oakes ed., 1988) [hereinafter HISTORY]-a terminological
note is necessary here. Under the Population Registration Act of 1950, the apartheid
regime formally classified individuals into one of four principal racial groups: Whites
(the descendants principally of Dutch- and English-speaking European settlers),
Africans (the descendants of those who made up South Africa's principal "tribes"
before the coming of the Europeans), Coloureds (mixed-race individuals of varying
ancestries), and Indians or Asians (descendants of South Asians who came to South
Africa as laborers or merchants under British rule).
Post-apartheid racial terminology seems to be somewhat in flux. In reaction to
the formal classifications of the Population Registration Act, it became popular among
"[pirogressive non-Whites in South Africa" to identify themselves merely as "Black,"
see Marshall S. Huebner, Note, Who Decides? Restructuring Criminal Justice for a
Democratic South Africa, 102 YALE L.J. 961, 965 n.21 (1993); Charles R. Lawrence III,
Forward: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 819, 827 (1995), a phenomenon which dates at least from Steve Biko's "Black
Consciousness Movement" in the mid-1970s, see HISTORY, supra, at 443. More recently,
a revived use of the more ethnically specific term "Africans" has come into vogue
among those who some have otherwise termed "Black Blacks," as they seek to assert
claims to government benefits against other South African "Blacks" of differing hue.
See, e.g., There's Black and Black, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 1994, at 52; Ford II, supra note 2,
at 1983-84.
Because of South Africa's long period of formal segregation and differentially
invidious treatment under apartheid, the old classifications of the Population
Registration Act have retained some real social and personal significance even after its
repeal in 1991. Accordingly, with due apologies to "progressive non-Whites in South
Africa," this Article will employ the terms "White," "African," "Coloured," and
"Asian" where such a degree of specificity is required. Similarly, with apologies to
those who find the term "non-White" to be "offensive," see, e.g., Huebner, supra, at 965
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"townships. '13 At their most extreme, these "tricks" involved
organizing extra-judicial assassination squads to target ANC
activists-not only "hit squads" made up of Zulus affiliated with the
fiercely anti-ANC "Inkatha" organization and local police forces
from the ethnic "homeland" of KwaZulu, 4  but also elite
assassination teams made up of White SAP regulars."' Indeed, these
police abuses were not limited to the government's domestic
opponents: the long arm of these extra-judicial assassins had an
international reach as well. 6
Nor was the apartheid-era South African Defence Force
("SADF") establishment immune to such abuses. SADF units were
apparently involved in training some of the Inkatha "death squads"
at secret military encampments on the Caprivi Strip in northeastern• • 17
Namibia, military intelligence units were reportedly "associated"
with the assassination and destabilization activities of so-called
"Hammer Units" in certain particularly volatile areas of South
n.21, "non-White" will still be used herein in order to avoid confusing American
readers unaccustomed to using the term "Black" to include all those persons who are
not actually "White." (The nearest U.S. analogue to the South African "Black" is the
awkward neologism "persons of color," which is inappropriate to use in discussing
South Africa by virtue of its narrow Americanness.). "Black" will be generally used
herein only to refer to the majority populations of other countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, where fewer such terminological confusions arise.
13. Most infamously it was the police who fired upon anti-government
demonstrators at Sharpeville in 1960, killing 69 people and wounding 180, and again
in 1976 in Soweto, where hundreds of people died in the orgy of rioting and street
clashes that followed the first clashes with police. See, e.g., HISTORY, supra note 12, at
398-403 & 443-44.
14. See generally Manby, supra note 10, at 45.
15. See, e.g., David Beresford, Ex-Police Chief Points Finger at Botha, GUARDIAN, Oct.
22, 1996, at 12 (recounting police general's claim to the Truth Commission that he had
been ordered by then-Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok to bomb headquarters
of South African Council of Churches); Alec Russell, Assassin for Apartheid Gets Two
Life Sentences, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 31, 1996, at 21 (recounting that the elite SAP
anti-terrorist unit operating until 1993 out of Vlakplaas farm outside Pretoria was
actually employed as an assassination squad).
16. See, e.g., Robert Block, South African Security Link to Palme Murder, SUNDAY
TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996 (recounting former SAP informer's claim to have had a role in
bombing ANC headquarters in London and in notorious parcel-bomb murders of anti-
apartheid activists). According to court testimony by the former head of the notorious
Vlakplaas assassination team, Eugene de Kock, the South African security services
were even involved in the murder of Swedish Prime Minister and former United
Nations Secretary-General Olaf Palme in 1986 (though Swedish investigators
apparently have not yet resolved the case). Id.
17. See Mark Ashurst, Six Go Free in Malan Murder Trial, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1996,
at 3. A German colony since 1884, Namibia (then known as South-West Africa) was
occupied by South Africa during the First World War. It was not given independence
until 1990, after a protracted guerrilla war.
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Africa,8 and police testimony before the Truth Commission has
suggested that SADF special forces and intelligence operatives
helped police officials select targets for "elimination."' 9 Beyond
South Africa's borders, the SADF became notorious during the 1980s
for mounting repeated cross-border raids to strike at ANC targets on
the soil of the Republic's Black-ruled neighbors.0
Moreover, as the proceedings of the Truth Commission have
shown, even the ANC-which presently rules South Africa and
seems likely to do so for the foreseeable future-became so
intoxicated with its anti-apartheid goal that it allowed itself to
commit abuses in its pursuit. For example, in a 100-page document
submitted to the Commission written by Deputy President Thabo
Mbeki, Minister of Transport Mac Maharaj, and Premier Mathews
Phosa of Mpumlanga Province, the ANC admitted to a number of
crimes, including the execution of thirty-four intra-ANC dissidents
in the organization's training camps in Angola and the use of
indiscriminate car-bomb attacks against civilian targets in apartheid-
era South Africa.2
18. See Shaun McCarthy, South Africa's Self-Defence Units, JANE'S INTEL. REV., Nov.
1994, at 520, 521 [hereinafter McCarthy, SDUs] (linking units operating in Eastern
Cape, Natal province, and East Rand areas to former Department of Military
Intelligence's "Directorate of Covert Collection").
19. See Stefaans Brummer, "Arrogant" SADF Angers Minister, Africa News, Oct. 28,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFRNWS File.
20. See, e.g., HELMOED-ROMER HEITMAN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR MACHINE 168-
74 (1985) [hereinafter HEITMAN, WAR MACHINE] (describing invasion of Angola in
1975). As it was put at the time, the SADF's mission was to "be able to take successful
action at any time and at any place in Southern Africa" in order "to locate and destroy
hostile terrorist bases, wherever they may be established." Senate Hansard 16 Feb 1981
Col 1508-13. South Africa also supplied arms and assistance to anti-government
guerrilla groups in neighboring countries, with the aim of weakening and
preoccupying potentially hostile Black-ruled regional states with domestic unrest and
making the costs of support for the ANC prohibitive. See, e.g., Rok Ajulu & Diana
Cammack, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland: Captive States, in DESTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT:
SOUTHERN AFRICA AT WAR 145-47 (David Martin & Phyllis Johnson, eds. 1986);
David Martin & Phyllis Johnson, Destabilization and Dependence, in APARTHEID IN
CRISIS 310 (Mark A. Uhlig, ed. 1986).
21. See Camp Discipline, supra note 7; Tutu Panel Summons 2 in Anti-Apartheid Attack,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1997, at All. In April 1997, the Truth Commission issued
subpoenas to ANC activists Robert McBride and Greta Appelgren, who had detonated
a car bomb outside a pub in Durban in 1985, killing three civilians. According to
McBride, the car bomb attack was ordered by his superiors in the ANC; the Truth
Commission apparently wished to know more about the ANC's terror-bombing
campaign.
This Article does not mean to suggest the moral equivalence of the abuses
committed by both sides in the anti-apartheid struggle. The point is merely that some
abuses were committed by both sides, and-as we will see-that this history presents
some special challenges for national security oversight in South Africa today.
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3. The Challenges of History
This history provides South Africans with a more compelling
lesson about the need for accountability and oversight of the
security apparatus than any textbook ever could. Not surprisingly,
the lessons of the past have hung heavily over the South African
government's attempts to ciaft oversight legislation for the post-
apartheid era. As Senator James Selfe of the Democratic Party stated
in parliamentary debates in 1994 over new intelligence legislation, it
has proven "virtually impossible" to talk about restructuring the
security apparatus "without referring to what transpired in the past....
[R]unning like a golden thread through the... [Intelligence] Bills is the
recognition that only a fool does not learn from history.
22
For their part, South African government officials claim to have
learned well the lessons of their unhappy past. As Deputy Intelli-
gence Minister of Intelligence Services Joe Nhlanhla proclaimed to
the House of Assembly during the Intelligence Bills debate,
[m]indful of intelligence service practices that were moti-
vated by internal political struggles that often saw them
gripped in a life-and-death conflict, either in support of or
in opposition to the apartheid system of government, these
Intelligence Bills make a[n] ... unambiguous statement to
all South Africans. Never again shall intelligence be used
to pursue the narrow interests of the political party in
power. Never again shall intelligence sow conflict [and]
destabilisation .... Never again shall intelligence be used
as a means of control over the lives of the people of this
land.23
According to another minister, "[t]he fatal flaw of the past,
when the minority government maintained power by employing all
22. Senate Hansard 15 Nov 1994 Col 3019 (remarks of J. Selfe).
23. House of Assembly Hansard 15 Nov 1994 Col 4130; see also id. Col 4140
(remarks of Kader Asmal) ("[N]ever, I repeat, never will the intelligence agencies be
allowed to influence the course of national events in a manner not compatible with
democratic principles."); id. Col 4153 (remarks of L.T. Landers) ("Never again should
the security forces, underpinned by our intelligence services, spawn the likes of [the
police-run assassination squads]. Never again should a message emanate from a
State Security Council calling for the permanent removal from society of a[n]
[anti-government activist]. Never again should residents of our townships or our
commuters be subjected to campaigns of .. .terror or ... violence by agents provo-
cateurs."). Kader Asmal, while also Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, was a
member of the Cabinet Subcommittee on Security and Intelligence Affairs (CSSIA) and
chaired the National Conventional Arms Control Committee.
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the instruments at its disposal, including intelligence, is now
mercifully behind us."24
What such dramatic historical illustrations of the pitfalls of
security oversight failure do not so easily provide, however, is a
clear blueprint of how to structure South Africa's laws, institutions,
and governmental processes in order to ensure national security
accountability in the future-and of how to cultivate the personal
and institutional mores upon which fidelity to such a system will
depend. The object lessons of past abuses, in other words, tell South
Africans that they require such things, but the post-apartheid state
has had to look elsewhere for more specific guidance as to how to
strike the difficult balance between liberty and security.
This sordid history presents a particular challenge in South
Africa because many persons involved in abuses during the struggle
for democratic rule remain-or have become-part of the security
bureaucracy today. While some White (and non-White) members of
elite military units such as the 1st Reconnaissance Commando, the
44th Parachute Battalion, and the 32nd Battalion appear to have
found gainful private employment outside South Africa,ns both the
24. Id. Col 4127 (remarks of Kader Asmal).
25. It has been repeatedly reported that many former members of such elite SADF
units now work for a private mercenary organization called "Executive Outcomes," a
shadowy company with extensive international financial connections which has
recently won itself some fame in combat against rebel forces in the service of the
governments of both Angola and Sierra Leone; more recently they may have had some
involvement in Zaire's civil war and in Papua New Guinea. See generally Tom Cohen,
Mercenaries Battle Image, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1997, at A14 (describing the complaints
of human rights groups and defense analysts over Papua New Guinea's use of
mercenaries); Jim Hooper, Peace in Sierra Leone: A Temporary Outcome?, JANE'S INTEL.
REV., Feb. 2, 1997, at 91 (tracing the conflict between the Liberian-backed
Revolutionary United Front and the President of Sierra Leone); Herbert M. Howe,
Mercenaries in Africa: A Force for Good or Evil?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 7, 1996, at G1
(describing the rise of Executive Outcomes, a South African mercenary organization);
Khareen Pech, Mobilisation of Mercenaries, JANE'S INTEL. REV., Mar. 1, 1997, at 11
(reporting on the influx of foreign military intervention in Central Africa); Khareen
Pech, South Africa Tries to Ban Mercenaries, JANE'S INTEL. REV.-POINTER, Feb. 1, 1997, at
13 [hereinafter Pech I] (describing South Africa's effort to prohibit the sale of military
and intelligence services to foreign governments); S. Africans Protect Sierra Leone Dam
From Rebels, Reuters World Service, Oct. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library,
REUWLD File (reporting on a mercenary group guarding a dam against rebel attacks);
South Africans to Train Sierra Leone Army in Jungle Warfare, Agence France Presse, June
7, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File (reporting on Sierra Leone's use of
a mercenary organization); Talifdeen, Mercenaries "Capitalise on Mineral Resources"
JANE'S DEF. WKLY., Nov. 13, 1996, at 5 (discussing the dealings of South African
mercenaries); The Mine-Strewn Paths to African Peace, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 1994, at 49
(describing the difficult path to establishing a peace deal in Angola); see also Tony
Buckingham, INTEL. NEWSL., Sept. 28, 1995, at 3 (describing Executive Outcomes'
international financial connections).
South Africa's new Constitution, however, provides that no South African
citizen may "participat[e] in armed conflict, nationally or internationally, except as
[VOL. 3:59
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South African military and the police service retain great numbers of
personnel who formerly served the White minority government. For
its part, of course, the ANC now runs the South African government,
placing its veterans of the armed struggle against apartheid in office as
the civilian masters of the security establishment. Large numbers of
former guerilla fighters from Umkhonto we Sizwe (or "MK," the armed
wing of the ANC) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (or
"APLA," the armed wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress) have also
been brought into the military service-now rechristened the South
African National Defence Force ("SANDF')-putting on uniforms
alongside the men they once fought. 6 Members of the ANC and
PAC intelligence services and those of the former self-governing
"homelands" of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda have also
been integrated with the intelligence services of the former apartheid
state.2"
Both the former security forces of the White minority regime
and the former guerrillas of MK and APLA have, independently,
demonstrated a tendency to assume that a righteous end justifies
any means employed in its pursuit. For the security forces, "national
security" was an altar upon which could be sacrificed all notions of
legality and propriety. During the 1980s they perceived themselves
to be, as Brigadier Jack Cronje once put it, in a state of "war" against
anti-apartheid guerrillas-convincing themselves in the process that
extrajudicial killing was "the only way effective action [that] could
be taken against activists in the war situation." Detention pursuant
to South Africa's already-draconian security laws was apparently
"not enough, seeing as it was limited and of short duration." Actual
prosecutions in a court of law, it was feared, would be even more
cumbersome, however, leaving the security forces with what Cronje
provided for in terms of the Constitution or national legislation." S. AFR. CONST. §
198(b). Such "national legislation" was proposed in early 1997 to forbid the offering or
selling of military or intelligence services to foreigners without first obtaining
permission from the National Conventional Arms Control Committee ("NCACC"). If
passed, it might "force [Executive Outcome] to move out of South Africa and may
hamper recruitment of South African personnel." Pech I, supra, at 13.
The 1st Reconnaissance Commando ("Recce Commando" or the "Recces") was
an all-White commando and strategic reconnaissance unit modeled after Britain's
famous Special Air Service. The 44th Parachute Brigade (the "Parabats" or simply the
"Bats") was an elite airbome-capable light infantry unit within the SADF, while the 32
Battalion (sometimes called South Africa's "Buffalo Soldiers") was a special counter-
insurgency unit led by White officers but with ranks filled by non-white soldiers. See
generally HEITMAN, WAR MACHINE, supra note 20, at 96-108.
26. See, e.g., Bereng Mtimkulu, Reluctant Peacekeeper, 52 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 9
(1996).
27. See House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 4130-31 (remarks of J.H.
Nhlanha).
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described as "no other choice than to take normal military action
and eliminate activists." '28
For the ANC, the fundamental morality of the struggle against
apartheid was similarly felt to make any conduct permissible. The
ANC strongly resisted making any submission to the Truth
Commission, reasoning that it had been fighting a "just war" that
required no apology, and agreed finally to do so only after the
Commission's chairman, Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu,
threatened to resign.2 Even in its submission to the Commission, the
ANC declared that the "overwhelming majority" of its strikes
against South African targets were legitimate. While the ANC
apologized for the deaths of "innocent civilians" in such attacks, it
defended the use of land mines against White farmers because they
had received military training, from the SADF. 30 Because South
Africa then employed universal White male conscription to fill the
ranks of the SADF, this reasoning would have made any White male
a "legitimate target"--a logic even more brutally permissive than
Brigadier Cronje's rationalization for assassinating pro-ANC
"activists." Now that their struggle has ended, when reminded that
the ANC, too, "permitted, indeed, encouraged its security arm to
operate above the law, without any requirement of accountability
whatsoever,"3'1 government ministers grow angry and defensive,
insisting that such activities were a regrettable but necessary side-
effect of their "resistance to an immoral system." In truth, they say,
"we have nothing to be ashamed of."32
Both components of the leadership of South Africa's post-
apartheid security apparatus, therefore, have demonstrated a
dangerous susceptibility to wholly result-oriented varieties of
operational ethics. This obviously poses a serious challenge in the
arena of security oversight, for in constitutional democracies the
belief that a worthy end automatically justifies any means is
inevitably the sworn enemy of security accountability and the rule
of law. Indeed, such a corrupted end/means rationality is the
cardinal sin of the security-oversight world. It will thus be the
challenge of South African national security law not only to create
formal structures and procedures for security oversight, but also to
28. Tom Cohen, Former Security Chief. Killing Anti-Apartheid Activists was Necessary,
AP, Oct. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, AP File.
29. See David Beresford, ANC and Tutu Heal Rift, GUARDIAN, Nov. 11, 1996, at 10.
30. See Camp Discipline, supra note 7.
31. See House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 4154 (remarks of J.A. Jordaan)
(quoting from report of the Douglas Commission).
32. Id. Col 4158 (remarks of Kader Asmal) (describing ANC misdeeds as "the
pathology of guardians guarding the integrity of leadership against [pro-apartheid] hit
squads committed to destroying the leadership").
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cultivate institutional mores conducive to such oversight. Given the
relative novelty of these ideas to former SAP, SADF, and intelligence
officials, and to the ANC itself, the creation of a new security
culture-one that recognizes that "[jiustice can never be adequately
pursued only as a goal or an idea" but "is also reflected in the means
employed"33-will have to be a high priority if South Africa's young
constitutional democracy is to remain a democracy in more than just
name.
4. The "Core Tension" of National Security Law
Though. South Africa's contemporary circumstances present, in
many ways, special challenges to security oversight, the basic di-
lemma the Republic faces is one that it shares with any democracy
which seeks to ensure that the actions it undertakes in self-
preservation do not fundamentally traduce the values which make it
worth preserving. Except, perhaps, in the most extraordinary cir-
cumstances of war or disaster,3 constitutional democracies cannot
33. Jay Katz, Human Sacrifice and Human Experimentation: Reflections at Nuremberg,
YALE LAW SCHOOL OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 2d. ser., no.2 (1997), at 17.
34. The U.S. Constitution, for example, recognizes an exception to the usual
inviolability of the writ of habeas corpus "in cases of Rebellion or Invasion." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may
require it."). Since this "suspension clause" appears in Article I of the Constitution,
however-the article laying out the powers of the U.S. Congress-it seems to reserve
the right to suspend habeas corpus for the legislature. Nevertheless, President Abraham
Lincoln took it upon himself to suspend the writ upon the outbreak of the U.S. Civil
War in 1861, deeming that particular liberty worth infringing in the broader interest of
preserving the constitutional scheme in its entirety.
Many authors otherwise supportive of a robust system of security oversight
similarly still accept the need for an executive dispensation to respond to emergency
situations. John Hart Ely, for instance, admits to the existence of at least some implicit
presidential power to respond to emergencies by the commitment of U.S. troops to
combat without restriction either by the constitutional reservation to Congress of the
power to "declare war" or by the statutory limitations of the War Powers Resolution.
See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 65 (1993). Loch Johnson, in examining
the murky ethical world of "covert action" by intelligence services, suggests an even
more dramatic scenario: "[ilf... a nation's leaders believe that a major city was about
to be vaporized by a nuclear device stolen by terrorists, they would no doubt use
every means available to avoid this calamity. Constitutional safeguards would be
thrown out the window. Even the assassination of the suspected terrorists would be
an option if the nation's leaders were persuaded that murder would prevent the
nuclear annihilation of millions-a consequentialist's imperative." LOCH K. JOHNSON,
SECRET AGENCIES 75 (1996) [hereinafter JOHNSON I]; see also id. at 76 ("In times of
overt warfare, almost anything goes when it comes to supportive intelligence
options.").
Many scholars of civil-military relations have noted the tension that exists
between security and liberty, especially in times of crisis. See, e.g., David R. Segal, U.S.
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permit themselves to go so far: we may not destroy our constitu-
tional community in order to save it. But, of course, save it we must.
National security issues force the politician, legislator, judge,
and citizen to confront this dilemma quite starkly. In a constitutional
democracy, national security law serves two often incompatible
masters, liberty and security. In attempting to strike a balance be-
tween the two, it can find itself in some very awkward situations. As
the above illustrations of apartheid-era abuses suggest, "[iut is not
unusual for legal princiPles to be at variance with perceptions of na-
tional security needs.' There exists a "basic tension in democratic
polities between the need for openness as a way of assuring power
sharing and the need for secrecy as a way of assuring efficiency.
''
3
Scholars of civil-military relations have long addressed
themselves to similar tensions in discussing what Peter Feaver has
called "the problem... [of] how to keep the military from taking
over the government. 3 7 In David Segal's words,
[o]ne of the cultural contradictions of the modern demo-
cratic state is that its defense almost invariably requires
either that the ideals it embodies must be compromised or
that its means of defense must be constrained by those ide-
als, rendering the defense less effective. A democracy
either must prepare for and fight its wars with one hand
tied behind its back, or it must become a bit less demo-
cratic in the interest of effectively defending itself. 3
The dilemma of national security law is closely related to this
tension, but broader. It is concerned not only with preventing a coup
(that is, with keeping the uniformed services from coming to control
Civil-Military Relations in the Twenty-first Century: A Sociologist's View, in U.S. CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS: IN CRISIS OR TRANSITION? 185, 195 (Don M. Snider & Miranda
A. Carlton-Carew eds., 1995) [hereinafter CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS] (noting "the
tension between democracy and the rule of law, particularly in wartime"); see also infra
note 247 (discussing tensions between rule of law and command authority in
wartime).
35. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, supra note 34, at 195.
36. W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION 131
(1992).
37. Peter D. Feaver, Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of Force, in CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS, supra note 34, at 113.
38. Segal, supra note 34, at 194; see also Feaver, supra note 37, at 115 ("[W]hat makes
the problem interesting however, is that [the] goals [of civil-military relations] can
sometimes be in conflict. For example, in seeking to insure that the military will not
dominate civilian politics it is possible to adopt methods that weaken or destroy the
military institution itself. Or, in protecting military institutions from mismanagement,
it is possible to free them to act out of consonance with national policy. In short, civil-




the civilian leadership), but also more generally with keeping the
conduct of the security bureaucracy within bounds set by law and
ensuring that bureaucracy's accountability both to its civilian
masters and (ultimately) to the public. To the "ghost of Cromwell"
that may be said to loom over issues of civil-military relations-a
reminder of the perils of allowing the military to assume the reigns
of power 3-we may therefore add the "ghost of Cronje."
The fundamental challenge, therefore, is how to strike this
balance: how to make national security law serve both security and
liberty in ways appropriate to the circumstances of the time and the
values this balance is undertaken in order to protect. It is an
inherently difficult process, and failure to find the right equilibrium
can be disastrous. This challenge, however, is one that no
constitutional democracy can entirely escape. 40 After all, perhaps the
only thing more dangerous than having an overpowering security
apparatus is not having one at all.
At the margin, of course, the tension between security efficiency
and liberty-a sibling of the more famous tension between order
and justice-that necessarily characterizes much of security over-
sight law is not a tension at all. As Thomas Hobbes recognized long
ago, it is the fundamental contribution of political life to secure
members of the body politic against the ever-present fear of violent
death.41 In national security affairs, a balance drawn radically in fa-
vor of liberty is no balance, and will provide no liberty. The
subtleties and difficult choices of security oversight arise, however,
as a society moves away from this extreme: after the point at which
some basic "floor" of security has been achieved. Given this ines-
capable fact-and bearing always in mind that it is the purpose of
security to serve liberty-the key question becomes one of how to
39. The "ghost of Cromwell" metaphor is that of Lt. Gen. (ret.) Dave Palmer, USA.
See, e.g., DAVE R. PALMER, 1794: AMERICA, ITS ARMY, AND THE BIRTH OF THE NATION
94 (1994). In his characterization, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution-acutely aware
of Britain's history of civil war and military dictatorship in the previous century-
found this "ghost of Cromwell" a "presence [they] could hardly ignore." Id. The
history of Cromwellian dictatorship, Palmer writes, illustrated the perils of having too
large a standing professional army, and was powerfully in the minds of the drafters of
both the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 96, 99-101,
103. The Framers, therefore, faced the classic dilemma of civil-military relations: how
to square the needs of defense with the requirements of freedom.
40. Reisman and Baker have discussed this challenge with respect to U.S.
intelligence law, see, e.g., REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 36, at 131 ("The urgent policy
question is which emerging legal and administrative arrangements best equip the
United States for its world role while preserving its democratic values."), but all
constitutional democracies face it to one degree or another.
41. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 379 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Pelican Books
1981) (1651).
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maintain control: "How [can] such a force be kept loyal to the re-
public? Who [will] watch it with a jealous eye?"4' 2
5. The Peculiarities of National Security Law
a. Specificity vs. Generality: The Problem of Shifing Equilibria
The difficulty of achieving this necessary balance tends to give
national security law a structure and function unfamiliar to those
accustomed to more conventional varieties of domestic jurispru-
dence. If, for ,example, it is the job of national security law to mediate
between the values of liberty and security, drawing a line appropri-
ate to the society it serves and the threats that society faces, then
there is little reason to believe that the same line will be appropriate
for all circumstances. Precisely because the particulars of this equi-
librium will depend to some non-trivial extent upon the particular
threats a society faces, it is very difficult to arrive at "bright-line"
rules for the regulation of security affairs. At least to some extent,
therefore, this leaves the proper functioning of national security law
less to the formal determinations of conventional domestic legality
(i.e., binary decisions of "legal" or "illegal") than to more informal
bargaining process between various participants in the governmen-
tal system-a process not always conducive to comprehensive
codification or simple yea/nea decision-making thereafter fixed into
precedential stone. One cannot escape the need to set legal restraints
and oversight institutions into a fixed form, but neither can one ex-
pect an extremely specific textual embodiment to work particularly
well.
The elaborate American corpus of intelligence oversight law,
for example, has struggled with this tension between specificity and
generality since the mid-1970s, and over the years of its develop-
ment has swung back and forth between more and less restrictive
texts. In reaction to the highly publicized hearings of a congressional
committee in the mid-1970s on involvement by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency ("CIA") in a number of (unsuccessful) past
assassination plots against foreign leaders,4. the U.S. Congress
42. PALMER, supra note 39, at 108.
43. The modem-day apparatus of congressional oversight of the U.S. intelligence
apparatus largely dates from the series of scandals--involving not just foreign
assassination plotting but widespread domestic spying against antiwar activists and
civil rights leaders, and drug experiments on unsuspecting victims-revealed during
this period. See generally REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON CIA
ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES (1975) (the "Rockefeller Commission" report);
JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 44-46; RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES, THE CIA AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 194-208 (1989); JOHN RANELAGH, THE AGENCY: THE RISE AND DECLINE
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passed its first law specifically requiring reports to the legislature on
the conduct of "covert operations' ' undertaken by U.S. intelligence
agencies. This was the so-called Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974.4,
It was not the intent of Congress to prohibit such activities, of course,
but merely to interpose a layer of legislative oversight and thereby
force the executive branch to behave with the circumspection born
of the knowledge that someone else was keeping an eye on its ac-
tivities."
Even Congress, however, soon came to believe that Hughes-
Ryan-which seemed to require that covert action reports be submitted
to as many as eight different congressional committees-was too
restrictive and too likely to lead to breaches of operational security.47 As
OF THE CIA 584-99 (rev. ed. 1987). Prior to the mid-1970s, the predominant
congressional reaction to the activities of U.S. intelligence was "I don't want to know!"
JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 44 (quoting Senator John Stennis of the Senate Armed
Services Committee in 1973).
44. The term "covert operations" has no precise definition, but has always been
understood to include a range of clandestine influence activities undertaken abroad
without public acknowledgment of the acting government's involvement, from
"black" (i.e., unattributable) propaganda operations to secret efforts to destabilize
foreign governments or assassinate troublesome foreign leaders. Under current U.S.
law, the term encompassing such activities is "covert action," which is defined to
mean "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political,
economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly . 50
U.S.C. § 413b(e) (1995).
45. See 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1983) (repealed 1991).
46. This circumspection, of course, is hardly a new phenomenon. As Shakespeare's
Sextus Pompeius told his loyal captain upon the latter's request for permission to kill
his lord's enemies by treachery, "[Tlhis thou shouldst have done, / And not have
spoken on't! In me 'tis villany, / In thee 't had been good service. Thou must know, /
'Tis not my profit that does lead mine honour; / Mine honour it. Repent that e'er thy
tongue / Hath so betray'd thine act. Being done unknown, / I should have found it
afterwards well done; / But must condemn it now. Desist, and drink." WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA act. II, sc. VII. Thus did the Bard suggest
both the doctrine of "plausible deniability" and the rationale for its repudiation some
three centuries before the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency.
47. According to Senator Barry Goldwater, the Hughes-Ryan amendment required
that the CIA reveal its covert operations plans to 50 Senators and 120 members of the
House of Representatives. Goldwater believed that the "leak" of information in 1975
about CIA activities in support of Holden Roberto's FNLA guerrillas in Angola could
be directly traced to this over-zealous reporting regime. JEFFREYS-JONES, supra note 45,
at 198. See also, e.g., S. REP. NO. 96-730, at 2-4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4192, 4193-94 (discussing reasons for changes in intelligence reporting law as
embodied in Bill S. 2284, from which was derived the Intelligence Authorization Act
of 1980). The leak to the Village Voice newspaper of the highly classified final report of
a House committee headed by Otis Pike investigating CIA abuses in 1975 also served
to sour executive officials and legislators alike on the idea of a reporting regime
involving more than a small number of congressmen. See JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at
91. Indeed, by the end of the 1970s, Congress was so widely regarded as likely to
"leak" sensitive information that the Canadian government refused to allow its
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a result, Congress repealed the amendment's multiple-committee
reporting rules in 1980, in favor of a reporting scheme requiring
Congress to provide information on "all intelligence activities,"8 but
only to the two congressional committees specifically concerned
with intelligence matters. 9 Backing away from the legislature's
initial instinct rigidly to "statutize" intelligence law in response to
the scandals of the 1970s, the 1980 law claimed to do little more than
to "place in statute the oversight process that has been in effect since
1976 5-that is, to codify general intelligence reporting practice as it
had developed through the process of congressional-executive
bargaining. In the wake of the revelation of the Reagan
Administration's secret arms sales to Iran and the diversion of
profits gained therefrom to assist the U.S.-supported Nicaraguan
contra rebels, however, Congress again amended the intelligence
oversight statute in 1991, establishing a more detailed reporting
scheme that dealt specifically and independently both with
conventional "intelligence activities" and with statutorily defined
"covert actions."5'
embassy to be used in connection with President Jimmy Carter's abortive attempt in
1980 to rescue Americans held hostage at the U.S. embassy in Teheran unless Carter
guaranteed that Congress would only be informed after the operation. Id. at 134.
48. The statute did not specifically mention "covert operations," but rather treated
them as a subset of "significant anticipated intelligence activities" of which the
president was to keep the intelligence committees generally informed. See Pub. L. No.
96-450, Title IV, § 407(b)(1), 94 Stat. 1981 (amending National Security Act of 1947 to
insert § 501(a)(1) requiring the president to keep committees "fully and currently
informed of all intelligence activities.., including any significant anticipated
intelligence activity"); SEN. REP. No. 96-730, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4192, 4194 (indicating that "significant anticipated intelligence activity" includes those
"covert operations" formerly governed by Hughes-Ryan Amendment). The 1980
legislation did not wholly repeal the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, however, keeping in
place its requirement that covert operations be undertaken only pursuant to explicitly
presidential "findings." See 22 U.S.C. § 2242. The covert operations rules were revised
and consolidated in the 1991 intelligence legislation, appearing today in 50 U.S.C. §
413b. See SEN. REP. No. 102-85 (1990), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 193, 222
(discussing repeal of Hughes-Ryan); SEN. REP. No. 96-730, at 5 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4192, 4195-96 (discussing modification of Hughes-Ryan).
49. See Pub. L. No. 96-450, Title IV, § 407(b)(1), 94 Stat. 1981. Even before this
statutory change, however, intelligence practice had shifted away from the multi-
committee scheme apparently envisioned by Hughes-Ryan. The Hughes-Ryan
Amendment had required reporting merely to all "appropriate committees" of
Congress, and while initially this had been understood to require disclosures to all the
various committees involved with foreign affairs and defense issues, after the
establishment of Senate and House oversight committees specifically for intelligence
matters the intelligence services and Congress alike came to agree that reporting only
to these two committees was "appropriate." See JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 89.
50. SEN. REP. No. 96-730, at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4192, 4194.
51. 50 U.S.C. §§ 413-413b.
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After two decades of pendulum-like adjustment, the United
States has acquired a highly developed statutory system of
congressional intelligence oversight. Indeed, so unique is U.S.
intelligence law in its complexity and in the degree of restraint it
places upon the executive branch that one former Director of Central
Intelligence has claimed it to be a "crude and often shortsighted
approach to making foreign policy... [that] complicate[s]
decision-making and... contribute[s] to the 'criminalizing' of
political differences between the Congress and the executive.""
That said, however, U.S. intelligence law has acquired nowhere
near the specificity and status as "hard" legal obligation enjoyed by
most domestic legislation. For one, the oversight statute leaves many
vital terms and requirements to processes of definition no more
formalized than the development of norms of inter-institutional and
inter-branch cooperation. The current oversight legislation, for
example, requires that the president keep Congress "fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities" undertaken by the
U.S. government, as well as of "any significant anticipated
intelligence activity and any significant intelligence failure."'53
Congress can hardly have intended that the "fully and currently
informed of all intelligence activities" requirement be taken literally,
of course, for oversight amidst such a blizzard of detail would be
no oversight at all. Nor is the concept of a "significant" activity
or failure anywhere defined in the statute. The meaning of these
requirements can only be assessed by reference to past
52. ROBERT M. GATES, FROM THE SHADOWS 559 (1996). Irrespective of the broader
merits of such a scheme, however, one might expect a professional intelligence officer
such as Gates to be at least somewhat put off by a system that requires that so much
arduously obtained and jealously guarded information be shared with legislators:
[iun 1993, for example, 1512 meetings took place between legislators and
the CIA legislative liaison staff, as well as 154 one-on-one or small-group
meetings between legislators and the [Director of Central Intelligence];
26 congressional hearings with the DCI as a witness; 128 hearings with
other CIA witnesses; 317 other contacts with legislators, and 887
meetings and contacts with legislative staff-a 29 percent increase over
1992. This does not even take into consideration liaison contacts between
the other intelligence agencies and the Congress. In 1993, the CIA alone
provided 4,976 classified documents to legislators, along with 4,668
unclassified documents and 233 responses to constituency inquiries.
JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 54. The number of CIA briefings given specifically to the
Senate and House intelligence committees (or their staffs) from 1987 through 1990
reportedly averaged about 1000 per year. Id. at 115. As these statistics show, whether
or not Gates' accusation hits its mark, the present system of congressional oversight
imposes significant information-provision burdens upon the U.S. intelligence services.
53. 50 U.S.C. § 413a(1).
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congressional-executive practice" and through an ongoing
process of norm-development as lived out over time between the
branches of government.
Moreover, even had the statute been more specific, the principal
enforcement mechanism for these statutes is itself a bargaining
process. Since the U.S. federal courts have apparently never had (let
alone accepted) the opportunity to decide a case interpreting the
intelligence oversight statute,5 adjudicating disputes over such
terms has so far been left entirely to bargaining relationships
between the principal congressional and executive actors. 57 It is not a
54. As noted above, the 1980 legislation-which provides the basic skeleton of
current U.S. intelligence oversight law-aimed to codify intelligence reporting practice
as it had developed in practice since 1976. See SEN. REP. No. 96-730, at 3-4 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4192, 4194; id. at 5, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4195 ("The
executive branch and the intelligence oversight committees have developed over the
last four years a practical relationship based on comity and mutual understanding,
without confrontation. The purpose of [this legislation] is to carry this working
relationship forward into statute.").
55. Interestingly, Congress in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1980 also
seemed to contemplate that the meaning of key terms would be subject to
development over time according to future practice between the legislative and
executive branches. In discussing another key provision of the statute left undefined
by its text-the provision noting that reporting should be undertaken with due
concern for the protection of intelligence "sources and methods," see, e.g., Pub. L. No.
96-450, Title IV, § 407(b)(1), 94 Stat. 1981-the House Conference Report on the 1980
legislation seemed to contemplate leaving the specific requirements of the text at least
in some degree to future bargaining between the president and the oversight
committees:
[it is agreed... that the protection of intelligence sources and methods is not
to be used as a device to place one branch in a position of advantage. By
agreement both branches recognize that particular circumstances will require
the exercise of unusual care and discretion.... Consequently, over the past
four years the intelligence oversight committees have consulted with the ex-
ecutive branch to determine those areas where, on the basis of past
experience and a reasonable sense of future needs, there might be good and
sufficient reason to withhold information when some compelling reasons
arise ....
H. CoNF. REP. No. 96-1350 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4207, 4212.
56. Neither the 1980 oversight statute nor its 1991 revision, for example, have as
much as a single interpreting case listed in the U.S. Code Annotated.
57. The courts have not been entirely without interest in national security matters
that intersect domestic affairs, having involved themselves in such matters as the
adjudication of disputes over the relationship between the right to freedom of
expression embodied in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and "contract-
based" restrictions on former intelligence officers' ability to write "kiss-and-tell" books
on their trade-disputes in which judges have generally sided with the government.
See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (permitting government to
require, by contract, that all information be subject to prepublication review, and
permitting placement of profits from unreviewed materials in constructive trust);
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972) (permitting CIA to require
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system like most areas of domestic legislation, in other words, in
which recourse to an authoritative third-party decision-maker (i.e., a
court) may be had. Instead, it is one where the outcome of disputes
is left to politics, power, and expediency as played out between an
executive branch possessing the advantages of information and
initiative and a legislature possessing the power of the purse (and
perhaps also of publicity).5 The U.S. system of intelligence oversight
law has long been one that far outstrips foreign analogues in its
specificity and intrusiveness upon security functions traditionally
left to executive discretion. It is also a scheme that is inescapably
incomplete and that must be fleshed out in vital ways through
informal processes of negotiation and compromise as Congress and
the president live out the long-running iterated game relationship
that is the U.S. system of "separated organizations sharing public
authority."59
This excursion into U.S. intelligence oversight law illustrates
the more general importance of cooperative institutional mores in
national security oversight, even in a regulatory scheme character-
ized by an extraordinary degree of statutory codification 60 This, in
former employee, by contract, to submit publications for vetting prior to publication in
order to censor classified information). See generally Anthony Lewis, Introduction, in
VICTOR MARCHETrI & JOHN D. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE xi-
xvii (1983) (discussing "contract-based" censorship cases). Overall, the courts' level of
general interest in such things as intelligence oversight has been quite low, see, e.g.,
JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 46 (reproducing chart purporting to show trends in
"Legislative Review," "Executive Review," and "Judicial Review" of intelligence over
time, and indicating far lower average levels of concern on part of U.S. courts since
early 1970s), and their impact upon most intelligence activity has been minimal.
58. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 414(b) (prohibiting use of funds available to intelligence
agencies for "any intelligence or intelligence-related activity for which funds were
denied by the Congress"); id. § 414(c) (prohibiting use of funds on covert actions not
authorized through procedures set out in 50 U.S.C. § 414(b)).
59. See RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 26 (1980); see also ROBERT A.
PASTOR, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 55 (1980)
(describing Congress and executive branch as having "independent and active
influence in each other's decision-making arena").
60. Even during the height of the "Intelligence Wars" between the U.S. executive
and legislative branches in the mid-1970s, for example, eager congressional
investigators hot on the trail of various foreign and domestic intelligence scandals
were never quite willingfully to pull the veil off of the U.S. intelligence apparatus. See
JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 110. As John Ranelagh has recounted, it was understood
that even in the heat of dramatic investigations and the collapse of presidencies there
would remain some "secret place" that would "not [be] examined too closely. It
existed by implication rather than by outright statement. Specifics could be
spotlighted, but people were not willing to expand upon those specifics to the general
picture." JOHN RANELAGH, THE AGENCY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE CIA 599 (rev.
ed. 1987). Almost all of the secrets revealed by the endless congressional hearings
were "dead" (thus for the most part avoiding the direct compromise of ongoing
operations), and the "big questions" relating to the nature of secret activity within a
democracy "were never really addressed" in any explicit fashion. Id. at 598-99.
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turn, underscores the need to ensure that the basic architecture of
the national security system is very carefully constructed, so as to
make it possible for meaningful accountability to survive the infor-
mal interplay of institutional forces to which national security law
tends to leave its enforcement. If the oversight system is to serve
both liberty and efficiency in the pursuit of security, these bargain-
ing processes cannot occur between institutional actors having
greatly unequal power. A successful oversight scheme works more
as a prophylaxis than a cure-that is, it functions best when it pre-
vents wrongdoing by increasing the security services' incentives to
behave by making sure they know that at least someone is watching.
Though obviously eager to learn from other countries'
experiences with security oversight,6 the ANC's post-apartheid
South Africa has yet fully to flesh out how "the law as we live it"
will deal with such tensions and achieve this balance.62
b. The Role of the Courts
As the example of U.S. intelligence law illustrates, thV role of
the national courts in deciding security oversight issues is a crucial
determinant of the functional character that a country's security-
oversight scheme will assume. The degree to which national security
law issues are left to the sort of informal bargaining procedures
Even vis-i-vis Congress, therefore, one might say that the U.S. intelligence
services were permitted to remain at least somewhat "surrounded by... a mysterious
circle of mist... [or] protective and veiling cloud." FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE
ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE OF HISTORY FOR LIFE 40-41 (Peter Preuss trans.
1980). It seems to have been felt that too much transparency, even to congressional
overseers, was undesirable. Cf ELY, supra note 34 (arguing that one of the reasons that
the War Powers Resolution has failed more significantly to restrain U.S. presidential
power is that Congress usually has not wanted to play more than an advisory role in
decision-making relating to the deployment of U.S. troops overseas); JOHNSON I, supra
note 34, at 111 (quoting former Director of Central Intelligence William Colby to effect
that "Congress is informed to the degree that Congress wants to be informed").
61. See, e.g., House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 4151 (remarks of L.T.
Landers) (citing influence of American, Canadian, and Australian intelligence
oversight); id. Col 4149 (remarks of Kader Asmal) (discussing CIA scandals of 1970s
and creation of congressional intelligence-oversight committees in United States); id. at
4144 (remarks of M.F. Cassim) (apparently discussing alleged rivalry between CIA
and FBI in United States as obstacle to effective oversight); Senate Hansard 15 Nov
1994 Col 3040-41 (remarks of S.S. Makana) (noting that South Africa's oversight
legislation "looks like a workable solution. Broadly speaking, many countries of the
world are adopting this approach to intelligence and security. We still need to test it in
our part of the world").
62. South Africa's "Intelligence White Paper" refers to this balance as that between
"transparency and secrecy." REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, WHITE PAPER ON
INTELLIGENCE 1994, 5.5; see also House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 4130
(remarks of J. Nhlanhla) (discussing balance between "secrecy and transparency").
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described above will depend in part upon the role that courts
assume in adjudicating national security disputes-and in part upon
how the courts play such a role if they assume it. For example, in the
United States the actual meaning of the intelligence statutes is
unlikely to be adjudicated by any court-even where such statutes
are specific and fairly unambiguous 3 Moreover, where U.S. courts
do adjudicate "national-security" related controversies, they
nevertheless commonly defer to the political process" by declaring
such disputes to be "political questions,"6 finding them otherwise
injusticiable," or simply choosing to defer to the president in
national security and foreign affairs matters.67
63. See, e.g., supra note 56.
64. As Thomas Franck once put it, "[i]n foreign-relations and national-security
cases... judges proclaim the separation of powers but almost always decide in favor
of the government." THOMAS FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS:
DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 30 (1992).
65. The "political question" doctrine of U.S. constitutional law is most clearly
expressed in the case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (specifically listing areas of,
inter alia, international treaty termination, recognition of belligerency abroad, and
recognition of foreign governments as ones generally unsuitable for judicial
determination and which courts will therefore leave to adjudication through political
process); see also Local 2855, AFGE v. United States, 602 F.2d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 1979)
(arguing that "it would appear unseemly" for court to substitute its judgment for that
of executive in political or military affairs).
66. See, e.g., Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990) (rejecting
congressman's challenge to warmaking authority of president vis-a-vis Congress as
injusticiable until such time as Congress should vote to reject use of force and
president should go to war anyway). While not an indefensible legal position in the
abstract, it seems clear that in all but the most extraordinary political circumstances,
the district court's position in Dellums amounts to de facto deference to the president
on war powers issues.
67. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (deferring to
president in exercise of foreign affairs power summarily to return Haitian refugees
seized upon high seas without complying with U.S. immigration law); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (deferring to executive claim of national security
danger in case challenging internment of Japanese Americans on West Coast after
outbreak of war with Japan); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(upholding Hirabayashi holding against equal protection challenge); Jim McGee &
Brian Duffy, Someone to Watch Over Us, WASH. POST MAG. (June 23, 1996), at 9, 12
(noting that Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court established to provide judicial
oversight over intelligence-related domestic wiretapping has never once flatly rejected
a government wiretap application); Michael A. DiSabatino, Construction and
Application of "National Security" Exception to Fourth Amendment Search Warrant
Requirement, 39 A.L.R. FED. 646 (discussing courts' willingness to dispense with
customary Fourth Amendment restrictions on searches and seizures in "national
security" cases). As this author has noted elsewhere, with respect specifically to war
powers matters, "[slome very early cases were noticeably more solicitous of
congressional prerogatives," but "[als U.S. power and responsibility on the world
stage have grown, so has the judiciary's willingness to defer to the foreign affairs and
warmaking initiatives of the executive branch." Christopher A. Ford, War Powers as
We Live Them: Congressional-Executive Bargaining Under the Shadow of the War Powers
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For this reason, despite the considerable degree of codification
that has developed in U.S. national security law, this author has
elsewhere suggested that national security law issues in the United
States may be understood through an analytical framework
originally suggested by a group of legal scholars associated with
Yale Law School and known as the "New Haven School. 68
c. Law as "Social Process?"
These "New Haveners," the most prominent of whom were
Myers McDougal, Harold Lasswell, and (in the present generation)
Michael Reisman, "spelled out an approach to understanding law
not by its congruence with the terms of a text, but as an ongoing
process of decision-making, in which norms develop partly
independent of legal wording through the interaction of institutional
actors and their expectations of each other's reactions to future
events."69 Because law is thus "a process of authoritative decision,"70
it is distinguishable both from mere legal text and from "the
enormous legalistic babble of... politics."7' Law nevertheless relates
to legal text via a "continuous process" in which "expectations will
be sustained or changed by the continuation or abatement of streams
of communication about the authority and credible control
intentions of those whose support is needed for the norms'
efficacy." Moreover, that process is characterized by "a constant
stress for change and for stability by different groups and
individuals using the different power bases at their disposal."'
3
Finally, the "process constantly accommodates to basic dispositions
of authority and effective power. '74 In simpler terms, the New
Haven approach sees law as growing out of an informal process of
expectation-shaping bargaining relations that change continually
Resolution, 11 J.L. & POL. 609, 618 n.48 (1995) [hereinafter Ford III]; see also id. at 613
n.24 (citing cases illustrating judicial deference to executive branch in foreign affairs
and national security matters).
68. See generally Ford III, supra note 67, at 613-20.
69. Id. at 613-14; see generally Myers S. McDougal & Harold Lasswell, The
Identifcation and Appraisal of Diverse System of Public Order, in INT'L L. ESSAYS 15
(Myers S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, eds. 1981).
70. W. Michael Reisman, Law From the Policy Perspective, in INT'L L. ESSAYS, supra
note 69, at 1 [hereinafter Reisman I] ("[Law] is a process of making decisions in
conformity with the expectations of appropriateness of those who are politically
relevant: more concisely, a process of authoritative decision.").
71. W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 1981
A.S.I.L. PROC. 101, 102 [hereinafter Reisman II.
72. Id. at 113.
73. Id.
74. Reisman I, supra note 70, at 10.
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over time but in which can nonetheless be found characteristic
behavioral patterns and "rules."
While originally developed as a means of understanding the
otherwise somewhat perplexing character of international law, this
schema may be applied usefully to some domestic legal issues,
particularly where courts generally play little role in deciding
disputes between governmental actors and where the actual
behavior of participants is only incompletely regulated by (or
incompletely congruent with) legal texts.'
Whether or not this is so has considerable jurisprudential
significance. If a given body of law is best understood through a
"New Havener" analysis, it will be "important to use contextual and
consequentialist methods of inquiry rather than methods of textual
and logical derivation," because a process-based legal scheme is
"structurally different from [most areas of law in] developed
domestic systems and perforce uses a different method for assessing
lawfulness. Hence, the consequentialist mode, based on a thorough
contextual examination rather than a textual and rule-oriented
approach, should be employed."76 If, on the other hand, a body of
law more closely fits the traditional domestic paradigm of textually
derived rules interpreted by authoritative decision-makers who are
not the principal actors whose behavior is regulated thereby-that is,
in a system of codified law in which disputes are adjudicated by
disinterested third parties (i.e., courts)--questions of "legality" and
"illegality" will be determinable in more conventional ways.
d. Finding the Balance
In reality, of course, social systems need not (and do not)
choose between "textual" and "process-based" legal schemes on an
all-or-nothing basis. As illustrated by the example of U.S.
intelligence law, it is entirely possible to have a highly textualized
legal scheme in which crucial elements-e.g., the meaning of a
"significant" intelligence activity or the degree of detail required in
reporting "all" activities to Congress-are nonetheless left to
bargaining processes among participants in long-running
interrelated game relationships. Workable systems of national
security law will necessarily draw upon both approaches, for there
75. See, e.g., Ford III, supra note 67, at 617-19 (arguing that congressional-executive
disputes in United States over the "War Powers Resolution," 15 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48
(1988), may for these reasons be understood through "New Haven" framework).
76. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 36, at 141-42. Reisman and Baker do not discuss
the possibility that such an analysis might obtain in certain areas of domestic
jurisprudence, however, limiting their analysis in this respect only to "international
law." Id.
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is probably no other way to mediate the tension between generality
and specificity in security oversight law. Here again, the challenge is
to find the balance appropriate for both society and circumstance.
It is still too early to tell whether South Africa will follow the
United States either in the extent of its statutory development or in
its jurisprudential commitment, nonetheless, of national security
issues to resolution through a New Haven-style "legal process" of
legislative, executive, and sometimes popular interaction. South
Africa's post-apartheid statutory scheme has only recently taken
shape, and its courts have had little opportunity to develop (or
refuse to develop) a relevant body of case precedent on national
security issues. South African officials clearly understand that these
first formative years of democratic rule are vital, and anticipate that
"the checks and balances built into the new arrangements [will] not
allow easy reversion" to the bad habits acquired by the country's
security forces during the apartheid era.7 Nevertheless, they realize
that a functional system of respect for rights and adherence to law
"is not built up by having something on paper alone. Such a culture
depends on human beings and on our ability to translate that piece
of paper into reality."78
The years ahead, therefore, will determine both the structure
and character of the Republic's security oversight scheme. A crucial
variable in this equation will be whether South Africa's courts will
be willing to leave "national security" to New Haven-style dispute
resolution, will wish to seize for themselves a more significant role
in adjudicating such matters, or will attempt to steer some middle
course between these approaches. If the South African courts seek a
significant role in such matters, they will find little in U.S. precedent
(or in that of any other country) upon which to model their efforts. If
they do not, the basic architecture of South Africa's security
apparatus and its oversight institutions will become doubly
important, for the success or failure of security oversight in the post-
apartheid state would ride upon the highly contextual and
contingent power-equilibria between them.It is indisputable, however, that South Africa is likely to have
many opportunities to advance the development of its national
security law and policy, for even as these new institutions take
shape, the new government has come to face significant-though
not always very conventional-security challenges. It is to these
issues that we turn in the following section.
77. Senate Hansard 15 Nov 1994 Col 3011 (remarks of S.S. Makana).
78. Senate Hansard 28 Jun 1994 Col 202 (remarks of Dullah Omar).
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B. South Africa's Challenges
1. Third World Problems
To no small extent, South Africa faces many of the characteristic
problems of a developing country, not the least of which is the deep
poverty of the majority of its non-White population, both in rural
areas and in the sprawling urban townships. Under apartheid, vast
pools of inexpensive labor formed on the fringes of South Africa's
residentially race-segregated industrial centers. Whether with
respect to providing employment, health care, public services, or
housing, the ANC government faces enormous challenges in
providing for the needs of its constituents and in meeting the great
expectations non-White South Africans have had for the post-
apartheid era. Like the governments of many developing countries,
however, the ANC also faces considerable resource constraints.
Unable fully to fund its ambitious Reconstruction and Development
Program9 ("RDP"), the ANC is acutely conscious of the need for
fiscal austerity in cultivating a favorable business climate that will
enlist foreign capital and expertise in the cause of South African
economic development. This combination of great poverty and
underdevelopment in large segments of South African society and
sharply limited financial resources available for expenditure on
development projects both contributes to the country's internal
security problems and ensures that domestic development projects
will have to compete with the security forces for a share of South
Africa's small fiscal pie.&
79. For accounts of the ANC's ambitious agenda after the April 1994 national
balloting, see Drusilla Menaker, Bringing Racial Fairness to S. Africa Economy to Prove
Difficult, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 6, 1994, at 5A, and Danielle DeBruyn, The
Road to Democracy: South Africa's Democratic Elections, NAT'L B. ASS'N MAG. May/June
1994, at 9. In the words of one observer, the ANC's sweeping promises of "Peace,
Freedom and a better life for all" in the political campaigning that led up to its victory
in the 1994 ballot, while arguably "appropriate for a liberation movement,"
nonetheless "verge[d] on the utopian" and were "questionable for a political party."
D.S.K. Culhane, No Easy Talk: South Africa and the Suppression of Political Speech, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 896, 942 (1994).
80. The South African defense budget has already been cut roughly in half since
1989, declining from roughly 20 billion rand (some $4.5 billion) to only about 10 billion
rand in 1996 ($2.6 billion)-principally in order to free up funding for social
programs. See Joe Modise, DEF. NEWS, Aug. 5-11, 1996, at 22; see also South Africa Cuts
Defence Budget, JANE'S DEFENCE '97, at 16. It appeared, by early 1996, that this period
of defense retrenchment was ending see, e.g., Helmoed-Romer Heitman, $2.9 Billion
Defence Budget Marks End to Decline, JANE'S DEF. WKLY., Mar. 25, 1995, at 5, but in
April 1996, President Nelson Mandela announced that the defense budget would have
to be cut once more. See Mandela Pledges Support for Peace-Keeping, Regional Defence,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library,
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South Africa also has an ugly history of violent conflict
between races and between particular ethnic groups, some of
which have acquired specific political party affiliations and
carried their antagonisms into the governmental structure of the
country.8 This history of conflict, of course, has also produced an
awkward situation-one not unfamiliar to other regional
developing countries such as Zimbabwe and Namibia-in which
groups formerly engaged in a bitter armed struggle against each
other now must co-exist peaceably not only within the same
political system but also within the same governmental structure
including the security apparatus itself.
Particularl X given South Africa's exploding rates of
violent crime and increasing problems with official
BBCSWB File. The competition of defense funding with social programs is likely only
to become more acute in the next few years, as the SANDF faces considerable "block
obsolescence" as aging equipment which had helped the former SADF survive the
years of the anti-apartheid arms embargo finally reaches the end of its already over-
extended service life and requires replacement. See Heitman, supra, at 5 (recounting
urgency of upcoming replacement of SANDF Impala jet trainers, C-160 Transall
transport aircraft, Mirage F-1AZ fighters, Alouette III helicopters, G-5 howitzers, Ton
class minesweeping vessels, Daphne class submarines, coastal strike vessels, the Ratel
infantry combat vehicle, Cheetah fighters, and C-130B Hercules transport aircraft).
One of the SANDF's top purchasing priorities, the acquisition of new corvettes and
submarines for the South African Navy, has been repeatedly delayed because of
funding difficulties and has teetered on the edge of cancellation for the past two years.
See SAN Must Buy to Meet Its Objectives, Says Chief, JANE'S DEF. WKLY., Nov. 20, 1996,
at 18.
81. Antagonism between the predominantly Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party ("IFP")
and the more multiracial ANC-long encouraged by the security forces of the White
minority regime-resulted in a brutal war of attrition and intimidation in which as
many as 14,000 lives were lost in the townships around Johannesburg and in the
mountainous province of Natal between 1990 and 1994. See, e.g., Manby, supra note
10, at 40. Led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, former head of the semi-independent
Zulu "homeland" of KwaZulu, the IFP won a parliamentary majority in the new
province of KwaZulu-Natal (and nearly 11% of the national vote) in the April 1994
elections. Id. at 46 n.58. Meanwhile, the National Party itself (the White-dominated
party that ran South Africa's apartheid-era government from 1948) managed to win a
parliamentary majority in the Western Cape province. See Ellmann, supra note 4, at 6
n.2. Even South Africa's "Coloureds," their distinct sense of group identity cultivated
for years by the apartheid government and their collective resentments fueled today
by the fear that the ANC will ignore them in favor of its more numerous darker-
skinned African constituents, are becoming not an insignificant anti-government
political force. See generally Ford I, supra note 2, at 1985-90; see also Angus Shaw,
Mixed-Race Protesters Run Riot in S. Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at A15 (describing
"the worst racial unrest since President Nelson Mandela defeated White leader
Frederick W. de Klerk came to power in 1994" as stemming from fears of "poor people
of mixed-race descent... [that) they have been treated unfairly by the new Black
leaders").
82. Though politically motivated violence in South Africa-e.g., killings occurring
in running battles between ANC and Inkatha supporters in Natal and the townships
around Johannesburg-declined "almost miraculously" after the April 1994 elections,
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corruption," this constellation of problems poses great
security challenges for the young ANC government-
problems which, in many respects, South Africa shares with
other developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In a
country where the majority of citizens have only recently been
offered any experience with modern democratic life, and with
a legal and political system that is, still trying to find its feet,
meeting the twin challenges of security and development
while preserving liberty may not be easy.
around Johannesburg-declined "almost miraculously" after the April 1994 elections,
ordinary violent crime in South Africa has risen precipitously, giving the country "one
of the worst crime rates in the world." Gavin Cawthra, From a Force to a Service: The
Police in the New South Africa, JANE'S INTEL. REV./SPECIAL REP. No. 3, July 1994, at 19,
19; see also Melanie Cheary, Crime Is Big Business in South Africa, Reuters Financial
Wire, March 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, REUFIN File (recounting
crime statistics in South Africa, including data showing that more than 50 people are
killed each day); Patrick Laurence, Vigilantes Signal Loss of Faith in ANC Action to Beat
Crime, Irish Times, Aug. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File
(noting that violent crime deaths in South Africa are now twice as common as motor
vehicle deaths); Sudarsan Raghavan, Africa Puts its Money Where its Fear Is, Bus.
WEEK, July 15, 1996, at 52 (recounting common occurrence of "carjacking" in South
Africa's Gauteng Province, where 9500 such crimes occurred in 1995); Who Exactly Is
in Command?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1994 [hereinafter Who Is in Command?], at 48
(noting that South African murder rate is 21/2 times that of United States). Particularly
in the wake of recent high-profile crimes such as those occurring against members of
South Africa's foreign diplomhatic community, see, e.g., ANC Says Embassy Crime Must
Be Seen in Context of Safety for All, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 27, 1996,
available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File; Anton Ferreira, Diplomats Fall Victim
to South African Crime Wave, Reuters Financial Wire, May 22, 1996, available in LEXIS,
World Library, REUFIN File, these dramatic and worsening crime problems have led
the private-security and home-security industry to become one of South Africa's
healthiest economic sectors. See Anton Ferreira, Business Booms in S. African Security
Sector, Reuters Financial Wire, Mar. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
REUFIN File.
83. Not the least disturbing of such reported corruption in South Africa is that said
to have developed within the ranks of the police service-the service whose job it is
(or should be) to help combat such evils. See, e.g., Shaun McCarthy, Muslim Vigilantes
or Islamic Extremism in South Africa?, JANE'S INTEL. REV., Dec. 1996, at 569, [hereinafter
McCarthy, Vigilantes] (noting that "the police are hampered in dealing with [drug
trafficking in South Africa] because of the levels of corruption within their own ranks"
and that "[m]any officers are alleged to be on the payroll of the drug barons"); Official
Seeks Tighter Weapons Control in Security Forces, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
June 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File (quoting Deputy
Minister of Intelligence Services Joe Nhlanhla as calling for tighter controls on
weapons within security forces in order to reduce illegal weapons trafficking); S.
African Police Involved in Gunrunning: Government Minister, Agence France Presse, Dec.
5, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File (quoting Mpumalanga Province
Minister of Safety and Security to the effect that at least four senior members of police
"firearms unit" in town of Nelspruit had been implicated in arms smuggling ring
bringing illegal weapons from Mozambique into Johannesburg and into KwaZulu-
Natal).
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This said, however, South Africa faces nothing like the
wholesale "collapse" of state functional and political legitimacy that
has characterized some post-colonial regimes in sub-Saharan
Africa." Despite its considerable problems, South Africa has a long-
standing separate national identity, a highly sophisticated
institutional and financial infrastructure, and a large and still quite
vibrant economy. With respect to civil-military relations, South
Africa does not seem to face significant danger from the notorious
"predisposition of African military 6lites to usurp the reigns of
government after a number of years of declining economic
activity.' ' Whereas for many post-colonial African states "the
military was often the only administratively competent institution in
an undeveloped country," making it "neither surprising nor
especially alarming that [when economic or political crises
developed] the man on horseback should intervene," 6 South Africa
has the good fortune to possess highly sophisticated institutions in
many areas of government and the private sector, reducing the
military's temptation to intervene and its likelihood of success in
doing so. More generally, at least for the moment,
South Africa is already markedly different from other
countries which have emerged from tyranny and have
retained oppressive laws from the past, later using them to
get rid of opposition under the fig leaf of "national
security." In South Africa's case, the laws from the old
days have been dumped and the [government] shows no
sign of wanting to resuscitate them-not even with the
leading partners [in that government], the African National
Congress, by far in the majority with close to two-thirds of
electoral support.87
Though sharing many problems of underdevelopment with its sub-
Saharan compatriots, South Africa nonetheless finds itself far better
off than most (and perhaps all) other states on the continent.
In fact, the predominant impression for many observers of
South African affairs-myself included-is less despair at the con-
siderable challenges that remain than a happy astonishment at the
84. See generally Makau wa Mutua, Putting Humpty-Dumpty Back Together Again:
The Dilemmas of the Post-Colonial African State, 21 BROOK. L. INT'L J. 505, 509 & 511-13
(1995).
85. Greg Mills, The Armed Forces in the New South Africa, JANE'S INTEL.
REV./SPECIAL REP. NO.3, July 1994 [hereinafter Mills I], at 7, 9.
86. Paul Bracken, Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations, in CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS, supra note 34, at 145, 154 (emphasis deleted).
87. Benjamin Pogrund, South Africa's New Openness in Danger of Being Squandered,
WORLDPAPER, Mar. 1996, at 1.
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Republic's ability to achieve so much so fast, and so successfully. 8
After all, as one review of South African affairs put it,
[e]ven as South Africans were going to the polls in [April]
1994, there was a widespread assumption that bloodshed
on a large scale would be unavoidable. It seemed likely
that right-wing White supremacist groups would attempt a
coup, or perhaps, that the already violent face-off between
the newly dominant ANC and the [Inkatha Freedom Party]
would develop into a full-scale civil war in Natal.8
Blessedly, such ominous expectations of civil war or a "preemptive
coup d'etat"9 appear to have been confounded.
2. First World Problems
In certain important respects, South Africa resembles a First
World country much more than it resembles its less-developed
neighbors to the north. In most ways, it must be said, this is a
distinct advantage. In terms of security oversight issues, however,
this presents the Republic with some additional challenges as it
attempts to define the role of its security forces both domestically
and in promoting development and stability in southern Africa as a
whole. Intriguingly, both in South Africa's position of economic and
military predominance in southern Africa9 and in the nature of its
debates over the appropriate structure and role for the armed forces
in this contemporary security environment, South Africa perhaps
resembles no developed country more than it does the United States.
88. See, e.g., South Africa: Review 1996, Quest Economics Database, Africa Review
World of Information, May 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File
[hereinafter Review 19961 (noting how remarkable South Africa's transition has been
and discussing factors responsible for this fact).
89. South Africa: Review 1995, Quest Economics Database, Africa Review World of
Information, Sept. 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
90. See William R. Cotter, Book Review: National Legal Systems and Private Dispute
Resolution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1988) (quoting Patrick O'Meara and N. Brian
Winchester appearing in THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUAGMIRE: IN SEARCH OF A PEACEFUL
PATH TO DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM 113 (S. Prakash Sethi, ed. 1987)).
91. See, e.g., Simon Baynham, U.S. Security Interests in Africa, JANE'S INTEL.
REV./POINTER, Nov. 1996, at 12 ("[Tihe [Republic of South Africa], as the regional
hegemon, has the most powerful and professional armed forces in sub-Saharan
Africa."); see also Helmoed-Roemer Heitman, Reshaping South Africa's Armed Forces
[hereinafter Heitman, Reshaping], JANE'S INTEL. REV./SPECIAL REP. No. 3, July 1994, at
10, 16 (describing South Africa's role in offering training assistance to regional air
forces as that of allowing other African aviators to "train with the most proficient air
force on the continent").
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a. Uncertain International Responsibilities
Like the United States at the dawn of the post-Cold War era,
South Africa clearly faces no immediate foreign military challenges.
As Defense Minister Joe Modise has admitted, "[t]here is no
identifiable threat to [South Africa's] security... ,9' As is the case
with the U.S. armed forces, however, at the same time that the
SANDF faces declining military budgets and personnel
retrenchments as a result of this otherwise congenial threatlessness,
it also faces increasing calls to become involved in international
deployments such as peacekeeping operations. This places demands
upon it quite different from those arising out of the more traditional
military missions for which it has hitherto been trained.93
Regional security operations are increasingly becoming a focus
of South African defense planning, particularly now that the
Southern African Development Community ("SADC")-the
contemporary incarnation of the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference ("SADCC"), an organization originally
founded to encourage cooperation among Black-ruled Southern
African governments in developing "countermanding responses" to
92. Joe Modise, interview, DEF. NEWS, Aug. 5-11, 1996 [hereinafter Joe Modise], at
22; see also Helmoed-Romer Heitman, Christopher F. Foss & Carol Reed, Facing up to
New Realities, JANE'S DEF. WKLY., Apr. 29, 1995, at 23 ("The present strategic situation
is that there is no immediate, near-term or even long-term military threat to South
Africa."); Mills I, supra note 85, at 8 ("There is no longer an external military threat to
speak of."); Martin Navias, South Africa's Security Challenges, JANE'S INTEL.
REV./SPECIAL REP. No. 3 [hereinafter Navias I], at 4, 6 ("The only security threats
emanating from [South Africa's neighbors] from Pretoria's point of view concern the
inflow of migrants and weaponry."). Among South Africa's neighbors, Botswana has
recently (and for somewhat mysterious reasons) embarked upon a significant military
buildup. See, e.g., Simon Baynham, Arms Spree in Southern Africa, JANE'S INTEL. REV.,
Sept. 1996, at 12; Gumisai Mutume, Neighbors Uneasy as Botswana Shops for Arms, Inter
Press Service, June 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, INPRES File. This
Botswanan "arms spree," however, does not seem to concern the South African
defense ministry. Indeed, if anything, recent South African comments suggest an
interest in encouraging neighbors to augment their military capabilities. See infra note
105.
93. For a discussion of the U.S. dilemma in this respect, see, for example, Don M.
Snider & Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, The Current State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations:
An Introduction, in CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, supra note 34, at 1, 10 (noting that
"[riapid force reductions and demobilization, in conjunction with America's post-cold
war foreign policy, are also creating tensions" as international community looks to
U.S. "to assist in resolving conflicts around the world" while "the U.S. military lacks
the budget and force structure as well as the political mandate to meet these
expectations"), and Curtis L. Gilroy, Civil-Military Operations and the Military Mission:
Differences Between Military and Influential Elites, in CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, supra
note 34, at 68, 68 (contrasting traditional warfighting role of U.S. military with "[a]
nontraditional interpretation [which] sees the mission as broader... [and argues that]
the armed forces can (and should) be used for missions other than war").
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the apartheid state's "war of attrition against its neighbors"-has
dedicated itself to developing a "community-based approach on
matters of security" in Southern Africa., principally under the
leadership of South Africa. According to South African Defense
Minister Joe Modise, it is the Republic's "ultimate goal" to see
Southern Africa develop a common defense policy.97 Many other
countries are eager to see the SANDF acquire a prominent role in
peacekeeping and other policing activities too, not only in Southern
Africa but throughout sub-Saharan Africa. The Clinton
Administration in the United States, for example, has strongly
encouraged South Africa to become involved in plans for an all-
African peacekeeping force organized under the auspices of the
Organization for African Unity, and South Africa's neighbors have
94. P. Kenneth Kiplagat, Jurisdictional Uncertainties and Integration Processes in
Africa: The Need for Harmony, 4 TUL. J. OF INT'L COMP. L. 43, 58 & n.80 (citing Derrick
Chitala, The Political Economy of SADCC and Imperialism's Response, in SADCC:
PROSPECTS FOR DISENGAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 13, 32
(Samir Amin et al. eds., 1987)); see also id. at 46-47 (discussing SADCC).
95. SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, communique of June 28, 1996, §
4.2.1(m), in Southern African Development Group Sets up Politics, Defence, Security Body,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library,
BBCSWB file.
96. The SADC "Organ on Politics, Defense and Security" has established an "Inter-
State Defence and Security Committee" ("IDSC"), of which South African Defense
Minister Joe Modise became the chairman in January 1996. South Africa's leadership
role on the IDSC's various subcommittees was also pronounced: Gen. George
Meiring, the head of the SANDF, was picked to chair the Defence Sub-Committee;
Vice Admiral Robert Simpson-Anderson, the head of the South African Navy, headed
the Standing Maritime Committee; and a representative from the South African Air
Force headed the Flight Safety Sub-Functionary group of the Standing Aviation
Committee. See Helmoed-Romer Heitman, The Jane's Interview, JANE'S DEF. WKLY.,
Jan. 3, 1996 [hereinafter Heitman, Jane's Interview].
97. Heitman, Jane's Interview, supra note 96 (quoting Joe Modise); see also Mike
Hough, Debate on National Security, JANE'S INTEL. REV./POINTER, Dec. 1, 1996, at 12
(noting that the draft "National External Security Strategy" document circulated in late
1996 identified the "promot[ion] [of] regional security" and "contribut[ing] to
international peace, stability and security" as two of the four most important goals of
South African defense policy). So far, this emphasis upon a close involvement in
cooperative regional security matters has produced a plan to use South African Navy
("SAN") ships and South African Air Force ("SAAF') aircraft to patrol regional littoral
areas against arms and drugs smuggling-a project in which it hopes shortly to enlist
other regional military forces. See S. Africa to Conduct Anti-Crime Air, Sea Patrols,
Reuters World Service, May 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, REUWLD File.
98. See, e.g., Neighbourhood Watch in Southern Africa, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 1994, at 51;
Peacekeeping in Africa: By Africans?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 1994 [hereinafter Peacekeeping
by Africans?], at 43, 44. Indeed, Washington's offer in 1995 to give South Africa three
surplus U.S. C-130 transport aircraft and an undetermined number of P-3 maritime
patrol aircraft was apparently designed to help South Africa better undertake regional
security missions. U.S. officials also expressed interest in organizing joint training and
peacekeeping exercises with the SANDF. See USA Offers South Africa Three C-130s and
P3s, JANE'S DEF. WKLY., Aug. 19, 1995, at 14.
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also repeatedly urged the Republic to undertake more regional
security missions.9 South Africa is increasingly "expected to play a
more active role in the region,"100 and will be "hard put to avoid
involvement in regional security operations. '0 '
At the same time, however, the SANDF is desperately short of
funding even for its conventional missions,' 02 and is presently in a
poor position to sustain roles abroad that require new equipment,
training, and capabilities.lu Like the contemporary United States,
therefore, South Africa is consequently "divided about the
dangers-and costs--of sending peacekeeping troops abroad to try
to end long-simmering disputes in other lands."' 4 President
Mandela has voiced his principled approval for the Republic's
participation in peacekeeping deployments,0'5 but has carefully
cautioned that such activities will only be undertaken "where we
have got the capacity"--as understood in light of South Africa's
99. See, e.g., Mtimkulu, supra note 26 (recounting pressure on South Africa by
regional organizations to help form African peacekeeping force); Heitman, Jane's
Interview, supra note 96 (quoting Joe Modise describing neighbors' efforts to encourage
South African involvement in regional maritime patrolling); Helmoed-Romer
Heitman, South Africa Wary of "Regional Policeman" Role, JANE'S DEF. WKLY., July 24,
1996 [hereinafter Heitman, South Africa wary], at 14 (recounting efforts by Angola,
Mozambique, and Tanzania to encourage greater South African involvement in
regional security operations); Peacekeeping by Africans?, supra note 98 (recounting
discussions by eight regional countries about possibility of regional peacekeeping
force).
100. Interview with Joe Modise, in Def. Min. Discusses SANDF Transformation,
Periscope Daily Defence News Capsules, Nov. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, Market
Library, IACNWS File.
101. Heitman, Foss & Reed, supra note 92, at 23.
102. See generally supra note 80.
103. See, e.g., Heitman, Jane's Interview, supra note 96; Heitman, South Africa Wary,
supra note 99; Mtimkulu, supra note 26 (also noting relative inexperience of South
African troops in peacekeeping missions in contrast to those of neighboring states
such as Zimbabwe with recent experience in United Nations deployments, especially
given SADF's traditional experience in using maximum force against anti-apartheid
guerrillas).
104. Mtimkulu, supra note 26. Mtimkulu also notes the similarity between
"rancorous discussions" in both the United States and South Africa "about how best to
stem the influx of illegal immigrants who flock across the border in search of a better
life."
105. Interestingly, with respect to recent fighting between Rwandan and Zairian
forces, Mandela displayed an instinct even for unilateral intervention in African crises.
For a while, the South African government appeared poised to intervene in support of
Rwanda, reportedly dispatching arms to Rwanda for "self-defence" purposes and
placing a "task force" on alert for possible military intervention. The shipment of arms
to Rwanda was supposedly undertaken by Mandela against the advice of his
intelligence staff. See Peter Younghusband, Mandela May Make Zaire His Vietnam,
DAILY MAIL, Nov. 4, 1996, at 13.
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unique" financial circumstances. Despite these signs of caution,
however, South African military officials announced in February
1997 that the Republic had finished training two battalions for
international peacekeeping duties, and would be prepared to
contribute up to 1000 soldiers to any such force.
107
b. Domestic Military Roles
Nor is the debate over the proper role and structure of the
SANDF limited to regional or other international missions and
responsibilities. Rather, like the post-Cold War U.S. military, the
SANDF is under considerable pressure to increase its involvement
in domestic affairs."8 Though some commentators feel that South
106. Mandela Affirms South Africa Intends to Participate in UN Peacekeeeping Missions,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
BBCSWB File; see also Mandela Pledges Support for Peace-Keeping, Regional Defence, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library,
BBCSWB File (quoting Mandela remarks to SANDF Day Parade that Republic must be
prepared to participate in peacekeeping "when conditions permit"). It is also a pillar
of South Africa's contemporary regional strategy to encourage other regional
governments to augment their own capability to participate in such operations (so as
to relieve South Africa of a disproportionate burden), see Simon Baynharn, Arms Spree
in Southern Africa, JANE'S INTEL. REV., Sept. 1996, at 12, as well as to emphasize
"preventative diplomacy" so as to keep problems from escalating to the point where
troop deployments might be needed. Mtimkulu, supra note 26 (citing Deputy Director
of Foreign Affairs Abdul Minty). Perhaps trying to reconcile South Africa's regional
dominance with its considerable interests in self-restraint, one government minister
proclaimed in 1994 that "[olur power in the subcontinent is so great that we must
learn some humility." House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 4129 (remarks of
Kader Asmal).
107. Greg Mills, Preparation for Peacekeeping, JANE'S SENTINEL/POINTER REV., Apr.
19 97, at 11.
108. For a discussion of such pressures upon the U.S. armed forces, see Gilroy, supra
note 93, at 71-73 (discussing contemporary calls for greater use of U.S. military in
domestic affairs) (citing, inter alia, BRIAN OHLINGER, PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT: A
SEARCH FOR RELEVANCE? (1992), and SAM NUNN, DOMESTIC MISSIONS FOR THE ARMED
FORCES (1993)); Douglas Johnson & Stephen Metz, An American Civil-Military
Relations: A Review of the Recent Literature, in CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, supra note
34, at 201, 218 (noting that some observers predict "a melding of law enforcement and
traditional military functions in response to 'gray area' threats, the privatization of
security, and new forms of high technology terrorism") (citing MARTIN VAN CREVELD,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 192-227 (1991) and Steven Metz, Insurgency after the
Cold War, in 5 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 63, 71-73 (1994)); James F. Mclsaac &
Naomi Verdugo, Civil-Military Relations: A Domestic Perspective, in CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS, supra note 34, at 21, 31-32 (arguing that "[wlith domestic conditions in
many areas deteriorating, the tendency for some Americans actively to solicit ways for
the military to get involved in non-war-fighting domestic tasks seems to be growing"
and that "pressures... will increasingly be brought to bear on the armed forces to
expand their participation in civil works"); Snider & Carlton-Carew, supra note 93, at
9, 13 (noting that "[n]ow, to an unanticipated degree, [the U.S.] military is being asked
to forsake or subordinate its former specialization and instead to... assist in
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Africa has yet to articulate a coherent, integrated national security
strategy," the South African defense ministry seems to have
developed an extremely broad conception of its contemporary
mission. According to the long-awaited Defence White Paper
presented to parliament in May 1996, the ANC's conception of
"national security" has been "broadened to incorporate political,
economic, social and environmental matters."'1I As presently
envisioned, "national security" threats are now seen to encompass a
range of "developmental non-military insecurities" ranging from
stemming cross-border refugee flows and arms smuggling"' to
"appeas[ing] external investor perceptions.""2 In the words of
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, "the security of our peoples must be
defined within... the context of their development and
prosperity.',1 3 The object of the Republic's plans for regional
security cooperation is to create the conditions of stability
necessary for economic development.14 Given South Africa's
pressing need for domestic development, the army's perceived
"ability to deploy skilled personnel and equipment to support
infrastructural programmes,"" '5 and the already considerable
involvement of SANDF troops in supporting the deployment of
police units to quell domestic unrest in South Africa's still-volatile
townships, 6 there will be much pressure to keep the focus of
SANDF activity "decidedly domestic in nature.",
117
addressing domestic problems" and that "in a dramatically changed international
environment that poses no direct external threat to U.S. security, the public and their
elected representatives are expecting the [U.S.] military to participate in numerous
'nontraditional' missions such as disaster relief operations and support for other
domestic needs").
109. See, e.g., Hough, supra note 97, at 12.
110. Defence White Paper Tabled in Parliament, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
May 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File [hereinafter Defence
White Paper].
111. Mills I, supra note 85, at 8; see also Navias I, at 6; Heitman, Reshaping, supra note
91, at 18 (quoting the comments of Defense Minister Modise on need to fight cross-
border crime and drug-trafficking).
112. Greg Mills, A Formalised SADC Defence Agreement?, JANE'S SENTINEL/POINTER,
Oct. 1996, at 13; see also Heitman, Foss & Reed, supra note 92, at 23 (noting that
"[niobody will invest in countries plagued by bandits, pirates, smugglers and
warlords"); Joe Modise, supra note 92, at 22 (quoting Defense Minister Modise that "no
right-thinking person is going to invest in a country that is not militarily strong enough
to defend those investments").
113. Quoted by Helmoed-Romer Heitman, Southern African States Pave Way for Co-
operative security, JANE'S DEF. WKLY., Sept. 23, 1995, at 19.
114. Id. (quoting Defense Minister Modise).
115. Heitman, Reshaping, supra note 91, at 11.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 227-34.
117. Navias I, supra note 92, at 4.
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c. The SANDF 's New Roles and Civil-Military Relationsm
Other than perhaps exacerbating the Defense Ministry's budget
crisis and distracting the SANDF from its efforts to bring its newly
integrated military services up to their traditional level of
proficiency in conventional and counter-insurgency warfighting,
South Africa's embarkation upon nontraditional international
military missions is likely to have few domestic consequences as
long as the SANDF avoids becoming embroiled in a particularly
costly foreign campaign. It may not be possible to say the same,
however, about the South African military's growing role at home.
Some scholars of civil-military relations have warned of the
potential dangers inherent in giving professional military services
significant domestic responsibilities distinct from their traditional
mission of securing a country's territory against external aggression.
Such a "growing internal focus," it has been argued, "could
undermine civilian control of the military"" 9 by making soldiers
"something other than warriors" and encouraging their creeping
involvement in making the domestic policies in which they become
increasingly important participants. 20 Others have focused less
specifically upon this erosion of the distinction between military and
political affairs, but still worry about the consequences for civilian
supremacy in countries with large militaries which are suddenly
deprived of external threats12'-also circumstances in which South
Africa certainly finds itself today.
118. In South African usage, as elsewhere, "civil-military relations" is understood to
relate to "the distribution of power and influence between the armed services and the
civilian authority." REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE (1996), at
9.
119. Michael C. Desch, U.S. Civil-Military Relations in a Changing International Order,
in CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, supra note 34, at 166, 176.
120. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Melancholy Reunion: A Report from the Future on the
Collapse of Civil-Military Relations in the United States, Address given at U.S. Air
Force Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Aug. 21, 1996, at 3; see also Snider &
Carlton-Carew, supra note 93, at 7 (warning that U.S. military "which has found itself
playing increasingly major roles in nontraditional operations, such as peacekeeping
and domestic disaster and humanitarian relief, presumes it is entitled to help develop
the policies that affect its status and competency"). Col. Dunlap has become
prominently associated with this thesis through his deliberately provocative sketches
of a hypothetical future in which, spurred on by such developments, the U.S. military
ultimately mounts a coup against its civilian masters. See Charles Dunlap, The Origins
of the American Military Coup of 2012, 22 PARAMETERS 14 (Winter 1992-93); Mclsaac &
Verdugo, supra note 108, at 31 (discussing Dunlap's thesis); Feaver, supra note 37, at
119 (same).
121. Desch, supra note 119, at 167, 169-70 (arguing that "civil-military relations are
most stable in states whose militaries have significant external missions," noting that
"the greatest danger to civilian control" is likely to come when the state is left with "a
large military force but no external mission," and observing that the countries with the
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In this respect, the ANC government's contemporary
articulation of a such an all-inclusive conception of its "national
security" mission122 should be somewhat worrisome. It is perhaps
worth remembering that it was just such an all-encompassing
conception of "national security"-also developed within the South
African Ministry of Defense-that helped produce the corruption of
South African civil-military relations and erosion of security force
accountability under the National Security Management System
("NSMS") of the 1980s. The NSMS was the brainchild of former
National Party prime minister and state president Pieter W. Botha,
who established the NSMS scheme as the institutional incarnation of
the "Total National Strategy" ("TNS") he developed while serving
during the mid-1970s as Defense Minister in the cabinet of Prime
Minister John Vorster. Convinced that communist-inspired and
Soviet-directed anti-apartheid forces had mounted a "total
onslaught" against South Africa, 23 it was P.W. Botha's ambition to
organize a "total strategy" in response-one that would coordinate
South Africa's reactions on every conceivable front: military,
political, economic, ideological, and social. 24This all-embracing idea
naturally elicited an all-embracing institutional response in the form
of the NSMS, erasing in the process all notions of security
accountability and the separation of national affairs into military
and civilian spheres. The ambition to organize a dirigiste response
across the socio-political spectrum led necessarily towards the
notoriously heavy-handed authoritarianism of late-apartheid South
Africa.
This ugly history suggests why it is worrying that the
contemporary South African security forces have adopted such a
worst records of civil-military relations in the developing world are those "that faced
few external threats but many internal ones").
122. See supra text accompanying notes 110, 112-114.
123. See, e.g., House of Assembly Hansard 21 Mar 1980 Col 3321 (remarks of P.W.
Botha) ("South Africa finds itself the target of a three-pronged onslaught... calculated
to bring about the downfall of this state .... The main object of the onslaught on the
Republic of South Africa, under the guidance of the planners in the Kremlin, is to
overthrow this state and create chaos instead, so that the Kremlin can establish its
hegemony here.").
124. See, e.g., REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, WHITE PAPER ON
DEFENCE 5 (1977) (describing need to coordinate "on an interdepartmental basis"
numerous "aspects of national security" from intelligence operations to natural
resource management to religious and cultural affairs, to telecommunications). The
idea of a "total strategy," however, was not original to P.W. Botha's defense ministry
but rather appears to have derived from Andre Beaufre's 1974 articulation of a
national endeavor integrating military, political, economic, moral, and ideological
elements. See Douglas Johnson & Steven Mets, American Civil-Military Relations: A
Review of the Recent Literature, in CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, supra note 34, at 204
(citing ANDRE BEAUFRE, STRATEGY FOR TOMORROW ix (1974)).
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broad working definition of "national security." As we have seen,
Joe Modise's Defence White Paper embodies a conception of
"security" elastic enough to include a variety of "developmental
non-military insecurities" ranging from stemming cross-border
refugee flows and arms smuggling" to "appeas[ing] external
investor perceptions. , 126 The situation is much the same with respect
to South Africa's post-apartheid intelligence services. Though
existing legislation sharply divides the domestic and the external
realms into separate spheres of institutional responsibility-the
former being the responsibility of the National Intelligence Agency
("NIA") and the latter that of the South African Secret Service
1 7
("SASS")---"national security" is viewed as encompassing
everything "associated with and essential to the 2 uality of life,
freedom, justice, prosperity, and development."'  As Deputy
Minister of Intelligence Services Joe Nhlanhla put it in 1994, for
example,
[a]gainst the background of failed traditional national
security approaches, policy-makers around the world have
begun to seek new models to inform the notion of national
security. In terms of the new approaches, national security
is defined as the most desired state of a nation's political,
economic and social well being and not merely the absence
125. Mills I, supra note 85, at 8; see also Navias I, at 6; Heitman, Reshaping, supra note
91, at 18 (quoting Modise).
126. Greg Mills, Formalised SADC Defence Agreement?, JANE'S SENTINEL/POINTER,
Oct. 1996, at 13.
127. See § 2(1)(a) of National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 (giving NIA
responsibility for "domestic" intelligence collection and analysis); id. § 2(2)(a) (giving
SASS similar responsibility for "foreign" intelligence).
The NIA, SASS, the criminal intelligence arm of the Police, and the SANDF's
Intelligence Division are apparently the only South African intelligence services. The
South African Constitution permits the president to establish intelligence agencies as
he sees fit, but requires that he do so only "in terms of national legislation." See S. AFR.
CONST. § 209(1); cf id. § 199(3)(a) ("Other than the security services established in
terms of the Constitution, armed organizations or services may be established only in
terms of national legislation."). Thus does the post-apartheid constitutional scheme
seek to prevent the establishment of secret "alternative" intelligence arms to further
the personal agenda of the head of state and evade conventional mechanisms of
oversight and accountability-as Lt. Col. Oliver North had in mind during the "Iran-
Contra Affair" scandal in the United States, and has apparently become a tradition
within the French intelligence system. See JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 78 (discussing
North's vision of an independent, self-financing, "off-the-shelf' covert action
organization); DOUGLAS PORCH, THE FRENCH SECRET SERVICES 437-54 (1995)
(discussing repeated use by French presidents of ad hoc alternative intelligence
institutions).
128. Senate Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 3011 (remarks of S.S. Makana); see also id. Col
4128 (remarks of Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry Kader Asmal) (stressing need
for "pre-emptive" provision for "basic human needs" as means to enhance security).
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of military threat or war. It is this definition of national
security that places a responsibility on the security policy-
makers of a nation to collectively address the vulnerability
within society. At the core of this new definition... lies the
concept of human security.
Human security must reflect the balance between the
freedom from fear and the freedom from want. Our
country's emerging national security doctrine should be
based on the principles of democracy, participation,
reconstruction, reconciliation, development and stability.'29
No issue or policy arena, it thus seems, can fall outside the realm of
South African "national security" as understood by its top security
policy-makers.
The point is not to suggest anything remotely akin to an
identity between these conceptions and the paranoiac and
authoritarian "Total National Strategy" theories of the Botha era. In
spirit and substance, these two approaches to "national security"
today remain-thankfully-worlds apart. But there does remain
something at least potentially dangerous about a security apparatus
that conceives of its mission as "incorporat[ing] political, economic,
social and environmental matters"130 and protecting society against
"ethnic hatred, [and] religious intolerance"13 1-particularly at a time
when the professional military components of that apparatus have
been deprived of external enemies and are increasingly being given
domestic responsibilities by the civilian authorities.
Defining "national security" as nothing less sweeping than
"human security" in all its variegated socio-economic richness
132
may sound enlightened and progressive, but such an all-
encompassing idea of "security" makes it dangerously tempting to
enlist the country's "security forces" in its pursuit across the breadth
of domestic policy.1 3 So long as government officials use such an all-
embracing conception of "national security" as merely a way of
reminding themselves that providing for "basic human needs" is
129. Id. Col 4132 (remarks of Joe Nhlanhla).
130. Defence White Paper, supra note 110.
131. Helmoed-Romer Heitman, Modise Stresses Wider Role, Effective Forces, JANE'S
DEF. WKLY., July 1, 1995, at 18 (quoting Deputy Defense Minister Ronnie Kasrils).
132. House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 4132 (remarks of Joe Nhlanhla).
133. The Secretariat for Safety and Security-the civilian bureau administering the
South African Police Service-is, in fact, already statutorily charged with
"promot[ing] and facilitat[ing] participation by the [South African Police] Service in
the Reconstruction and Development Programme." § 3(d) of South African Police
Service Act 68 of 1995; cf. S. AFR. CONST. § 208 (requiring establishment of civilian
secretariat for police service).
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more important than "seeking so-called enemies or foes under, in or
above the beds,"" South Africa's citizens (and neighbors) will thank
them for it. But if confronted with sudden crises or acute inter-
institutional stresses, there is some danger that a security
establishment with such a broadly defined area of responsibility
could decide that the proper fulfillment of its domestic role requires
rather more than a proper balance between liberty and security
should permit.
It is this danger to which one opposition parliamentarian in
South Africa alluded in 1994, for example, during the National
Assembly's debate over the government's new intelligence
legislation. Worrying that the statutory definition of "intelligence"
was "wide enough to drive a truck through," Kobus Jordaan of the
Democratic Party warned that "[tihere are certain components in the
[government's] White Paper [on Intelligence] which refer very
clearly to the political arena and in respect of which the political
terms of today are used, just as the wording 'total onslaught' was
used in the past."' Observers with sensitivities honed by years of
watching the abuse of the term "national security" under apartheid
might note with some nervousness today, for example, the fact that
South Africa's National Intelligence Agency is given jurisdiction
over "intelligence on any internal activity, factor or development
which is detrimental to the national security of the Republic .. ,,13'
The Intelligence Services Act, in turn, permits the NIA to undertake
electronic surveillance or physical searches of property in pursuit of
any "information which has or could probably have a bearing on the
functions of the Agency., 13 7 Understood in this context, therefore,
Joe Nhlanhla's concept of an all-encompassing "human security"
sounds positively alarming; with "national security" defined with
such a broad brush, no one and nothing in South Africa could fail to
be the lawful object of clandestine NIA attentions1 3
134. House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 4128 (remarks of Kader Asmal).
135. Id. Col 4144-45 (remarks of J.A. Jordaan). It is thus perhaps no coincidence that
representatives of the National Party so quickly agreed with Deputy Minister of
Intelligence Services Nhlanhla's broad definition of security. See, e.g., id. Col 4134
(remarks of D.P.A. Schutte) (describing the role of intelligence services as "cover[ing]
the whole field of the nation's existence").
136. See §§ 1 & 2(1)(a) of National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 (giving NIA
jurisdiction over "domestic intelligence" and defining "domestic intelligence" as
"intelligence on any internal activity, factor or development which is detrimental to
the national security of the Republic, as well as threats or potential threats to the
constitutional order of the Republic and the safety and the well-being of its people").
137. § 5(2)(a)-(b) of Intelligence Services Act 38 of 1994
138. The intelligence arm of the South African Police Service, by contrast, is limited
to the covert collection of "crime intelligence," which is defined to mean "intelligence
used in the prevention of crime or to conduct criminal investigations and to prepare
evidence for purposes of law enforcement and the prosecution of offenders." §§ 1 &
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In the realm of security oversight, it should thus be clear, there
is much virtue in a narrow conception of "national security"--
especially for an unstable society struggling to overcome a very ugly
past. To be sure, the South African security services are both
statutorily and constitutionally required (as well as certainly
expected) to avoid partisan involvement in South African domestic
politics. 13 The danger, however, is that too broad a conception of
"national security" will tend to blur the lines between legitimate and
illegitimate service concerns, ultimately making such prohibitions
unintelligible to those who are supposed to be bound by them.
140
Walking the requisite security-accountability tightrope in the years
ahead may prove to be a significant challenge for the post-apartheid
state.
3. Uniquely South African Challenges
a. Transforming the Military
South Africa also faces a number of security-related challenges
deriving from its peculiar recent history of White minority rule and
a negotiated transfer of power. Part of the price of apartheid's
negotiated demise was, as we have seen, the retention of White
members within the security establishment."' Because of the danger
2(3) of National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 (limiting SAPS jurisdiction to
"crime intelligence" and defining term).
139. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. § 199(7)(a)-(b) (prohibiting security services or
members thereof from "prejudic[ing] a political party interest that is legitimate in
terms of the Constitution" or "further[ing], in a partisan manner, any interest of a
political party"). With respect to the South Africa's intelligence services, for example,
statutory law also requires the directors-general of the National Intelligence Agency
and the South African Secret Service to take all "reasonably practicable" steps to
ensure that "no action is carried out that could give rise to any reasonable suspicion
that the Agency or Service, as the case may be, is concerned in furthering, protecting
or undermining the interests of any section of the population or any political party or
organization." § 4(3)(b) of Intelligence Services Act 38 of 1994.
140. Nor, it should be noted, does the literature on intelligence oversight lack
examples illustrating the perils of an "intelligence culture" which "blur[s] the lines
between politics and intelligence, [and] which [sees] no contradiction in using
intelligence for partisan ends." PORCH, supra note 127, at 459-60 (discussing "Rainbow
Warrior" affair in which French intelligence agents killed New Zealand man in
process of sinking ship belonging to Greenpeace anti-nuclear protesters).
141. Joe Modise, South Africa; Army Marches into the Future, Africa News, Nov. 8,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFRNWS File (noting that "dominant
positions" in SANDF are still in hands of former SADF generals because of "[the late
South African Communist Party leader and Minister of Housing] Joe Slovo's so-called
'sunset clause' " requiring their retention in the post-apartheid military). Needless to
say, the Ministry of Defense was more than willing to accept resignations from SADF
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of a preemptive military coup by the White-dominated SADF should
the transfer of power be perceived to be going too far or too fast,"' it
was clear to ANC officials that "in Defence, more than in any other
state institution, the conflicting pressures of stability and
transformation need to be sensitively managed." 43 With the
transition period marked by a notably conciliatory tone set by
Mandela himself, the appointment of the respected White
commander Gen. George Meiring to head the SANDF, T and
Defense Minister Modise's tireless (if not always successful) efforts
to win the military adequate funding,1 45 the new government
managed to keep the trust of the officer corps.14 Within the Defence
Ministry itself, a new civilian secretariat was also established, with
the aim of ensuring that "civilians [would] formulate Defence policy
and the military [would execute] this policy," leaving
"civilians.. . responsible for the political dimensions" of defense
policy. 47 Despite mutterings by some ANC officials concerned that
the party's plans may be "thwarted by the White-controlled
bureaucracy, including the police and army,'' 48 the military has
holdovers who did not wish to serve the ANC government, by November 1996
Modise had already accepted several thousand military resignations. Id.
142. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
143. Def. Mr Discusses SANDF Transformation, Periscope Daily Defence News
Capsules, Nov. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File [hereinafter
SANDF Transformation] (quoting Joe Modise); see also Brummer, supra note 19 (quoting
Deputy Defense Minister Ronnie Kasrils to effect that ministry "has to be sensitive to
the nature of the transition" in order to ensure stability); Joe Modise, South Africa;
Army Marches into the Future, Africa News, Nov. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, World
Library, AFRNWS File. [hereinafter Modise, Into the Future] (same). Achieving such a
"sensitive[] balance," said Defense Minister Joe Modise, was "my ministry's greatest
challenge." SANDF Transformation, supra (quoting Joe Modise).
144. See Brummer, supra note 19.
145. See Review 1996, supra note 88.
146. South Africa's Black-ruled neighbors may also have played at least some role in
mollifying the White-dominated top leadership of the SADF. According to the SANDF
Acting Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Siphiwe Nyanda, SADC's willingness to give South
Africans a leadership role in forging regional security arrangements may have been at
least in part influenced by a desire to assure the SANDF of its continuing prestige and
important security responsibilities in the post-apartheid era. See South Africa to Head
Regional Defence and Security Committee, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 8,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File (describing the decision to hold
IDSC meeting in Cape Town as "an attempt by Africa to boost the confidence of the
[South African] security forces and encourage them to respect democracy").
147. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE (1996), at 13; see also S.
AFR. CONST. § 204 (requiring establishment of civilian secretariat for defense).
148. Who Is in Command?, supra note 82, at 48 (citing concerns expressed by Tokyo
Sexwale, premier of Gauteng Province).
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proven "conspicuously loyal"149 and remarkably willing to give
"visible support to its new Black masters."'
' 5
But the "transformation" process in the SANDF has still been
far from smooth, particularly with respect to the incorporation of
thousands of former anti-apartheid guerrillas into the ranks of the
regular uniformed service. After a long series of negotiations that
began in April 1993 between the then-ruling National Party, the
ANC, and various other groups,"" the South African military after
the April 1994 elections began the complicated process of integrating
former guerrillas from Umkhonto we Sizwe 52 ("MK," the military arm
of the ANC) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army ("APLA,"
the military arm of the Pan-Africanist Congress) 15 3 with troops from
the old SADFt and military units from South Africa's apartheid-era
ethnic "homelands."1 4 The plan aimed to integrate these disparate
forces, ultimately creating a standing military strength of
approximately 75,000 persons.
149. Review 1996, supra note 88.
150. Navias I, supra note 92, at 4 (noting that "[tihis demonstrative backing, coupled
with no coup pledges, highlights both the realism of the military and the shift in
power that only a few months ago would have seemed unbelievable").
151. See generally Heitman, Reshaping, supra note 91, at 10 (recounting negotiations
leading up to April 1994 elections); Mills I, supra note 85, at 7 (same). As something of
an experiment in military integration-a "micro-level forerunner for the integration
programme"-a "National Peacekeeping Force (NKPF)" was also set up in January
1994, combining troops from the military wing of the ANC, "homeland" military
forces, and the SADF itself. This experiment did not go well, however, and "as a result
of the incidence of ill-discipline and racism experienced both in preparation and
during actual deployment in the strife-tom Johannesburg townships, the unit was
disbanded in June [1994]." Mills I, note 85, at 9.
152. The name means "Spear of the Nation" in the Xhosa language.
153. The PAC initially refused to take part in the integration process, but
subsequently relented. See Heitman, Reshaping, supra note 91, at 11.
154. According to Abdul Minty, deputy director of the South African Foreign Affairs
Department (the civil service arm of the foreign ministry), the integration process
involved 14,600 former MK and APLA fighters, 11,000 troops from the former
"homelands" of Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, and CiskeL, and some 80,000 SADF
regulars. See Mtimkulu, supra note 26 (quoting Minty). Defense Minister Joe Modise,
however, later gave somewhat different numbers, saying that of 28,000 registered MK
fighters and another 6000 from APLA, a total of 16,000 opted for military integration
(4,000 of whom chose to mobilize as regular-service soldiers). According to Modise, of
those integrated, some 1700 (including 150 women) were appointed as officers,
including 11 generals (of whom one was female). This made the former guerrillas
approximately 10% of the SANDF officer corps. Some 500 officers from the former
"homeland" armies were also integrated. See SANDF Transformation, supra note 143.
155. See Mtimkulu, supra note 26 (quoting Abdul Minty). Because simply combining
these forces would produce "a huge and clumsy army far too big for South Africa's
needs," Heitman, Reshaping, supra note 91, at 13, the integration program planned also
to demobilize as many as 60,000 soldiers. Mtimkulu, supra note 26; see also SANDF
Transformation, supra note 143 (quoting Modise discussing efforts to facilitate
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Integrating the former "homeland" soldiers apparently did not
prove too difficult-after all, their armed forces had been established
under SADF tutelage and trained according to SADF doctrine',"-
but the former MK and APLA guerrillas were often troublesome.157
Indeed, amid disputes over pay and their treatment within the
military, thousands of disgruntled MK fighters rejected military
discipline for five months, leaving their training camps and
marching on the ANC's headquarters in Johannesburg, camping on
Nelson Mandela's presidential lawn in Pretoria, and demonstrating
in front of the headquarters of the South African Broadcasting
Corporation. Only in mid-October 1994 did the ANC reassert control
over the guerrillas, ordering them back to barracks and discharging
some 2000 of them outright.' The integration of the remaining
trainees proceeded apace, but the SANDF's first annual report made
clear that integration had not been harmonious even after their
training had been completed: "[a]lthough the phenomenon of
mistrust is gradually decreasing, it still plays a negative role...
where mistakes are sometimes seen as mischief and established
personnel practices are considered to be discriminatory."15 Morale
reintegration of demobilized personnel into civilian society by means, inter alia, of
demobilization gratuities and job training).
156. See Heitman, Reshaping, supra note 91, at 13.
157. See generally id. ("The primary problem is the lack of formal military training
and actual service experience. Many of the ANC's 16,000 men received little or no
training, and its operations never progressed much beyond urban terrorism. The
result is that, as a force, it is difficult to amalgamate with a normal military structure.
The ANC sent many of its personnel to friendly countries for training after 1992, but
much of that was conducted in countries with doubtful standards."). A 30-man British
"Military Advisory and Training Team" was imported to help ease this process of
transition for former MK and APLA fighters by acting as a neutral arbiter in a training
and selection process sure to be rife with suspicion, see generally Mills I, supra note 85,
at 7; Heitman, Reshaping, supra note 91, at 13, but some tensions could not be avoided.
158. See Who Is in Command?, supra note 82, at 48. Some of the demonstrators had
also thrown rocks at former MK Chief of Staff Siphiwe Nyanda, and set his car alight,
as well as jeering at their former MK commander, Defense Minister Joe Modise. Some
of the former guerrillas discharged in October as a result of these disturbances
reportedly went to ground in South Africa's townships with their government-issue
weapons, even threatening to attack police stations and government offices unless
given an appropriate "financial package" by the government. Id.
159. Quoted by Brendan Boyle, Brain Drain Dogs New South African Army, Reuters
North American News, Nov. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, REUNA File.
Both the ex-guerrillas and the regular SADF troops apparently felt mistreated in the
process, the former perceiving an endemic institutional racism and the regular feeling
slighted by personnel practices that they felt eroded military standards and resulted in
the elevation of ANC stalwarts to positions unwarranted by their military capabilities
and experience. See Mtimkulu, supra note 26; Boyle, supra. At least to some extent,
both groups were surely correct. See, e.g., Heitman, Reshaping, supra note 91, at 13
("Some senior MK officers will.., be taken into the defence force in senior positions
whether their training and experience justify this or not. That is a political necessity
that cannot be avoided."); Mills I, supra note 85, at 9 (describing how 1994 experiment
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problems among former SADF regulars also made it difficult to
retain skilled personnel, and resignations among instructors, junior
officers, aviators, intelligence operatives, and medical personnel
reportedly greatly eroded SADF mission capabilities.1" Nonetheless,
despite these problems, the armed forces have been integrated: by the
end of March 1995, for example, the SANDF reported that it had
75,479 personnel, of whom 39,473 were Africans, 28,192 were White,
6982 were Coloured, and 832 were Asian (Indian).16'
The ultimate success of this "blending" process62 may have
significant implications for civil-military relations in South Africa.
Scholars of civil-military relations have pointed to two basic theories
of how best to control the role of the armed forces in society. One
model derives in large part from the work of Harvard political
scientist Samuel Huntington," and argues that the establishment of
"a body of [regulatory] laws.., and a formal chain of command
[will] make the military responsible to their host society."1" A
second approach, associated with the work of Morris Janowitz,6
takes a more sociological turn, arguing that "civilian control of [the]
armed forces is best realized when the military are integrated with
and woven into the broader social fabric."'" These two models, in
in integration had to be abandoned in part because of racist treatment of new
trainees); Modise, Into the Future, supra note 141 (describing "Affirmative Action and
Equal Opportunities" program to "fast-track" non-Whites with "the greatest
capability").
160. Of some 488 pilot positions in the South African Air Force ("SAAF'), for
example, only 375 could be filled by March 1995, and the SAAF expected to have
fewer than 300 trained pilots by March 1996. See Boyle, supra note 159.
161. At that time, there still remained some 12,000 ex-guerrillas to be integrated. Id.
Except for the use of the term "African" instead of the reported "Black," this race-
classificatory breakdown is apparently that given by the SANDF itself. For a
discussion of the problems of racial terminology in discussing contemporary South
Africa, see supra note 12.
162. The term is that of Abdul Minty, deputy director of South Africa's department
of foreign affairs. See Mtimkulu, supra note 26.
163. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND
POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (1957); see also Snider & Carlton-Carew, supra
note 93, at 3 (crediting Huntington with paternity of this traditional model of civil-
military relations theory).
164. David R. Segal, U.S. Civil-Military Relations in the Twenty-First Century: A
Sociologist's View, in CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, supra note 34, at 185, 189.
165. See MORRIS JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
PORTRAIT (1960).
166. Segal, supra note 164, at 189. This idea long predates Janowitz, however, a form
of it having been articulated even in the debates over the drafting of the U.S.
Constitution. See PALMER, supra note 39, at 122 (recounting arguments at
Constitutional Convention by Gouverneur Morris that congressmen should be
permitted simultaneously to hold military commissions because to do otherwise
would contribute to isolation of military from society and political process and
produce an alienation that could prove dangerous to civil-military relations).
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turn, broadly suggest the two principal techniques by which
civilians may attempt to control the military: (1) "adjusting the
incentives of the military" so as to make coups d 'etat both difficult
and unattractive; and (2) "adjusting the ascriptive characteristics of
the military so it will be populated by people disinclined to [mount
a] coup."'6 These approaches are not, of course, mutually exclusive,
and in its efforts to "develop security forces that are more broadly
representative of society,"16 South Africa has employed both. If
establishing a new statutory scheme to govern defense affairs,
enshrining civilian control of the SANDF in South Africa's new
Constitution,1 69 and endeavoring to cultivate "new military
attitudes"' 70 may be said to represent the former technique, the
process of "blending" the former guerrillas and the regular army-
however awkward it may have been-clearly represents the latter.
So far, despite some obvious problems (especially in the initial
phases of the integration process), this approach seems to be
working. Some writers have worried that an over-zealous attempt to
employ "ascriptive" control techniques may be counterproductive as
a means of civilian control because of the tendency of such methods
to politicize the armed forces,"' but South Africa's situation suggests
that an incomplete ascriptive process may actually make civil-military
relations more manageable. At least for the moment, the SANDF is
far from the politicized creature of the ANC. Quite to the contrary,
the awkward process of "blending" former guerrillas and former
regulars has created a military with less of a monolithic political
interest than ever before-and one containing demographic and
ideological factions perhaps more concerned with policing each
other's propriety than with acting in concert against civilian
authority. While residual internal divisions and suspicions resulting
from the guerrillas' integration will undoubtedly continue to take a
167. Feaver, supra note 37, at 115-116.
168. The phrase is actually that of U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Joseph Nye, describing South Africa's efforts to "transform" its
armed services. See Pentagon Looks to Military Cooperation with South Africa, Agence
France Presse, Aug. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File.
169. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. §§ 201-02, 204 (establishing military accountability to
president, cabinet, and parliament, and requiring establishment of civilian defense
secretariat).
170. See Modise, Into the Future, supra note 141 (noting Defense Ministry efforts to
create new attitudes through such measures as "civic education, language and religion
work groups together with [equal opportunity hiring and promotion] structures"
within military); see also S. AFR. CONST. § 199(5) (requiring that security services "act,
and must teach and require their members to act, in accordance with the Constitution
and the law, including customary international law and international agreements
binding on the Republic").
171. See, e.g., Feaver, supra note 37, at 116 (citing HUNTINGTON, supra note 164, at
80).
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toll on the SANDF's combat effectiveness, at least in the near term,
the ANC's incomplete ascriptive transformation of the armed
services probably bodes well for civil-military relations.
Nevertheless, the "potentially explosive process of 'blending'
South Africa's military" has been and continues to be a particular
challenge for the post-apartheid state, because the ANC must
concern itself not simply with controlling the military and ensuring
that its conduct remains within the bounds permitted by law but
also with ensuring that it remains capable of protecting South
Africa's security interests at home and abroad. As we have seen, the
imperatives of military accountability and effectiveness pull at least
to some extent in different directions.'7 It will remain the new
government's challenge to see that both of these masters are
adequately served.
b. Problems in the Police Force
Unlike the SANDF, the process of "blending" forces into the
new South African Police Service ("SAPS") has principally involved
only regular personnel from the old South African Police "Force"
and police units from the ten former ethnic "homelands" of the
apartheid era.174 Because former ANC guerrillas had little training
even arguably relevant to conventional police work, ANC integra-
tion in this area proceeded slowly (for the most part only through
conventional processes of recruitment and training).175 Members of
172. Mtimkulu, supra note 26.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
174. See, e.g., Suzanne Daley, Apartheid's Feared Police Prove Inept and Corrupt, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1997, at Al. Upon the integration of the homeland forces with both
White and non-White members of the South African Police after the April 1994
elections, the new SAPS contained some 50,000 White policemen (of whom some
47,000 remained in service in early 1997). Id.
175. Cawthra, supra note 82, at 19-20. The only analogous experience in ANC ranks
was in intelligence collection and, with respect to the ANC's VIP protection unit,
bodyguard work. Id. Some ANC-affiliated township "Self-Defense Units" ("SDUs"),
however, were also potential candidates for police integration, id., but such projects
have proven quite controversial-especially after the Eastern Cape province's
minister of safety and security, Maliza Mpehle, was implicated in establishing an anti-
crime police unit made up of former MK and SDU members that was involved in a
bloody incident at Tsolo in which over 150 persons were killed. See Eastern Cape
Security Minister Suspended for Establishing Anticrime Unit, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Feb. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File. SDUs were
also accused of abusing their positions as police auxiliaries in the East Rand township
of Kathelong. These problems notwithstanding, provincial government still
endeavored to integrate SDUs in to community policing efforts. See generally Shaun
McCarthy, South Africa's Self-Defence Units, JANE'S INTEL. REV., Nov. 1994 [hereinafter
McCarthy, SDUs], at 520, 521.
[VOL. 3:59
Watching the Watchdog
both of the principal components of the new force, in other words,
had spent their previous careers in defense of the apartheid status
quo. For this reason-and because the police had borne the brunt of
the burden in the White minority government's struggle to crush
anti-apartheid unrest-it was long feared that the police would be
more troublesome even than the military.176 Efforts properly to re-
form and restructure the police also got off to a slow start, with
senior leadership preoccupied with "crisis management" tasks.1 77
Among other things, the police reportedly suffered from significant
morale problems related to the exposure of apartheid-era human
rights violations by police units (in which many senior White offi-
cers were implicated), 8 the restrictions placed upon police powers
by the country's interim Constitution, and the government's release
of many prisoners." Police reform efforts were delayed,'" morale
eroded, and discipline was weakened by funding problems,
prompting members of the South African Police Union to refuse to
work overtime and conduct "go-slow" protests over salary and
overtime-pay issues. T8 Though the police budget had been greatly
increased under the new government-rising to 8.5 billion rand for
1994-95 and "rapidly closing the gap with the [declining] Defence
budget" -it was not enough to forestall a series of violent strikes
176. See, e.g., Navias I, supra note 92, at 5 (also noting that "[ilt is among the Whites
in the police that support for far right-wing fringe groups has been strongest").
177. See generally Mills I, supra note 85, at 8.
178. Though apparently not himself directly implicated in such police "dirty tricks,"
even national police commissioner Gen. Johan van der Merwe was "deeply
compromised" by his support for senior officers suspected of such abuses. See, e.g.,
Cawthra, supra note 82, at 20. As a result, van der Merwe was replaced by Maj. Gen.
George Fivaz-a White with some 30 years of police service-in January 1995. See
New Police Chief Calls for Professionalism; Parliament Considers "Truth Commission," AP,
Jan. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, AP File [hereinafter Police
Professionalism].
179. Mills I, supra note 85, at 8.
180. One reform that did quickly occur, however, was the establishment of a civilian
secretariat, paralleling the top uniformed ranks of the Police Service and headed by a
Secretary for Safety and Security who is formally co-equal to the (uniformed) National
Commissioner for Police. This civilian secretariat was intended to "establish a degree
of continuity in policy management in the department even as individual ministers
may change." REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, ANNUAL PLAN OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE
SERVICE 1996/97 (1996), at 27-28; see also § 2(1)(a) of South African Police Service Act
68 of 1995 (establishing civilian Secretariat for Safety and Security). The secretariat is
charged, inter alia, with promoting "democratic accountability and transparency"
within the Police Service. § 3(1)(c) of South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995.
181. See, e.g., Mandela Intervenes to Improve Police Pay, Reuters World Service, Mar.
25, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, REUWLD File; Minister Appeals for Calm as
S. African Detectives Begin Go-Slow, Agence France Presse, Mar. 24, 1995, available in
LEXIS, World Library, AFP File.
182. Cawthra, supra note 82, at 21. A gift of 20 million rand by the Belgium
government also proved helpful, but obviously amounted to only a small fraction of
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in early 1995 in which loyal security forces killed or wounded sev-
eral protesting policemen in the process of quelling police
mutinies!lsa
The situation has stabilized since those tense early months of
1995, but the process of post-apartheid "transformation" in the South
African Police clearly has been rocky. In conjunction with the
police's traditional de-emphasis of ordinary policing in favor of
"internal security" duties (i.e., in favor of the suppression of anti-
apartheid domestic unrest), " these problems have helped leave the
police still unequal to the significant criminal and public-order
challenges that face contemporary South Africa' 8 -thereby further
eroding both internal morale and the service's reputation in the
public eye.16
police expenditure. See Belgium to Provide Funds, Advice on Demilitarization of Police,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
BBCSWB File.
183. See Mandela Moves to Rebuild Police, AP, Jan. 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, AP File (recounting suppression of January 1995 police Strike in Soweto in
which one protesting officer was killed and one wounded); Police Professionalism, supra
note 178; South African Troops End Police Mutiny, UPI, Feb. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, UPST95 File (recounting incident in which security forces using
helicopters and mortar fire regained control of town of Umtata in Eastern Cape
province from police mutineers, killing one and wounding another); David Beresford,
Mandela Gets Tough, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WKLY., Mar. 5, 1995, at 4 (same).
South African law prohibits strikes by members of the police. See § 41(1) of
South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 ("No member [of the SAPS] shall strike,
induce any other member to strike or conspire with another person to strike.").
184. See Navias I, supra note 92, at 5; Daley, supra note 174, at Al (declaring that "the
police force the National Party left behind is deeply corrupt, barely literate and lacking
some of the most basic skills needed in conventional police work" and recounting that
while police "kept Blacks out of White areas and controlled riots," their investigative
skills often did not go far beyond "beat[ing] a confession out of the suspect").
185. See KEITH B. RICHBURG, OUT OF AMERICA 197-98 (1997) (describing its many
years as "a tool of antiBlack repression" as having made the SAP into "one of the
world's most incompetent when it came to detective work or rudimentary crime-
solving"). With so much competition for that title on the African continent alone,
Richburg's claim seems somewhat exaggerated, but his basic point is well taken.
186. After so many years of seeing the country's security services enlisted in the
fight to suppress anti-apartheid protest, these services (and especially the police) also
began the era of majority rule with significant problems of legitimacy among the
country's non-White population. See, e.g., Celina Romany, Black Women and Gender
Equality in a New South Africa: Human Rights Law and the Intersection of Race and Gender,
21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 857 n.39 (1996) (noting degree to which security forces are
"associated with apartheid repression"). The police service's inability to protect South
Africans against the country's contemporary explosion of violent crime-not to
mention reports of police corruption, see supra note 83-has made these problems
worse.
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c. The Entrenched Civil Service
Another peculiar challenge for the new ANC government
resulting from the National Party's negotiated departure from
power has been the job guarantees given to South Africa's
apartheid-era civil servants. Despite the financial burdens of
maintaining an expensive public service sector that has been
described as "bloated" on account of the 1.2 million members it
maintains (a number which includes some 750,000 civil servants),
the ANC government promised a five-year guarantee against
involuntary layoffs both to the (predominantly White) ranks of the
national civil service and to some 500,000 civil servants in South
Africa's former ethnic "homeland[s] .''
In addition to the considerable budgeting problems entailed by
the necessity to maintain such a large civil service'" and the political
discontent among the ANC's non-White constituency engendered
by the decision to retain so many of the former administrators of the
apartheid state,8  these job-guarantees may have intriguing
implications for South African security oversight. On the one hand,
as with the incomplete process of armed services "blending"
discussed above, the retention of so many Whites within the South
187. See Review 1996, supra note 88.
188. According to Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, public service salaries and
welfare payments and payments made in servicing South Africa's large state debt
made up approximately 90% of the state budget. Mbeki Says Right Wing No Longer a
Serious Threat to South Africa, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 1, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File [hereinafter Mbeki, Right Wing]. This
problem was made worse, moreover, because the hoped-for level of civil service
retirements failed to materialize on account of funding problems in the principal civil
service pension funds. See Review 1996, supra note 88.
189. Not least of these is the great delay the job-guarantees have caused in the
ANC's efforts to "redress the imbalances of the past" in South Africa's public
administration in order make the government bureaucracy "broadly representative of
the South African people." S. AFR. CONST. § 195(a)(i) (stating principle of public
administration). As this author has elsewhere recounted,
[n]on-Whites are being brought into the government bureaucracy to
replace Whites who retire or resign, but although early retirement is
encouraged and many new positions (fillable by non-Whites) have been
created, few, if any, Whites have actually been laid off. The Mandela
government's relatively cautious and conciliatory approach to public
sector affirmative action has, in fact, apparently proven quite frustrating
to many ANC supporters who had hoped quickly to be given
government employment after the 1994 elections. After Mandela's
inauguration, for instance, some two million job applications reportedly
flooded in for the 11,000 civil service openings then available.
Ford I, supra note 2, at 1970 (citations omitted) (citing, inter alia, Ellmann, supra note 4,
at 28 n.88; Arlene Getz, South Africa Pushes to Put Blacks in Top Jobs, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Fla.), Nov. 25, 1994, at 23A).
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African civil service suggests that the non-uniformed security
bureaucracy-e.g., the foreign and domestic intelligence services-
is in no immediate danger of becoming a wholly politicized
instrument of the ANC in ways that could threaten the political
freedoms of the post-apartheid era. The high rate of White retention
probably also makes it rather more likely that any such abuses will
quickly be brought to light in the press or by opposition
parliamentarians. On the other hand, however, even apart from
concerns about the practices to which such individuals may have
become accustomed in the past, the large mass of officials retained
from the National Party's civil service greatly complicates the
ANC's own intra-governmental oversight processes. That is, the job
guarantees the ANC made before the April 1994 elections will
require of the Mandela cabinet a continuing effort to ensure that the
various arms of the national administration actually obey their duly-
elected political masters and to prevent government golicies from
being "thwarted by the White-controlled bureaucracy."
d. Domestic Political and Religious Groups
Despite much domestic and international agonizing before and
during the National Part's transfer of power to the present ANC-
dominated government," there does not presently appear to exist a
significant right-wing domestic security threat in South Africa. After
the collapse of a bungled effort at military insurrection and
territorial independence undertaken by self-styled commandos from
the neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance Movement ("AWB") in
conjunction with the ethnic "homeland" government of
Bophuthatswana, 19' and the arrest of some thirty-four members of
the so-called Afrikaner Republican Army ("BBL") in the wake of a
series of ominously well-orchestrated car-bombings in 1994,93 little
seems to remain of any organized White resistance to majority
rule.'9
The same cannot quite be said of non-White radicals. Armed
revolutions, it has been observed, tend to breed revolutionaries
190. Who Is in Command?, supra note 82, at 48 (citing concerns expressed by Tokyo
Sexwale, premier of Gauteng Province).
191. See, e.g., supra note 89.
192. See Manby, supra note 10, at 36.
193. See Shaun McCarthy, The Afrikaner Resistance Movement in Decline?, JANE'S
INTEL. REV., July 1994, at 22, 24 (noting that Iin the space of a few days, the BBL
conducted a far superior spate of attacks than the ANC was able to achieve even at
the height of their terror campaign.").




whose preferred methods of political change are often incompatible
with those required of citizens in a democratic civil society.' 9 There
has also developed in post-apartheid South Africa something of an
"expectations gap," as the politically and financially constrained
ANC government has found it increasingly hard to fund the RDP
and to fulfill its grandiose promises of "Peace, Freedom and a better
life for all.' 196 The coincidence of these two factors presents a danger
to the new government: the risk that the more radicalized of the
ANC's non-White constituents will find in the decades-long armed
struggle against apartheid so tempting a "process and a language
[with which] to deal with an iniquitous government"197 that such a
discourse of violence will come to structure their relations with the
new regime as well.
The initial signs, however, are fairly hopeful. A significant
potential security danger to the ANC government was avoided after
the 1994 elections when the Pan-Africanist Congress-a smaller but
more radical anti-apartheid movement long notorious for its slogan
of "one [White] settler, one bulle" 198 -agreed to allow its APLA
guerrillas to take part in the SANDF's integration process. Though
dissidents from within both APLA and the ANC's own Umkhonto we
Sizwe have caused some concern to the new government's security
forces,19 the ANC now claims that such groups are no longer a
threat.
10
Nevertheless, the new government still faces some headaches in
this respect. Tactics from the anti-apartheid struggle designed to
make the country "ungovernable" for the White minority
government remained popular in South Africa's sprawling and
impoverished townships after the arrival of majority rule, with
strikes, sit-ins, and rent boycotts remaining common ways of
195. See PALMER, supra note 39, at 11 ("Revolutions inevitably cast up
revolutionaries.... Having overthrown one government, they slide easily in to
contemplation of overthrowing another. Force is their proven method of choice.").
196. See supra note 80.
197. PALMER, supra note 39, at 176.
198. See, e.g., Culhane, supra note 79, at 929 n.208.
199. Lesotho police claimed in 1995, for example, to have seized large APLA arms
caches hidden in that country, and at the end of that year Lesotho (and possibly South
African) police arrested former APLA commander Letlapa "Happy" Mphahlele on
charges relating to a December 1991 hand grenade attack upon a police station in
Bloemfontein, South Africa. See Security Minister Says Ex-APLA Commander's Arrest
Was Legal, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, World
Library, BBCSWB File.
200. Or so Minister of Defense Modise claimed when asked about this problem in
parliament. See Defence Minister Says MK and APLA Dissidents Pose 'No Threat' to
Security, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
Library, BBCSWB File.
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expressing discontent with social and economic conditions.2°'
Township "Self-Defense Units" made up of radicalized youths and
"comrades" from the ANC's young urban cadres, established during
the apartheid years as an alternative township control structure, also
proved hard to control and to assimilate in the post-apartheid era-
some reportedly even abandoning the ANC and moving into drug
and weapons trafficking. °'
Even greater a concern for the new government is an entirely
new township phenomenon: that of radical Islamic groups
dedicated to a form of vigilante jihad (or holy war) against reputed
drug dealers and local crime bosses. With its roots in a combination
of religious faith and populist outrage against the spiraling problems
of violent crime and drug trafficking in South Africa's townships,
groups such as "People Against Gangsterism and Drugs"
("PAGAD") have attracted significant support in the past two years
among members of the country's Muslim community.213 PAGAD-
and, particularly, a number of more radical Islamic fundamentalist
groups with which it is loosely affiliated-have proven to be an
increasing headache for the ANC government. To protest the
ineffectiveness of the national police in curbing South Africa's post-
apartheid crime epidemic, for example, armed PAGAD members
occupied the Cape Town residence of Justice Minister Dullah Omar
in March 1996, forcing the ANC's top law enforcement official to
move elsewhere.2°
Even more dramatically, in August 1996, some 2000 PAGAD
members and supporters descended upon the home of one of the
Western Cape's most notorious drug dealers, Rashaad Staggie,
shooting him several times before burning him to death amid
widely publicized calls for a vigilante jihad against drug
201. See, e.g., Who Is in Command?, supra note 82, at 48-50; McCarthy, SDUs, supra
note 175, at 520.
202. See generally McCarthy, SDUs, supra note 175, at 520-21 (discussing problems
reported in integrating SDUs into municipal policing efforts).
203. Various commentators give greatly varying estimates for the size of the Islamic
community in South Africa. See Islamic Fundamentalism Threatens South African
Security, Africa News, Aug. 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFRNWS File
[hereinafter Fundamentalism Threatens]; Beatrice Khadige, Resurgent Islamic Militancy in
S. Africa Has Its Roots in Apartheid, Agence France Presse, Aug. 14, 1996, available in
LEXIS, World Library, AFP File (giving figure of between 500,000 and 1 million);
Patrick Laurence, Vigilantes Signal Loss of Faith in ANC Action to Beat Crime, Irish
Times, Aug. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File (giving figure of
350,000); McCarthy, Vigilantes, supra note 83, at 570 (claiming that the Muslim
community "numbers approximately 2.6 million"). Racially, PAGAD's supporters in
the Cape Town area are apparently predominantly of the group that the apartheid
state classified as "Coloured." See Khadige; Fundamentalism Threatens, supra.
204. See Laurence, supra note 203; McCarthy, Vigilantes, supra note 83, at 569.
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traffickers.2 0 After clashes between government security forces and
PAGAD supporters which led the ANC's Western Cape spokesman
to suggest that a state of emergency might be needed,2 6 the police
subsequently arrested one PAGAD leader on charges of murder and
sedition while others fled into hiding.2 7 The ANC government has
since moved to defuse some of these tensions, announcing the
establishment of a joint government-PAGAD committee to
investigate ways to curb crime.28 Feelings still run T0 h, however,
and violent crime as yet shows no signs of decreasing.
Also quite worrying, from an internal security perspective, is
mounting evidence that Muslim radicals affiliated with PAGAD or
its associated groups have developed close ties both to international
radical Islamic governments such as Iran and Libya, and to Islamic
terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hizbollah 1° Cape Town's
Muslim community, apparently more inclined to fundamentalist
militancy than South African Muslims in the Johannesburg area,
plays host to a number of organizations linked to PAGAD but
reputedly more radical and inclined toward international
fundamentalist activism. Perhaps none of these groups is more
notorious than the group known as Qibla,' which has in the past
205. See generally Fundamentalism Threatens, supra note 203.
206. Roger Matthews, S. Africa Moves on Moslem Militants, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1996,
at 4. The ANC, however, did not control the Western Cape government, which was in
the hands of the National Party ("NP"). NP provincial premier Hernus Kriel seemed
more sympathetic to PAGAD, no doubt also relishing the chance to embarrass the
ANC for its problems in controlling crime and to cement the support of his large
number of Coloured constituents. Kriel called merely for an inquiry into the early
August violence, while expressing his sympathy for the public's frustration with an
ineffective policing and judicial system. See Fundamentalism Threatens, supra note 203.
207. See generally Matthews, supra note 206, at 4; Hugh Dellios, Vigilantes Take on S.
African Drug Gangs, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 1996, at 4.
208. See South Africa to Form Liaison Committee for Security, Xinhua News Agency,
Dec. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, XINHUA File.
209. In February 1997, Minister of Safety and Security Sydney Mufamadi spoke
harshly to Police Commissioner George Fivaz, complaining of the lack of progress in
curbing violent crime, while President Mandela told Parliament in Cape Town that
criminals were "easily evading" the country's law enforcement authorities. See Simon
Baynham, Pretoria's Strategy Failing to Cut Crime, JANE'S SENTINEL POINTER, Apr.
1997, at 11.
210. Hamas is a Palestinian terror organization that developed during the period of
Palestinian intifada in the 1980s and 1990s in resistance to Israel's occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza and which opposes the sporadic efforts of Yasser Arafat's
Palestinian Liberation Organization (al-Fatah) to negotiate with Israel over the
establishment and enlargement of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.
Hizbollah is a Lebanese terrorist organization backed by Iran which achieved notoriety
in the 1980s for its multiple kidnappings of foreigners (especially Americans) in
Beiruit.
211. See generally Fundamentalism Threatens, supra note 203 (discussing Qibla's role in
recruiting South African Muslims to fight in Bosnia and in hosting- visit by d'Anouar
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proclaimed the need to turn South Africa into an Islamic state and
whose members are said to be a powerful force within PAGAD. 2 2
South African security personnel and Western intelligence
sources are reported to believe that PAGAD and affiliated Muslim
groups have received training and support from Iran and from
Hamas and Hizbollah. 1 3 According to one police spokesman, in fact,
militant Islamic cells have been established in several areas of South
Africa, and members of Qibla have been trained in Libya and
Pakistan, even acquiring some guerrilla experience by fighting with
Hizbollah against Israeli forces in Lebanon.1 It has also been
reported that in 1996, in response to Israeli complaints, South
African officials admitted the existence of several Hizbollah training
camps near the city of Pietermaritzburg, though the government
claimed that these camps had only been used to marshal Islamic
fighters en route to Bosnia and that they had since been closed.2 5
Even given the recently developed warmth of Nelson Mandela's
relations with radical Middle Eastern governments such as his
much-publicized recent courting of Libya's Muammar Quaddhafi-
a controversial approach apparently taken partly out of gratitude for
these regimes' support during the armed struggle against apartheid
and in reaction to Israeli and Western support for the former
National Party government M6-the involvement of such groups with
Haddam of Algeria's banned Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)); McCarthy, Vigilantes,
supra note 83, at 570 (discussing radicalism of Cape Town Islamic community); Dele
Olojede, Militants Mobilizing in S. Africa?, NEWSDAY, Aug. 19, 1996, at A16 (listing
fundamentalist groups in South Africa, including Qibla, Bosnia Action Committee,
Islamic Unity Convention, Islamic Jihad Movement, and S.A. Hizbollah).
212. See Olojede, supra note 211, at A16 (noting prominence of Qibla leader Achmad
Cassiem-an Islamic cleric who reportedly believes the ANC government to be
illegitimate because it agreed to a negotiated settlement-at PAGAD rallies); Dellos,
supra note 207, at 4 (noting Qibla's calls for Islamic state).
213. See, e.g., Con Coghlin, Iran Coaches Cape Town Street Gangs, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Dec. 9, 1996, at 24; Olojede, supra note 211. PAGAD leader Mohammed Ali Parker at
one point confirmed at least that Hamas and Hizbollah had made offers of assistance,
though this was subsequently disputed by the Islamic Unity Convention. See Counter-
Violence in the Cape Causes Concern, JANE'S SENTINEL POINTER, Oct. 1996 [hereinafter
Counter-violence in the Cape], at 11; McCarthy, Vigilantes, supra note 83; Matthews,
supra note 207, at 4.
214. Fundamentalism Threatens, supra note 203 (quoting police spokesman Reg
Crewe).
215. McCarthy, Vigilantes, supra note 83, at 570; see also Fundamentalism Threatens,
supra note 204 (noting claims by Israeli newspaper that five such camps exist);
Olojede, supra note 212 (describing briefing by security officials on training camps).
216. See McCarthy, Vigilantes, supra note 83, at 570; see also Palestinians View South
African Security Equipment, Reuters North American News, Sept. 17, 1996, available in
LEXIS, World Library, REUNA File (noting warmth of South African relations with
new Palestinian Authority in West Bank).
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domestic Islamic militancy poses a significant potential security
threat for the ANC government.
e. Cross-border Problems: Aliens, Weapons, Drugs, and Theft
Finally, contemporary South Africa faces a panoply of cross-
border and domestic threats which, while hardly unique to the
post-apartheid era, have become markedly worse in recent years.
Illegal immigration is one problem, for example, that has
increased enormously with the coming of majority rule. South
Africa has made extensive use of foreign laborers in its mineral
extraction industries since the late nineteenth century, and for many
years it has had problems with illegal immigration as well. Since the
coming of majority rule in 1994, however, illegal immigration has
become almost a flood, and current estimates suggest that between
three and four million persons presently live illegally in South
Africa, placing great strains upon the ANC government's already
under-funded development programs and adding to the country's
unemployment rate (which was estimated to be about forty percent
in 1996).117 The illegal cross-border flow of persons is also closely
linked to drug trafficking and gunrunning from war-torn
Mozambique and elsewhere; 8  this suggests an increasingly
important domestic mission for the SANDF in providing border
security.
219
217. Michael Hough, Illegal Aliens Threaten Security, JANE'S INTEL. REV. [hereinafter
Illegal Aliens], June 1, 1996, at 11; see also Neighbourhood Watch in Southern Africa,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 1994, at 51.
218. Illegal Aliens, supra note 217, at 11. Weapons smuggling problems are of
particular concern to the security forces given the explosion of violent crime in South
Africa, see supra note 82, not to mention the traditional propensity of ANC and Inkatha
supporters to come to blows in KwaZulu-Natal and in the townships around
Johannesburg, see supra note 81. Indeed, the propensity of domestic groups to resort to
violence in public gatherings has led to a general ban on the display and possession in
public gatherings of a wide range of lethal (or potentially lethal) weapons-including
spears, assegais (traditional Zulu stabbing spears), machetes, swords, daggers, axes,
metal-loaded sticks, petrol bombs, sharpened sticks, and clubs. See Security Minister
Bans Weapons at Public Gatherings, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 2, 1996,
available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File; S. Africa's Weapons Ban Goes
Countrywide, Xinhua News Agency, Oct. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library,
XINHUA File.
219. See generally Heitman, Reshaping, supra note 91, at 13. South Africa has already
announced plans to "intensify" joint police activity with Zimbabwe and Zambia, and
has been attempting greatly to increase security on the border with Swaziland and
Mozambique. See Southern African Countries to Intensify Police Cooperation, Xinhua
News Agency, Aug. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, XINHUA File; South
Africa to Step Up Border Security Control, Xinhua News Agency, Dec. 11, 1995, available
in LEXIS, World Library, XINHUA File. Cross-border drug trafficking was also the
subject of a meeting between officials from SADC and from the European Union in
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Adding to its cross-border problems, South Africa apparently
has just "the 'right profile' for exploitation" by a host of
international malefactors involved in drug trafficking, foreign-
exchange fraud, vehicle theft, gunrunning, and passport thievery:
a sudden boom in free trade, the movement (legally and
illegally) of much larger numbers of people across its
borders[,]... an inadequate bureaucracy ill-prepared to
meet the new challenge... [and a] combination of poverty,
lawlessness and a highly sophisticated banking system
through which [unlawfully obtained] funds can be
efficiently laundered.22
Though somewhat "shielded during the apartheid era from
much of the global growth in the narcotics trade,"2 21 South African
security forces now face an exploding drug economy that hasencouagedpolie .. 222
encouraged police corruption, helped turn some formerly pro-
ANC township "self-defense units" into outlaw gangs, 23 and
spurred reactive vigilante violence by PAGAD against drug dealers
such as the late and unlamented Rashaad Staggie.224 In 1994, police
officials even uncovered an assassination plot by drug traffickers
against the ANC's Gauteng provincial premier Tokyo Sexwle,
allegedly in response to his efforts to control the drug trade.225
f. A Continuing Internal Security Role for the Military
The various cross-border and internal security threats faced by
the new South African government have so far demanded more
than that country's troubled police force has been able to provide.
Although South Africa's Constitution makes clear that the mission
of the SANDF is to protect the Republic against external threats and
226 rzdito leave internal security to the police service, it is authorized in
November 1995, which suggested the development of a regionally coordinated
approach to drug control. Greg Mills, A Formalised SADC Defence Agreement?, JANE'S
SENTINEL POINTER, Oct. 1996, at 13.
220. Simon Baynharn, Drugs Set to Become Africa's New Invaders, JANE'S INTEL. REV.,
Sept. 1996 [hereinafter Baynham, Drugs], at 426, 427; see also Interpol Chief Warns of
Organized Crime Threat in South Africa, Agence France Presse, May 29, 1995, available in
LEXIS, World Library, AFP File.
221. Baynham, Drugs, supra note 220, at 426.
222. See supra note 83.
223. See supra text accompanying note 202.
224. See supra text accompanying note 205.
225. Id. at 428.
226. Compare S. AFR. CONST. § 200(2) ("The primary object of the defence force is to
defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people .... ) with id. §
205(3) ("The objects of the police service are to protect, combat and investigate crime,
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certain circumstances to operate domestically 227  and Nelson
Mandela has proclaimed--quite in keeping, it must be said, with the
ANC's all-encompassing conception of "national security"228-that
the military will continue to play a vital role in supporting the police
in internal security tasks.22 For most of 1993 and 1994, some 10,000
army troops were deployed in support of police operations,230 and
the government's repeated reliance upon the SANDF in response to
periodic local crises of domestic unrest since the 1994 elections231 has
made it clear that the military will play such a role for some time.
After PAGAD's execution of Rashaad Staggie in August 1996, for
example, the government rushed additional police and some 200
troopers from the 44th Parachute Brigade to the Cape Flats to keep232
order. It is avowedly Mandela's intention to "sideline and even
crush all dissident forces in our country,"23 and it is apparently his
intent that the SANDF join the policemen in the effort.
Despite a general prohibition upon domestic involvement by
South African military intelligence, this continuing internal role may
to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and
their property, and to uphold and enforce the law."); see also Cawthra, supra note 82, at
21 (making same point about interim Constitution).
227. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. § 201(2) ("The defence force may be employed in co-
operation with the police service, in defense of the Republic ... under the authority of
the President.").
228. See supra text accompanying notes 110, 112-114.
229. Mandela Pledges Support for Peace-Keeping, Regional Defence, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Apr. 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File
(recounting Mandela's speech of April 27, 1996, on the occasion of "SANDF Day").
230. Cawthra, supra note 82, at 21.
231. See, e.g., Tom Cohen, Mandela Orders Police, Soldiers to Trouble Spots, AP, Feb.
27, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, AP File (recounting Mandela's dispatch of
extra police, backed by soldiers, to part of KwaZulu-Natal, parts of Eastern Cape,
Johannesburg, and Cape Town); Heitman, Foss, & Reed, supra note 92, at 23
(recounting that army has "a daily average of 44 companies deployed on border
protection and in support of the police in areas hit by political violence"); S. Africa to
Conduct Anti-Crime Air, Sea Patrols, Reuters World Service, May 6, 1995, available in
LEXIS, World Library, REUWLD File (recounting dispatch by Minister of Safety and
Security Sydney Mufamadi of extra police and troop to KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng
provinces because of political and criminal violence); Security Forces to be Stepped Up in
Crime-Ridden Areas, Agence France Presse, Aug. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
Library, AFP File (recounting Mufamadi and Modise announcement that police and
soldiers would "immediately and substantially" be sent to Johannesburg area,
KwaZulu-Natal, and Eastern Cape to fight violent crime); Heitman, Jane's Interview,
supra note 96 (quoting Modise discussing SANDF deployments in KwaZulu-Natal and
Gauteng in support of police).
232. Counter-Violence in the Cape, supra note 213; see also McCarthy, Vigilantes, supra
note 83, at 569.
233. Mandela Says Government Will "Sideline and Even Crush" All Dissident Forces,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
BBCSWB File. Mandela noted, however, that he would "prefer" to use persuasion on
such dissidents. Id.
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keep the SANDF's Intelligence Division involved in South African
internal affairs. As the government's 1996 Defence White Paper
described the situation, while "[a]s a general rule, the Division is not
permitted to collect domestic military intelligence in a covert
manner," where the SANDF is "deployed internally in support of
the police, the National Strategic Intelligence Act provides that the
President may authorise the Division to engage in such collection in
a specific geographical area for a specified duration."'2 4 As long as
there are "troopies" on duty in South Africa's townships, in other
words, there will probably be military "spooks" lurking in the
alleyways and SANDF wiretaps on the telephones.
C. Lessons from the U.S. Experience?
South Africa, to its credit, has been nothing if not self-aware in
drawing upon a variety of international models in the creation of its
new constitutional and statutory system.23 Though issues of security
oversight and civil-military relations have been a less prominent
part of this undertaking than have broader legal and constitutional
issues, the ANC government has also professed itself eager to learn
from the experiences of other countries in building a post-apartheid
order that is both free and secure.23 And well it should be. For while
234. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE (1996), at 12; see also
House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 4140 (remarks of Kader Asmal) (noting
that statute prohibits covert collection of domestic intelligence by military "except
under exceptional circumstances and with the explicit permission of the Cabinet").
Under intelligence legislation adopted in 1994, the SANDF was authorized to
undertake clandestine collection of domestic military-related intelligence when the
President
is of the opinion that conditions are such that the [SANDF] has to
prepare itself for possible employment for [domestic] service referred to
in... the Constitution and upon having been authorized by the Co-
ordinator for Intelligence acting with the concurrence of [the National
Intelligence Coordinating Committee] and the Cabinet.
§ 3(2) of National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994.
235. Johan van der Vyver, a professor at South Africa's University of the
Witwatersrand, for example, wrote an article in 1991 that illustrates the breadth of the
jurisprudential net South Africans cast in searching the legal systems of the world for
principles and institutions that would well serve the post-apartheid state. See van der
Vyver, supra note 9, at 760-820 (discussing British, Canadian, Dutch, French, German,
Namibian, United States, and other legal systems, principles of international law, and
principal approaches to South African constitutionalism espoused by academics and
South African political parties); see also, e.g., supra note 62 (citing examples of South
African interest in drawing upon security oversight models from, inter alia, the United
States).
236. Defense Minister Modise, for example, has expressed a desire to learn from
other SADC countries' experiences in this regard. In his view, many of South Africa's
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issues of racial equality, federalism, and constitutional rights are
obviously vital to the future of the Republic, it is the thesis of this
Article that issues of national security law and oversight are vital as
well. The ugly history of South Africa in the twentieth century
teaches crucial lessons not only about segregation and racial
injustice but about the evils that may befall a state which entrusts
power without accountability to those in whom it vests a monopoly
upon lawful violence and coercion. Sub-Saharan Africa, after all, is
thick with countries whose peoples have shed oppression by other
races only to brutalize and impoverish themselves under more
indigenous tyrannies. History should suggest to South Africans
today that for those who aspire to democracy and justice within a
stable constitutional order, racial equality is not enough. Reaching
an appropriate equilibrium between liberty and security, therefore,
is an area in which South Africa will be able to learn from other
countries. With luck, it will also be a subject in which the Republic
can prove teacher as well.
In drawing upon foreign lessons and experiences in national
security law, it seems only natural that the United States should be
an important object of study. This is not to suggest that U.S. models
are worthy of reflexive approval or adoption in other lands. Indeed,
if anything, the idiosyncrasies of the American separation of powers
system might make certain approaches and innovations-even if
praiseworthy-very difficult to adopt in other contexts. And, as has
been suggested above with respect to intelligence oversight law,37
there is by no means agreement even within the United States that
its approach to security regulation is always wise, and there are
surely many foreign observers of American affairs who must think it
somewhat mad to commit so much to statutory text.
Even if one were to grant such criticisms some validity,
however, the fact remains that the United States essentially invented
national security law, and remains its foremost practitioner today.
As the first nation to establish a constitutional democracy and the
present possessor of both the most powerful military force and "the
largest organization for the production of [secret] information in
the history of civilization," it is thus both appropriate and
Black-ruled neighbors are, like South Africa, "emerging democracies. They have
embarked on building civil-military relations which are consistent with democracy.
There is much we can learn from each other." Helmoed-Romer Heitman, Southern
African States Pave Way for Co-operative Security, JANE'S DEF. WKLY., Sept. 2, 1995, at
19.
237. See supra text accompanying note 53.
238. See JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 7. Though the actual figures are classified,
according to Loch Johnson, the U.S. intelligence community employs more than
150,000 people and spends "some $28-30 billion a year." Id. at 6. To put this in
perspective, a $30 billion allocation for U.S. intelligence in 1993 would have been the
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unsurprising that the United States should be at the forefront of
security oversight law.
The American concern for these issues, in fact, long pre-dates
the establishment of the formidable U.S. national security apparatus
of modern times. The proper balancing of the interests of liberty and
security was a fundamental concern of the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution, who acutely perceived both the necessity of a
competent professional security apparatus and the imperative of
ensuring its subjection to the Constitution, civilian authority, and
the rule of law. As George Washington stated, "[a]ltho' a large
standing Army in time of Peace hath ever been considered
dangerous to the liberties of a country, yet a few Troops, under
certain circumstances, are not only safe, but indispensably
necessary."2 Then as now, the trick was to find a way to walk the
tightrope between liberty and security and to establish institutions
and procedures that will permit one's successors also to do so.
Always a principal preoccupation of the Framers, national security
law issues never lost their significance in American history, but they
became even more important after the end of the Second World War
when the pressures of global involvement on an unprecedented
scale and the demands of the worldwide confrontation with the
Soviet Union led to the establishment of a massive national security
bureaucracy in the United States. The structures and functions of
this security apparatus were established by statute,240 thereby
bringing the dilemmas of national security law and oversight into a
particularly sharp focus at a point when history provided-in the
form of Nazi Germany and international communism-indelible
examples both of the need for vigilance against foreign aggression
and domestic subversion and of the perils of entrusting too much
power to one's guardians.
equivalent of not much less than one-fifth of South Africa's entire gross domestic
product for that year. Cf. CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK 364 (1994).
239. Quoted in PALMER, supra note 39, at 25.
240. 50 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (National Security Act of 1947). The U.S. executive
branch established national security institutions under its own authority as well. The
National Security Agency ("NSA"), for example-the organization responsible for
electronic eavesdropping and code-breaking, and an agency having a budget
reportedly significantly larger than that of the Central Intelligence Agency-was
established solely by a top-secret (and still classified) presidential directive in 1952. See
CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY 197 (1996) (recounting
"secret presidential signature" and noting that "[b]efore long, both the new agency's
budget and its personnel outstripped those of the CIA"); JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE
PALACE 12, 15 & 81 (1983) (recounting establishment of NSA and describing it as
largest single item in U.S. intelligence budget); JOHNSON I, supra note 15, at 125 ("The
NSA... is considered 'the largest and most expensive intelligence agency in the
history of Western civilization.' ") (quoting Christopher Andrew).
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National security law issues grew into even greater prominence
in the U.S. during the 1970s, fueled by the disillusionment with
executive power that accompanied the collapse of the U.S. war effort
in Vietnam, the resignation of President Richard Nixon amid
scandals small and large, and the revelation of intelligence agencies'
involvement in widespread domestic spying and other activities.
The mid-1970s thus saw the birth of the second generation of
statutory national security oversight in the United States with the
passage of the War Powers Resolution241 and the first intelligence
oversight statutes," setting in motion a process of statutory
adjustment and readjustment that continues to this day.
43
The United States' long-standing engagement with the
dilemmas of national security law and oversight makes its
experience with these issues, while perhaps sometimes rather
idiosyncratic, by far the most extensive of any political or legal
system on the planet. Such experience must almost inevitably
provide some lessons for the emerging security oversight regime in
South Africa.
D. The Challenges of Security Oversight
1. A Taxonomy of Oversight Law and Policy
South Africa's post-apartheid system will have to grapple with
the five principal tasks of security oversight:
(1) Executive Oversight-the establishment and mainte-
nance of institutions or procedures that tell the president
and the cabinet what various portions of the security bu-
reaucracy are doing so as to facilitate the maintenance of
civilian control over these institutions and to prevent them
from deviating from government policy or from the
bounds imposed by the Constitution and laws;
241. The War Powers Resolution was adopted in 1973 by a two-thirds majority vote
of the U.S. Congress, overriding President Nixon's veto. See generally STEPHEN DYCUS
ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 119 (1990).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 43-51.
243. For examples of the ongoing debate over the present system of authorizing the
use of U.S. military force overseas, for example, see ELY, supra note 34; HAROLD H.
KO-, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION (1990); Thomas Franck, After the Fall:
The New Procedural Framework for Congressional Control over the War Power, 71 AM. J.
INT'L L. 605 (1977); Harold H. Koh, Why the President (Alnost) Always Wins in Foreign
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988); Eugene Rostow,
"Once More Unto the Breach: " The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1
(1986).
FALL 19971
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
(2) Intra-institutional Oversight-the establishment and
maintenance of institutions or procedures to ensure that
the various constituent parts of individual state security
organs remain within the bounds of law and institutional
policy;
(3) Popular Accountability-the establishment and main-
tenance of institutions or procedures to ensure that the
public as a whole remains sufficiently aware of actions the
government undertakes in its name to hold that govern-
ment politically accountable;
(4) Legislative Oversight-the establishment and mainte-
nance of institutions or procedures to ensure that the
operations of the national executive and the security appa-
ratus are known to the national legislature so as to make it
possible for that body to hold the government politically
(and financially) accountable for its actions and to permit
the legislature to enact or amend national law to reflect its
understanding of oversight requirements; and
(5) Judicial Oversight-the establishment and mainte-
nance of institutions or procedures to ensure that the
national executive does not violate the Constitution or
laws in its operation of the security apparatus, and that the
legislature does not in its pursuit of security enact laws
that violate the Constitution.
The Republic's contemporary circumstances suggest that all of these
will prove challenging in some respects, but some clearly have
special importance as South Africa attempts to develop norms and
institutions appropriate both to the values of democracy and
constitutionalism and to the country's security needs.
2. Setting the Security-Oversight Mold: Now or Perhaps Never
The democratically elected South African government of
Nelson Mandela is still young and the country has only just begun
its life under the permanent Constitution it adopted last year. If the
Republic is to achieve a workable system of security oversight
capable of meeting the challenges this new government faces, this is
the period in which the laws, institutions, procedures, practices, and
cultural norms required by such a system must be set. Real legal and
constitutional accountability has never before been asked of South
Africa's security services, the military has never before been
genuinely integrated, the ANC-led parliament is "largely new to the
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business of running a country," 4 a body of judicial precedent
dealing with oversight issues has yet to develop, and the patterns of
behavior between (and within) the security forces, the parliament,
and the public with respect to these matters have not yet taken root.
As will be seen hereinafter, much of the formal institutional
structure for security oversight in South Africa has already been
established, but it is still too early to tell how all of these
mechanisms will work together in responding to the tensions and
challenges that lie ahead.
Because of the premium national security law places upon the
setting and continuous adjustment of a fine equilibrium between
liberty and security, systems of national security oversight are
perhaps even more dependent than other areas of law upon norms
of intra- and inter-institutional propriety. The patterns of behavior
set today, in other words, will powerfully determine the shape of
security oversight for years to come. Learned Hand once suggested
that such mores are in fact more important than a country's formal
institutions of oversight and accountability:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much
upon Constitutions, upon laws and courts. These are false
hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the
hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no
Constitution, no law, no court can save it; no Constitution,
no law, no court can even do much to help it.245
Particularly in a' system in which the role of the courts
themselves in security oversight has yet to be determined-and in
which it therefore remains unclear whether conventional
adjudicative models or a more informal, "New Havenish" process
will form the backbone of South African national security law-it is
vital quickly to establish a culture of accountability. Especially in
times of crisis, the norms of behavioral propriety internalized by
members of the security forces may well turn out to be society's
regulatory mechanism of both first and last resort.24'
244. Heitman, Foss, & Reed, supra note 92, at 23.
245. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189-90 (3d ed. 1960).
246. With respect to observance of lawful conduct by U.S. military personnel during
the war in Indochina, for example, it has been suggested that "legal restraints [are] not
that important in the eyes of most commanders[,] ... [who instead] act[] more on their
own sense of moral right and wrong, ignoring written rules where they seriously
impeded operations, while seeking some sense of moral proportionality .... " ROGER
H. NYE, THE CHALLENGE OF COMMAND 88-89 (1986). The quoted argument is not
necessarily that of Nye himself, but later he does concede, for example, that codes of
military conduct specifying that soldiers must not obey "unlawful" orders are
essentially unenforceable in any formal sense. In all but the most egregious cases, he
writes, "the refusal to obey is worked out between contending parties" rather than
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The early years of any new governmental system are obviously
crucial ones in establishing the patterns according to which its
various constituent parts will interact for good or for ill. It was
certainly so in the American experience, and both U.S. citizens and
the rest of the world owe much to the example set by George
Washington and his compatriots in the early years of that republic,
for instance, in staving off military meddling in political governance
during the so-called Newburgh Conspiracy of 1783 and in
suppressing the Whisky Rebellion of 1793-94 only through actions
taken in painfully strict observance of constitutional propriety.
47
Capitulation to expediency or any less rigorous an insistence upon
proper legal conduct in those formative years could have "altered
forever the equation of civil-military relations in the United States,
with what calamitous results we will never know. 248 Less
dramatically but perhaps no less importantly, the period
immediately following the Second World War-in which a "basic
alignment" among the "most critical [U.S.] civil-military
subsystems" was established by legislation such as the National
Security Act of 1947 49at just the point when American policymakers
were acquiring vast international responsibilities and found
themselves plunging into a bitter period of confrontation with the
Soviet Union and its communist allies-was a vital watershed for
future patterns of security oversight and civil-military relations in
the United States. The new constitutional democracy in South Africa
will also face significant security oversight challenges in the months
and years ahead; it will be similarly vital that it pass these tests with
its integrity unblemished.
through any formal adjudication of the actual legality of the command in question.
The principal purpose for the "unlawful order" rule, therefore, is "to deter
commanders from issuing illegal orders." Id. at 120.
Much more broadly, as Nye recognizes, the tension between the efficient
pursuit of security and the demands of individual liberty are also continually
"adjudicated" through such informal means in the day-to-day interactions between
military commanders and their subordinates. Id. at 124-25. These observations on the
observance and efficacy of the rule of law during the heat of battle not only illustrate
the importance of informal "New Haven"-style analysis in national security matters,
but also the importance of what are described hereinabove as "ascriptive" civil-
military control techniques that seek to ensure that security professionals are carefully
selected and trained with an eye to the inculcation of a strong sense of professional
propriety and restraint. Id. at 167; cf. JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 29 (discussing
selection and training of intelligence officers).
247. See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 39, at 18 (discussing Newburgh Conspiracy); id. at
264, 267-68 (discussing Whisky Rebellion).
248. Id. at 20.
249. Paul Bracken, Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations, in CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS, supra note 34, at 145, 156.
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South Africa thus enjoys a vital "window of opportunity," that
offers great opportunities for good. Today, though the institutions
and practices of the South African oversight system remain
somewhat fluid, the government is in a position to set the tone for
years to come. The political momentum of establishing an entirely
new governmental system is conducive to "new thinking" about
such problems, and reformers could hardly wish for a better call to
arms-or a better lesson in what not to do in matters of security
regulation-than the abuses carried out in the name of national
security during the apartheid era and now being exposed in
gruesome detail by Bishop Desmond Tutu's "Truth Commission."
21°
Moreover, because the personal prestige and credibility of
Nelson Mandela have played a critical role in smoothing the
Republic's uneasy transformation from racist oligarchy to
constitutional democracy, the window in which security oversight
reforms may be carried out and patterns set will not last forever.
Mandela has made it clear that he will "definitely not" seek another
term as South Africa's president after the expiration of his present
term in 1999.s' Because "no one can fill Mandela's shoes," many
South Africans reportedly "look to the post-Mandela era with
trepidation."252
Taking full advantage of this "window of opportunity" while it
lasts is therefore one of the greatest challenges facing the ANC
government today. And the stakes are enormously high. To
paraphrase one American military historian, determining the
character and powers of a nation's national security institutions is
essential to the creation of that nation itself: a country's vision of its
own future is reflected in the consensus it forms about the nature of
the institutions it creates in order to protect itself.2 s3 What a triumph
it would be for those who so long resisted majority rule in South
Africa, after all, for the post-apartheid era to squander the freedoms
for which its people fought for so long by falling back into the ugly
patterns of unaccountable authoritarianism that plagued the
250. Though the incident had been an international cause celbre since its occurrence,
for example, it was only "confirmed" (i.e., officially admitted) in 1997 submissions to
the Truth Commission that Steve Biko-the leader of South Africa's "Black
Consciousness Movement"-had been murdered while in police custody in 1977. In
South Africa, Confessions to Dark Era's Worst Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997, at Al.
251. See, e.g., Peter Gregson, Mandela in Good Health But Will Not Seek New Term,
Reuters World Service, Feb. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, REUWLD File.
252. Rohan Minogue, When Mandela Goes-South Africa Looks to 1999 with Trepidation,
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Dec. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, DPA File.
253. PALMER, supra note 39, at 24 ("[Dletermining the scale and scope of a nation's
military structure is an essential prerequisite to the creation of the nation itself. The
vision of the shape of a country's future is depicted largely in the consensus formed
over the shape of its army.").
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Republic until recently.2- If South Africa is to establish legal,
institutional, and cultural patterns appropriate for its new
democratic constitutional order, now is the time in which it must do
so.
II. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA
A. Executive Oversight
Earlier, this Article described executive oversight as relating to
the establishment and maintenance of institutions and procedures
that inform the top political leadership of
what various portions of the security bureaucracy are
doing so as to facilitate the maintenance of civilian control
over these institutions and to prevent them from deviating
from government policy or from the bounds imposed by
the Constitution and laws.
This definition obviously implicates issues of both legal propriety
("Did they break any laws?") and policy control ("Are they doing
what I told them to do?"),5 although the focus of this Article is
upon oversight of the legal variety.2 Continuing concerns over the
254. Or, as George Washington put it upon being offered an American crown at the
close of his successful campaign to expel those who would govern the American
colonies in the name of a British one, "What a triumph for our enemies to verify their
predictions! What a triumph for the advocates of despotism to find that we are
incapable of governing ourselves, and that systems founded on the basis of equal
liberty are merely ideal and fallacious!" Id. at 72.
255. Even in the highly legalized world of U.S. security oversight, it was the "policy"
nexus which traditionally received the most attention from senior leaders; only after
the intelligence scandals of the mid-1970s did specifically "legal" concerns acquire
currency. See, e.g., UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 234-36 (Bruce
Watson, Susan Watson, & Gerald Hopple, eds. 1990) [hereinafter INTELLIGENCE
ENCYCLOPEDIA]. In many other countries, such as France, the legal oversight issue has
traditionally received very little attention, and intelligence "reform" efforts-to the
extent they are undertaken at all-involve improvements in inter-agency coordination.
See, e.g., PORCH, supra note 128, at 466-67 & 494-96 (discussing French proposals to
adopt interagency coordination committee for intelligence matters).
In South Africa, the principal institution of policy coordination was an effort to
reduce fragmentation in the national intelligence apparatus through the establishment
of a "National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee" ("NICOC") made up of the Co-
ordinator for Intelligence, the directors-general of the NIA and the South African
Secret Service, the chief of the SANDF's Intelligence Division, and the head of the
National Investigation Service of the police service. See National Strategic Intelligence
Act 39 of 1994.
256. Similarly, security oversight functions may be understood also to include the
more conventional criminal/prosecutorial tasks of ensuring that members of the
country's security bureaucracy obey anti-corruption laws-e.g., the Corruption Act 94
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degree to which South Africa's intelligence services really
understand themselves to be "playing on the same team," however,
underscore the point that both the policy and the legal aspects of
executive oversight will have to be important parts of post-apartheid
South African governance.
2 5 7
South Africa, it should be noted, is no stranger to extra-
institutional executive-level security oversight, having historically
had some experience with appointed overseers who occasionally
approached their work with a remarkable degree of vigor and
independence. Observers of the contemporary South African scene
will be familiar, for example, with the Goldstone Commission's
pathbreaking inquiry into "third-force" violence and extra-judicial
executions by members of the apartheid-era security forces.2m It is
often forgotten today, however, that it was also the inquiring eye of
Auditor-General Gerald Barrie that helped topple the government of
Prime Minister B.J. Vorster in 1978 after Barrie's audit of the
Ministry of Information revealed widespread misappropriation of
government funds2 -- and this only a year after Vorster had led the
National Party to win the largest majority it had ever enjoyed in
South Africa's all-White House of Assembly. These examples
illustrate that it is indeed possible for persons of integrity to play a
of 1992-and remain subject to ordinary criminal prohibitions. This Article, however,
will focus more narrowly upon abuse-of-power issues, leaving it for others to cover
South Africa's contemporary criminal justice system.
257. Most dramatically, press accounts in early 1996 suggested that electronic
listening devices found in the homes of several prominent police officials had been
planted by the National Intelligence Agency. National Police Commissioner George
Fivaz told the press that former police official and apartheid-era "dirty tricks"
specialist Dirk Coetzee had identified NIA as the institution responsible. Deputy
Minister of Intelligence Services Joe Nhlanhla, Deputy Co-ordinator for Intelligence
Moe Shaik, and NIA Director-General Sizakale Sigxashe, however, all denied any NIA
involvement-while Coetzee is said to have subsequently recanted (Shaik, however,
declared that it was "extremely possible" that the plan originated with rogue elements
within the police service itself). See Deputy President Mbeki Calls Meeting of Senior Police
on Spying Allegations, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 5, 1996, available in
LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File; Lynne Duke, S. African Police Asking Who Bugged
Their Line, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1996, at A18.
In May 1996, the Democratic Party's Tony Leon also directed a parliamentary
question at Justice Minister Dullah Omar inquiring as to whether the government had
been monitoring the communications of cabinet ministers, members of parliament,
and provincial government officials. Omar, however, refused to answer, claiming that
the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act barred the disclosure of any such
information. See House of Assembly Hansard 11 Mar 1996 Col 279-80 (remarks of A.J.
Leon and Minister of Justice with respect to Question 65).
258. See, e.g., supra note 10.
259. See generally HISTORY, supra note 12, at 451. The scandal growing out of Barrie's
audit was known variously as "Infogate" and "Muldergate," the latter term being
derived from the name of Minister of Information Connie Mulder, who was forced to
resign before Vorster himself stepped down for reasons of "health."
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fundamental role in investigating allegations of wrongdoing and
bringing to light abuses of power by even the most secretive of
administrations. It will be up to their modern analogues to build
upon this legacy in South Africa today.
Contemporary South Africa has already, in fact, developed a
number of semi-independent institutions dedicated to providing
certain types of "oversight,'2 6 all of which have at least some
potential relevance to the regulation of the country's security
services. Three of these institutions are written into South Africa's
new Constitution: the Public Protector, the Auditor-General, and the
Human Rights Commission. All are appointed by the President with
the approval of the National Assembly,2 61 and may be removed only
for cause and by a full Assembly vote.262 These "[s]tate [ilnstitutions
[slupporting constitutional [d]emocracy" are intended to be
genuinely "independent" institutions, "subject only to the
Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and must
exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear,
favour or prejudice."26 Other organs of state are bound to "assist
and protect" these offices, while they, in turn, must report at least
annually to the National Assembly on the progress of their work.2"
Inspired by the recognition that modern democracies need
someone to "watch the watchdog, ' 26 the office of the Public
Protector is perhaps the position with the most direct relevance to
security oversight. According to one ANC parliamentarian, the idea
for the Protector was borrowed from Swedish law, which has
established a general government Ombudsman--"an independent
and impartial officer whose task would be to act as a guardian of the
people in a democracy" by standing up "against any unscrupulous
action at any level of government by any person holding public
office"-charged with receiving and investigating a wide variety of
complaints lodged by the public.26 Legislation adopted in 1994,
moreover, went further than the present Constitution requires in
260. Some have suggested that modem South Africa actually has too many such
independent institutions. President Mandela's legal advisor, for example, has
described South Africa's new Constitution as being "littered" with oversight
institutions almost to a fault. Nicholas Haysom, remarks to the University of Michigan
School of Law (Mar. 21, 1997).
261. S. AFR. CONST. § 193(4H5).
262. Id. § 194(1) (describing procedures for removal due to misconduct, incapacity,
or incompetence).
263. Id. § 181(2).
264. Id. § 181(3), (5). Under legislation adopted in 1994, the Public Protector was
required to report to Parliament every six months. See Senate Hansard 2 Nov 1994 Col
2655 (remarks of Deputy Minister of Justice).
265. Id. Col 2666 (remarks of M.W. Moosa).
266. Id. Col 2657-58 (remarks of R.J. Radue).
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encouraging a degree of independence for the Public Protector,
providing for his appointment by the President only upon the
recommendation of a multi-party parliamentary committee, and
subjecting the Protector to parliamentary approval by a seventy-five
percent vote.267
According to the new Constitution, the Public Protector is
empowered to investigate "any conduct in state affairs, or in the
public administration in any sphere of government, that is alleged or
suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety or
prejudice[,]" to report on such conduct, and "to take appropriate
remedial action."" The drafters of the Protector's authorizing
legislation seem to have envisioned the office principally as a
weapon against official corruption,269 but its constitutional and its
statutory mandate are written broadly enough to cover almost any
wrongdoing by government employees and might well extend toS 270 y .
security oversight issues. Whether the occupants of this office will
choose to involve themselves in security matters, of course, is
something that remains to be seen; the impact of the Public Protector
upon oversight issues is a necessarily idiosyncratic variable that will
no doubt vary enormously from one Protector to the next. The
constitutional requirement that reports issued by the office "must be
267. See § 3(2)(b) of Public Protector Act 23 of 1994; see also House of Assembly
Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 4155 (remarks of J.A. Jordaan); Senate Hansard 2 Nov 1994
Col 2673 (remarks of R. Rabinowitz). The Constitution requires that the Public
Protector be limited to a single, non-renewable seven-year term. See S. AFR. CONST. §
183.
268. S. AFR. CONST. § 182(1).
269. See, e.g., Senate Hansard 2 Nov 1994 Col 2654-55 (describing Public Protector as
"the operational arm of Parliament" in "ensur[ing] that... funds are properly used
and that such funds are properly accounted for"); see also id. Col 2665-67 (remarks of
M.W. Moosa and J.R. De Ville).
270. § 6(4) of Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 (giving Public Protector, "[i]n addition
to the powers and functions assigned ... [by] the Constitution," powers to investigate
any alleged "maladministration in connection with the affairs of any institution in
which the State is the majority or controlling shareholder or of any public entity,"
"abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair, capricious, discourteous or other
improper conduct or undue delay by a person performing a function connected with
his or her employment by [such] an institution or entity," "improper or unlawful
enrichment or receipt of any improper advantage," or "act or omission by a person in
the employ of [such] an institution or entity.., which results in unlawful or improper
prejudice to any other person"); see also Senate Hansard 2 Nov 1994 Col 2675-76
(remarks of E.N. Lubidla) (describing duties of Public Protector as including "the
investigation of complaints regarding any alleged maladministration in connection
with the affairs of the government at any level, the abuse or unjustified exercise of
power or unfair, capricious, discourteous or other improper conduct or undue delay
by a person performing a public function, as well as improper or dishonest acts, or
omissions or corruption with respect to public money").
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open to the public" except in "exceptional circumstances"2 71 may also
make it difficult for the Public Protector to deal routinely with
security oversight matters.27 One may hope, however, that the
prestige and power of this office-it has, for example, been called
"one of the most important checks and balances for which provision
has been made in our Constitution to combat the many evils of
government"2"3-will be usefully so employed (Particularly to the
extent that corruption within the security services erodes their
ability to safeguard South Africa's borders against drug and
weapons trafficking and properly to pursue criminal investigations
against international and domestic organized crime syndicates,
moreover, even a monomaniacal focus by the Public Protector upon
traditional "corruption" issues will be of no small benefit to security
oversight in South Africa).
Another constitutionally created office with potential relevance
for security oversight issues is the position of Auditor-General. The
Auditor-General's jurisdiction only extends to financial matters,275
but this mandate, of course, is by no means unimportant to security
issues. As noted above, after all, it was an Auditor-General who in
1977-78 helped bring down the Vorster government by exposing the
271. S. AFR CONST. § 182(5). The authorizing statute, however, does not require
such publication, providing merely that the Public Protector "may... in the manner
he or she deems fit, make known to any person any finding, point of view or
recommendation in respect of a matter investigated by him or her." § 8(1) of Public
Protector Act 23 of 1994.
272. There is apparently no provision in South African law for a wholly confidential
institution of security oversight analogous to the United States' Intelligence Oversight
Board ("IOB")--a standing committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board ("PFIAB") charged with reporting to the White House on suspected violations
of law, executive order, or presidential directive by U.S. intelligence agencies. See
generally E.O. 12,863 (Sept. 13, 1993), at §§ 2.1-2.3 (re-establishing lOB as part of
PFIAB and defining IOB's responsibilities). The IOB was first established in 1977 by
President Gerald Ford upon the recommendation of the Rockefeller Commission,
which had been appointed to study abuses by the U.S. intelligence services. See E.O.
11,905 (February 18, 1976). With apparently only one exception-its release in June
1996 of a report on CIA activities in Guatemala, see INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD,
REPORT ON THE GUATEMALA REVIEW (June 28, 1996)-the IOB's reports have always
been secret.
273. Senate Hansard 2 Nov 1994 Col 2668 (remarks of J.R. De Vine). Even the ANC-
whose officials will for the foreseeable future be the principal objects of scrutiny from
the Public Protector--claims to recognize the importance of this office. As one
parliamentarian put it in 1994, though the ANC felt that no Public Protector was
needed as long as it was in power, "we... believe in transient majorities" and endorse
the need to write strong oversight institutions into the fabric of South African law. Id.
Col 2656 (remarks of E.S. Mchunu).
274. See, e.g., supra notes 83, 184, & 220.
275. S. AFR. CONST. § 188(1)(a) (providing that the Auditor-General "must audit and
report on the accounts, financial statements, and financial management of all national
and provincial state departments and administrations").
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Ministry of Information's illegal clandestine propaganda campaigns
both within South Africa and abroad.27' What role this office will
play in the years ahead, of course, remains to be seen, but the role
the Auditor-General can play in uncovering corrupt misuses of
government funds is itself an important one.
The other constitutionally created office with at least potential
relevance to security oversight is the Human Rights Commission.
This body is generally charged with "monitor[ing] and assess[ing]
the observance of human rights in the Republic[,]" and is
empowered "to take steps to secure appropriate redress where
human rights have been violated...."77 Under authorizing
legislation enacted in 1994, the Commission enjoys considerable
investigatory and even quasi-prosecutorial powers. "All organs of
state" are required to give the Commission "such assistance as may
be reasonably required for the effective exercising of its powers and
performance of its duties and functions."m In the course of
conducting its own investigation, the commission may require the
production of information, administer oaths, and compel
testimony.279 Persons who "without just cause" obstruct or otherwise
refuse to cooperate with a Commission investigation, moreover, are
subject to a fine or imprisonment of up to six months."" The
Commission also enjoys a robust power of search and seizure of
276. See HISTORY, supra note 12, at 448-49, 451.
277. S. AFR. CONST. §§ 184(1)(c), (2)(b). By statute, the Commission's jurisdiction
extends over issues concerning "fundamental rights." § 7(1)(c) of Human Rights
Commission Act 54 of 1994. In addition, the Commission must each year require
"relevant organs of state to provide the Commission with information on the measures
that they have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights
concerning housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the
environment." S. AFR. CONST. § 184(3).
278. § 7(2) of Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994.
279. Id. § 9(1)(aHd). With respect to testimony before the Commission, there is no
self-incrimination privilege per se, but section 9(3)(a) of the statute provides that
incriminating answers "directly or indirectly derived from [required testimony] shall
not be admissible as evidence against the person concerned . . . in a court of law or
before any body or institution established by or under any law." Such testimony,
however, is admissible for certain specific purposes (e.g., in prosecutions for perjury
or with respect to criminal prosecutions under the provisions of section 18 of the
Human Rights Commission Act, which imposes penalties for non-cooperation with
the Commission).
280. Id. § 18 (providing penalties for, inter alia, refusing to cooperate with the
Commission; knowingly giving false evidence; interrupting or "misbehav[ingl" during
Commission proceedings; "defam[ing] the Commission or a member of the
Commission in his or her official capacity;" committing actions that would otherwise
constitute contempt of court, attempting improperly to influence the Commission, or
failing to offer necessary assistance).
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premises and property,"' although a court warrant for such action is
usually required.2 2  Ultimately, the Commission may "bring
proceedings [for the enforcement of rights] in a competent court or
tribunal in its own name, or on behalf of a person or a group or class
of ,,21of persons.
' 2
The extensive powers of the Human Rights Commission-so
broad as to cause some opposition parliamentarians to voice a
concern that the Human Rights Commission watchdog might itself
need some watching2 4---may have some significance for security
oversight in post-apartheid South Africa. The Constitution's bill of
rights includes a number of provisions restraining the conduct of the
security services with respect to law enforcement, domestic
intelligence collection, and in-country SANDF deployments. Its
clauses protecting the rights of prisoners and detainees, providing
South Africans with a general right of access to "any information
held by the state,"2" and articulating a broad right of privacy with
significant implications for domestic intelligence surveillance, 7 for
example, seem likely to give the Human Rights Commission some
ability to act as a check upon the South African security forces.
Finally, South African statutory law contains provisions for
certain additional oversight institutions. A law enacted in 1993, for
example, created a "Security Forces Board of Inquiry" made up of
281. Id. § 10(1) (allowing the Commission to "enter any premises on or in which
anything connected with [a Commission] investigation is or is suspected to be"); id. §
10(3) (authorizing seizure of evidence therein); see also Senate Hansard 28 Jun 1994 Col
204 (remarks of R.J. Radue) (discussing Commission's "unqualified right to enter
upon and inspect any premises" and to seize any documentation "reasonably required
for the purpose of investigating the suspected contravention of the human rights
concerned").
282. § 10(5) of Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994. No warrant is needed,
however, where the Commission (or its agent) believes "on reasonable grounds" that
going through the process of requesting a warrant would "defeat the object of the
entry and search." Id. § 10(6)(b).
283. Id. § 7(1)(e). Generally, however, the Commission is expected first to attempt to
"resolve any dispute" or "rectify any act or omission" through the use of "mediation,
conciliation or negotiation." See id. § 8.
284. See, e.g., Senate Hansard 28 Jun 1994 Col 208, 213-14 (remarks of J. Selfe & J.R.
De Ville) (suggesting that Commission's powers to compel testimony are overbroad).
285. § 12(1) of Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994 (providing right "not to be
deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause," "not to be detained without
trial," "to be free from all forms of violence," "not to be tortured in any way," and "not
to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way"); id. § 35 (providing
various procedural and substantive rights to "arrested, detained and accused
persons"); see also id. § 37(6)-(7) (providing some protections for detainees in event of
state of emergency).
286. Id. § 32(1)(a).
287. Id. § 14 (providing persons with right "not to have... their person or home" or
"their property searched," "their possessions seized," or "the privacy of their
communications infringed").
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three persons (one of whom had to be a judge).2" Grounded in the
supposition that South Africa's police force "cannot adequately
investigate allegations against its own members," 28 this Board was
charged with "inquir[ing] into the alleged commission of a serious
offense by a member of a security force" and making reports and
recommendations to the government with respect to any violations
thereby discovered]9 A statute passed in October 1996, moreover,
provided more generally for a government mechanism for the ad
hoc creation of task-oriented presidentially appointed "Special
Investigating Units" and corresponding "Special Tribunals" to
investigate and adjudicate allegations of "serious maladministration
in connection with the affairs of any State institution," "improper or
unlawful conduct by employees of any State institution," or
"unlawful appropriation or expenditure of public money or
property."291 These institutions may be established by the president
by proclamation in the Government Gazette whenever he or she
deems it "necessary. "2 Furthermore, the special investigating unit
enjoys powers to require the production of information, compel
testimony, and search premises similar to those wielded by the
Human Rights Commission.
It is unclear what impact these statutory bodies will have upon
security oversight in South Africa. The Special Investigating
Units/Tribunals, it was said, were necessary to give the government
a greater "capacity to act swiftly and decisively upon allegations of
conduct posing serious threats to the interests of the State and the
public at large" than it already possessed.9 The "special"
investigation process was apparently intended principally to target
288. See § 3(1) of Security Forces Board of Inquiry Act 95 of 1993.
289. House of Assembly Hansard 10 Jun 1993 Col 10745 (remarks of L. Fuchs).
290. § 2 of Security Forces Board of Inquiry Act 95 of 1993. The Act defined a
"member of a security force" in such a way as to exclude members of a civilian
intelligence service such as the then-National Intelligence Service (now the NIA). See
id. § 1 (defining phrase to include members of then-SADF or Reserve force, police
officers, members of Department of Correctional Services, or certain other officials). A
"serious offence" was defined to mean murder, kidnapping, assault upon a person in
custody with intent to do grievous bodily harm, violating the Corruption Act 94 of
1992, "defeating the ends of justice," or committing "any other offence which in the
opinion of the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer [of the Board of Inquiry] is of
a serious nature." Id.
291. § 2(2)(aHc) of Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Bill B 76B-96 of
1996.
292. Id. § 2(1).
293. See generally id. §§ 5-6 (enumerating the powers of the special investigation
unit); see also id. § 12 (providing penalties for interference with, non-cooperation with,
or obstruction of Investigating Unit inquiry).
294. MEMORANDUM ON THE OBJECTS OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNITS AND
SPECIAL TRIBUNALS BILL B 76B-96, § 2 (1996).
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"corruption in Government departments and corruption and
malpractices in parastatals,"295 but its authorizing statute contains
extremely broad phrasing giving it jurisdiction over all "improper or
unlawful" activities by state employees.2 The responsibilities of
these "special institutions," therefore, could easily be understood to
extend generally to abuses of power by security personnel or other
issues related to security oversight.
To the observer concerned with checks upon government
power in post-apartheid South Africa, however, these "Investigating
Units" and "Tribunals" might well seem more alarming than
reassuring. In a sense, these bodies represent a parallel, government-
controlled judicial system designed to resolve matters without being
inconvenienced 7 the delays and procedural impediments of
formal litigation. The Special Tribunal is, in fact, authorized "to
adjudicate upon any civil law dispute which may be brought before
[it] by a Special Investigating Unit or an interested party."298 The
Tribunal's jurisdiction reaches only government employees and is
limited to civil (as opposed to criminal) wrongdoing,2 but the
Tribunal still enjoys considerable coercive power even with respect
to persons not formally the target of its attentions (e.g., witnesses). It
may, for example, imprison someone "with a view to securing his or
her presence as a witness" or to produce evidence," and it is
authorized to "make any order which it deems appropriate so as to
give effect to any ruling or decision given or made by it"'3 0-perhaps
295. House of Assembly Hansard 29 Oct 1996 Col 3124 [unrevised copy] (remarks of
Minister of Justice).
296. § 2(2)(b) of Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Bill B 76B-96 of
1996.
297. Id. § 3 ("The object of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Bill
is, therefore, to provide a mechanism through which such serious allegations can be
comprehensively and swiftly investigated, and at the same time, through which
remedial steps, which would ordinarily have to be pursued through the courts of law,
can be taken swiftly and cost-effectively."); see also House of Assembly Hansard 29 Oct
1996 Col 3124 [unrevised copy] (remarks of Minister of Justice) ("The object of the
legislation is to strengthen the hand of the executive, to strengthen the hand of
political authority, if I could put it that way, and indeed to strengthen the hand of the
President, so as to enable effective action to be taken to deal with allegations of serious
misconduct or maladministration."). The Tribunal process was considered preferable
to reliance upon the Public Protector, for example, in part because the Protector lacked
"adjudicative powers to enforce its findings." MEMORANDUM ON THE OBJECTS OF THE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNITS AND SPECIAL TRIBUNALS BILL B 76B-96, § 2 (1996)
298. MEMORANDUM ON THE OBJECTS OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNITS AND
SPECIAL TRIBUNALS BILL B 76B-96, § 8.1 (1996).
299. § 8(2) of Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Bill B 76B-96 (1996).
300. Id. § 8(5).
301. Id. § 8(2)(b).
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even including the power to imprison persons for contempt.2 For a
country that has only recently and at great cost managed to acquire a
system of constitutional rights enforceable against the political
branches of government by an independent judiciary, the
establishment of such a government-run "alternative" court system
sounds regressive, to say the least. With their authorizing statute
having only recently been enacted, however, it is still far too early to
tell whether these bodies will prove to be a powerful weapon in the
battle against the abuse of power or themselves a tool wielded in
such abuse.
B. Intra-Institutional Oversight
Intra-institutional oversight, as we have seen, relates to
"institutions or procedures to ensure that the various constituent
parts of individual state security organs remain within the bounds
of law and institutional policy." The task of ensuring intra-
institutional legal and policy conformity is particularly important on
account of the awkward "blending" process of integrating
apartheid-era security officers, "homeland" security units, and
former anti-apartheid guerrilla fighters of APLA and MK.3. In
addition to the more conventional problems of monitoring intra-
institutional compliance, South Africa thus faces the task of making
sure its security institutions run smoothly even when comprised of
groups of formerly antagonistic ex-combatants who no doubt still
somewhat distrust each other.3 Partly for this reason-and partly
simply because such institutions contribute to the security oversight
process in important ways-the post-apartheid government has
developed a number of organs dedicated to intra-institutional
oversight. Most prominent among these is the institution of the
inspectors-general.3 0
With respect to South Africa's intelligence services, the new
Constitution requires Parliament to enact legislation to permit
"civilian monitoring of the activities of [the intelligence] services by
302. See id. § 8(2)(b) (noting Tribunal's general power to "make any order which it
deems appropriate"). Anything done "in relation to a Special Tribunal" that in a court
of law would justify a citation for contempt (a category which presumably includes
failing to obey an order issued by the Tribunal) is a crime punishable by up to five
years' imprisonment. Id. § 12(1)(d).
303. The "blending" process for the SANDF has been described above. See supra text
accompanying notes 151-161.
304. See, e.g., Daley, supra note 174, at Al (recounting that before 1994 elections,
"African National Congress candidates worried that even when they took office, their
phones would be tapped, their meetings spied upon, their efforts sabotaged").
305. It was an audit of the Ministry of Information begun by the inspector-general.
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an inspector appointed by the President as head of the national
executive, and approved by a resolution adopted by the National
Assembly by a vote supported by at least two-thirds of its
members."3 Intelligence legislation adopted in 1994 went further
than today's Constitution requires, by providing that the inspector-
general be nominated by the parliamentary committee charged with
intelligence oversight and requiring that any such appointment be
approved by a parliamentary vote 307 Under this statute, the
inspector-general for each intelligence service (the NIA or SASS)38 is
formally responsible to the President, reports to the relevant cabinet
minister and the parliamentary oversight committee, and is
generally charged with reviewing service activities, monitoring
compliance with official policy, and evaluating service actions in
response to "unlawful intelligence activity" and "significant
intelligence failure[s]."309 Each service's inspector-general was also
306. S. AFR. CONST. § 210(b).
307. See §7(1) of Committee of Members of Parliament on an Inspectors-General of
Intelligence Act 40 of 1994. The 1994 legislation specified approval by a "resolution
adopted by a majority of at least 75% of the members present and voting at a joint
meeting" of the then-Senate and National Assembly. Id. § 7(1)(b).
308. Billy Masethla is presently the director-general of SASS, having succeeded Mike
Louw (who for some time was the most senior of apartheid-era intelligence officials to
remain in office) after the latter's retirement in April 1996. Sizakhele Sigxashe, a
former member of the ANC's Directorate of Intelligence and Security, now heads the
NIA-having himself succeeded former APLA commander Muziwendoda Ndluli,
who died of a gunshot wound to the head under somewhat mysterious circumstances
in October 1995. (Adding to the sensation of Ndluli's death, some South African
papers carried accounts that Ndluli had been spying for Zimbabwe's Central
Intelligence Organization). See generally Simon Baynharn, ANC Gets a Grip on State
Power, JANE'S INTELL. REV., Aug. 1, 1996, at 12 (reporting on the ANC's presence in
the security and intelligence forces); South African Intelligence Chief Found Dead,
Reuters North American News, Oct. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
REUNA File; South African Security Service (SASS), JANE'S INTEL. REV., Dec. 1, 1996, at
576; Zimbabwe Says S. African Spy Chief Not Its Agent, Reuters World Service, Oct. 29,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, REUWLD File.
309. See § 7(7), (11)(b) of Committee of Members of Parliament on and Inspectors-General
of Intelligence Act 40 of 1994 (enumerating the functions of the Inspectors-General and
requiring the submission of yearly activity reports and reports of corrective action in the
event of unlawful activity or intelligence failure). According to one cabinet minister, this
legislation was also intended to give the Inspector-General a role in helping intelligence
service personnel "appeal in terms of the constitutional, and especially the human rights,
provision in our bill of rights as protection for their services." House of Assembly Hansard
11 Nov 1994 Col 4151 (remarks of Kader Asmal).
In contrast to the Inspector-General's role at the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency-which was expanded in the 1950s to include financial auditing, apparently
on the assumption that the General Accounting Office might be unable properly to
handle classified information, see Geoffrey R. Weller, Comparing Western Inspectors
General of Intelligence and Security, 9 INT'L J. INTEL. & COUNTER-INTEL. 383, 392 (Winter
1996)-the South African Inspectors-General are not generally responsible for
auditing and financial oversight. But see House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col
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given a broad right of access to intelligence-related information
needed for the fulfillment of these functions31°-a right considerably
broader than that allocated South Africa's parliamentary intelligence
oversight committee. 311 Loosely based on the inspector-general
provisions of Canadian intelligence law 3 2-- but adding the
constitutional requirement of parliamentary appointment by
supermajority vote-this South African system is designed to
provide the cabinet with an independent set of "eyes and ears"
within the intelligence apparatus charged with reporting "whether
anything done by a service is... unlawful or an unreasonable
exercise of power.'
4153 (remarks of L.T. Landers) (describing Inspector-General as having a role in
ensuring provision by intelligence services of "a quality product and value for
money").
310. The governing legislation provides that
[nlotwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or
the common law, an Inspector-General shall have access to any
intelligence, information or premises under the control of the Service in
respect of which he or she has been appointed if such access is required
by the Inspector-General for the performance of his or her functions, and
he or she shall be entitled to demand from the Head of Service and its
employees such intelligence, information, reports and explanation as the
Inspector-General may deem necessary for the performance of such
functions.
§ 7(8) of Committee of Members of Parliament on and Inspectors-General of
Intelligence Act 40 of 1994; see id. § 7(9) ("No access to intelligence, information or
premises ... shall be withheld from an Inspector-General on any ground."); REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA, WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE 1994, § 6.1 ("These two
Inspectors-General will have unhindered access to classified information."); Senate
Hansard 15 Nov 1994 Col 3041 (remarks of Deputy Minister of Justice) ("No access to
intelligence, information or premises may be withheld by a service from an Inspector-
General."). Such access, of course, is vital to the ability of the Inspectors-General to
play their role in the oversight scheme properly. See generally Weller, supra note 309, at
394-95 ("The work of the Inspectors General would be hampered and their reputation
and credibility damaged, if they were unable to obtain the full access necessary to
carry out their function.").
311. See infra note 377; see also House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 4151
(remarks of Kader Asmal) (noting that Inspectors-General of intelligence have "very
wide access to documents, information or premises under control of the various
intelligence services, including intelligence sources and the methods used to obtain
information. These powers go beyond those of the committee of members of
Parliament.").
312. See Senate Hansard 15 Nov 1994 Col 3041 (remarks of Deputy Minister of
Justice) (describing the South African system as being based on Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act of 1984).
313. Id. (remarks of Deputy Minister of Justice); cf. Weller, supra note 309, at 385
("[I]n the Parliamentary systems [of Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom] the
Inspectors-General are the Minister's 'eyes and ears' on the intelligence agencies
covered by the relevant legislation."). According to one official, South Africans can not
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The foregoing examination has focused upon the oversight of
intelligence operations by means of the inspector-general
mechanism, but the NIA and SASS are not alone subject to such
intra-institutional oversight. There is also an inspector-general of the
SANDF, not only charged with overseeing policy and legal
compliance but also given financial auditing and management
oversight responsibilities.314 Within the South African Police Service
there is also an "Independent Complaints Directorate" at both the
national and provincial levels that is charged with investigating
"any misconduct or offence allegedly committed by any member" of
the police.315
The effectiveness of such intra-institutional actors in providing
meaningful oversight of the security apparatus is, of course, highly
dependent upon the strength of character, assiduousness, and
credibility of those the government appoints to fill these positions.
On paper, South Africa's intra-executive oversight institutions
sound quite promising. The inspectors-general of intelligence-
appointed, by a three-quarters parliamentary vote (rather than
simply upon the direction of the president) and given an apparently
unlimited right of access to classified information-would seem
particularly well-equipped to fulfill their oversight functions.
Provided that the government can both appoint and retain high-
caliber individuals, 6 such offices are likely to become a vital part of
the security oversight system in South Africa, complementing the
institutions of executive oversight discussed above (e.g., the Public
Protector and Auditor-General) 37 in ensuring that the executive
"justly claim that we... have the most advanced system of supervision and control
over intelligence in the world." Id. (remarks of Deputy Minister of Justice).
314. The Inspector-General of the SANDF also has responsibility for intelligence
oversight functions vis-a-vis the Intelligence Division of the military service. See
generally REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE 1996, at 12. The
Defence White Paper also urged the creation of a "Military Ombudsman," whose main
duty would be to investigate complaints against the SANDF made by military
personnel or members of the public. Id. at 11.
315. See § 53(2) of South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995; see also id. § 50(1)-(4)
(establishing directorate, providing for its independence from rest of SAPS, and
requiring all organs of state to give Directorate "such assistance as may reasonably be
required"); REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, ANNUAL PLAN OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE
SERVICE 1996/97, at 28 ("[lit is [the] responsibility [of the Independent Complaints
Directorate] to investigate allegations of abuse of powers against police officers.").
316. The appointment process, of course, is only half the battle: the government
must also provide remuneration and working conditions sufficient both to attract and
keep quality personnel in oversight positions. In October 1996, Inspector-General-for-
intelligence-designate Louis Skweyiya resigned his post as the result of a salary
dispute. See Intelligence Monitor: South Africa, JANE'S INTEL. REV., Mar. 1997, at 144.
Hopefully, such problems can be avoided in the future.
317. If anything, the intra-institutional offices (e.g., the inspectors-general) are likely
to be more important than offices such as the Public Protector because of their much
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branch of the South African government should be able to exercise
self-control if it wishes to do so. The possibility that it might not
wish to do so, however, leads us to the consideration of extra-
executive institutions of security oversight.
C. Popular Accountability
This category of "oversight" revolves around ensuring "that the
public as a whole remains sufficiently aware of actions the
government undertakes in its name to hold that government
politically accountable" for what it does.3 8 Especially in a democracy
of which the fundamental law is said to represent "the collective
wisdom of the South African people and [to have] been arrived at by
general agreement, ' 9 this is a vital function. Unfortunately,
however, while popular accountability is the bedrock of
governmental oversight in most areas of governance, it can be
difficult to rely upon it in the national security arena-where some
information must quite properly remain hidden from the public's
direct view. Nevertheless, as the United States CIA found out in the
1970s when the New York Times broke the story of its "Operation
CHAOS" domestic mail-opening program,32 an inquiring media and
an informed public can be a powerful check upon even the most
closely guarded of clandestine initiatives.
At first glance, and in contrast to the secrecy-obsessed regime it
succeeded, the post-apartheid South Africa takes a position of
extreme openness. The Constitution itself provides for a sweeping
right to information from the government. Specifically, "[elveryone
has the right of access to... any information held by the state."3 "2
The Constitution, in fact, mandates that "[n]ational legislation... be
enacted to give effect to this right," although this requirement is
subject to "reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and
financial burden on the state" that such access may entail.32 As a
greater ability to acquire expertise in their subject area and to devote their attentions
specifically to security issues.
318. Cf. JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at ix ("[Diemocracy relies on a knowledgeable
citizenry to provide general guidance to those few individuals who make foreign
policy decisions on their behalf.")
319. S. AFR. CONST. explanatory memorandum.
320. See generally JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 117 (discussing the influence of the
media as a check upon overreaching by intelligence agencies); RANELAGH, supra note
43, at 533-36 (discussing Operation CHAOS).
321. S. AFR. CONST. § 32(1). The Constitution also provides that "[e]veryone has the
right of access to... any information that is held by another person and that is
required for the exercise or protection of any rights." Id.
322. Id. § 32(2). The phrasing of this section suggests that the "reasonable measures"
refer to procedural matters relating to access (e.g., fees and the imposition of an
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general matter, moreover, the Constitution provides that as a general
principle of public administration in South Africa, "the public must
be encouraged to participate in policy-making" and that
"[t]ransparency must be fostered by providing the public with
timely, accessible, and accurate information."' 23 Despite some
political growing pains on the part of ANC officials unused to the
glare of critical media scrutiny324-and despite both the
government's disturbing willingness in mid-1996 to invoke section
205 of the Criminal Procedure Act in its effort to force the media to
divulge information about the sources used for news stories32s and
the South African arms industries' willingness to hide behind
apartheid-era laws in restricting information about its efforts to
cultivate overseas markets326-most apartheid-era laws sharply
restricting access to any arguably security-related information have
application process) rather than to measures designed to protect national security
information from disclosure.
Until the enactment of such "national legislation," however, § 32(1) shall be
deemed to read only that "[elvery person has the right of access to all information held
by the state or any of its organs in any sphere of government in so far as that
information is required for the exercise or protection of any of their rights." Id. at
Sched. 6, § 23(2)(a)(1). This default rule is considerably less broad than the "any
information held by the state" provisions that are to apply only once a legislative
scheme is in place to regulate the assertion of the sweeping constitutional right.
Compare id. § 32(1)-(2) with id. Sched. 6, § 23(2).
323. Id. § 195(1)(e), (g). This rule is said to apply to "the administration in every
sphere of government" and all "organs of state" and "public enterprises." Id. § 195(2).
"Proclamations, regulations and other instruments of subordinate legislation" must
also be "accessible to the public." Id. § 101(2).
324. See, e.g., Pogrund, supra note 88 (discussing Deputy President Thabo Mbeki's
tendency "to react with suspicion even to well-intentioned reporting in a sensitive area
such as [governmental] corruption" and recounting Mbeki's 1995 appointment of
"special task group" to review government communications policy, including
possibility of government ownership); see also Culhane, supra note 79, at 942-43
("Early indications of the ANC's commitment to free political speech remain mixed.")
(citing, inter alia, Bill Keller, The Urge to Suppress Persists in South Africa, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1993, at A16).
325. Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act is a provision that permits the police
to demand information from individuals, who face imprisonment if they refuse. The
government invoked § 205 last year in an attempt to force the disclosure of
information learned from confidential media sources. Specifically, the police served
subpoenas under § 205 requiring several South African newspapers, the Associated
Press, and the South African Broadcasting Corporation ("SABC") to reveal information
relating to violence in the Cape Flats relating to PAGAD. See generally Media-Security
Relations In South Threatened, Africa News, Sept. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, World
Library, AFRNWS File. Should such attempts succeed, of course, it would become
much harder for South Africa's media to function as a check upon governmental
overreaching.
326. See, e.g., Jeff Erlich, S. African Firm Bars Reports on Arms Exports, DEF. NEWS,
Aug. 4-10, 1997, at 4.
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been repealed or replaced. In today's South Africa, it has been
said, "[tihere are virtually no limits, apart from defamation-and in
some instances, pornography--on the freedom to ask, to probe, and
to criticize."3' 8
At the heart of South Africa's information-access system is the
so-called "Open Democracy Bill" being drawn up by the Deputy
President's Office. This legislation, it has been reported, would put
statutory flesh on the constitutional bones of South Africa's right of
information access by creating a "fast-track information court"
procedure, an expedited process of review in conventional courts
through which the adjudication of requests for information would
be carried out.319 If this bill is enacted in a form that permits it to play
as significant a role in the process of public accountability as the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") has in the United States,3
South Africa's emergent security oversight regime will have been
well served. At least with respect to the U.S. security services, it
should be remembered that FOIA has been a notable restraining
influence. According to a former staff member of one of the U.S.
327. See, e.g., Protasius Ndauendapo, Media Laws Under Scrutiny, Inter Press Service,
Nov. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, INPRES File; South Africa: Opening Up,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 1994, at 44. See generally Culhane, supra note 79 (listing
apartheid-era legislation that directly or indirectly restricted South Africans' freedom
of speech).
328. Pogrund, supra note 87.
329. It had originally been proposed in January 1995 to create an entirely separate
"information court" with specialized procedures, but the present version would
require individuals to use an expedited motion procedure in the country's High Court.
The proposal to create a separate "Open Democracy Commission"--charged with
reviewing all laws and regulations relating to governmental accountability,
responsiveness, and openness-was also dropped. See generally Richard Calland, Open
Democracy Bill: Snail's Pace to Transparency, PARLIAMENTARY WHIP, Feb. 21, 1997, at 2.
330. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. The FOIA statute does not impose a blanket requirement
that government-held information be released to the public, however, but rather
contains exemptions for, inter alia, (1) information "specifically authorized under
criteria established by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy and.., properly classified pursuant to such executive
order;" (2) information "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency," (3) information "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute"
without making such withholding subject to agency discretion; (4) "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential;" (5) "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;"
(6) personnel or other files "the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," and (7) "records or information compiled
for law enforcement purposes" to the extent that disclosure would interfere with
proceedings, invade personal privacy, disclose the identity of confidential sources, or
cause an unfair trial. Id. § 552(b). It remains to be seen how the Open Democracy Bill
will deal with issues of privacy, security classification, and the protection of
information about ongoing law enforcement investigations.
FALL 1997]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
intelligence oversight committees, in fact, FOIA "has been the best of
all external overseers" of the U.S. intelligence community.331
How well the South African process works in practice-
whether it will be able to advance both liberty and security in the
post-apartheid state-remains to be seen. The South African security
services have proclaimed their sensitivity to the need for "a fair and
acceptable balance... between the need to protect sensitive
information and the demands for freedom of information in respect
to intelligence activities. " 2 "Although a measure of secrecy will
undoubtedly be necessary," the Defence Ministry has pledged, "the
governing constitutional principle is 'freedom of information.'
Exceptions to this principle should be limited and specific, and will
be dealt with in legislation."333 Since the underlying right to
information is a constitutional one enforceable against the legislature
as much as against the national executive itself, however, whether
(and how) South African law is to provide national security
exceptions to this rule will be a matter as much for the courts to
decide as it is for parliamentarians. Needless to say, South Africa's
jurisprudence of information access is still in its infancy.
While the need for at least some such exceptions is clear, how-
ever, this very necessity illustrates the principal problem of relying
upon public accountability to provide a check upon a country's
security services. Simply put, there are some types of informa-
tion-certain details of a country's operational military
deployments and contingency planning, its intelligence services'
sources and methods, the progress of ongoing criminal investi-
gations, what it has learned of other countries' secrets, the new
technologies or techniques its arms industry is developing, the
"keys" to its diplomatic and military cryptography, and so forth-
that even the most open democracy must conceal. Every govern-
ment must therefore create laws and institutions to establish and
safeguard this secrecy. The very success of these laws and institu-
tions in obscuring certain security-related aspects of governance,
331. JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 117.
332. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE 1996, at 12; see also Co-
operative Security, supra note 113 (quoting Defence Minister Joe Modise: "[tihe
conditions that required total secrecy in the past are over.... [M]uch can be conveyed
to our parliaments and citizens without prejudicing security interests."). The
preparation of the government's 1996 Defence White Paper, through an elaborate
process of public consultation with virtually anyone who expressed interest, set a
good example for public involvement in debating South African security policy. See
generally Def. Min. Discusses SANDF Transformation, Periscope Daily Defence News
Capsules, Nov. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File; Boyle,
supra, note 159; Defence White Paper, supra note 111 (discussing the consultation
process preceding the Cabinet approval of the White Paper).
333. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE 1996, at 11.
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however, works powerfully against public accountability. Worse,
this necessary cloaking can give the government both incentive and
opportunity for malfeasance in precisely the areas shielded from
view.
Unalloyed "public accountability" is thus generally an
unreliable vehicle for security oversight. Voters cannot react to
things of which they are denied knowledge, and one cannot rely
solely upon corrective action at the ballot box as a check upon
governmental overreaching in areas relating to national security and
intelligence operations. Instead, "public accountability" becomes a
two-step process: the first line of defense must be provided by the
public's "elected surrogates" in the political branches (e.g., inquiring
parliamentarians and oversight committees),' individuals or
institutional checks within the security apparatus itself (e.g.,
inspectors-general or agency "whistleblowers,") or the scrutiny of
an independent judiciary. The check of the ballot box comes later, if
it comes at all. "When surrogates are shut out, so are the people." 6
D. Legislative Oversight
This category of oversight involves ensuring "that the
operations of the national executive and the security apparatus are
known to the national legislature," so as to enable that body to "hold
the government politically (and financially) accountable for its
actions and.., enact or amend national law to reflect its
understanding of oversight requirements." Under South Africa's
new Constitution, the National Assembly is the legislative body
principally responsible for policing the activities of the permanent
bureaucracy, having been charged by the Constitution with
"scrutinizing and overseeing executive action.'33 To this end,
members of the Cabinet are "accountable collectively and
334. Cf. JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 79 ("[Tlhe people in modem [American] society
are forced to rely chiefly on their elected surrogates in both Congress and the White
House to monitor and assess the wisdom of secret foreign policy initiatives.").
335. The awkwardly integrated character of South Africa's present security
services-combining, as they do, both holdovers from the apartheid era and former
guerrilla fighters and ANC appointees-may itself help keep these services in check
by increasing the likelihood that misdeeds by one element will find their way to the
attention of parliamentarians or the media by back-channel means of communication.
It is admittedly somewhat awkward to think of "leaks" as instruments of "security
oversight law," since such disclosures are often patently unlawful and can sometimes
be profoundly destructive. Nevertheless, as any observer of contemporary U.S.
politics can attest, the likelihood of "leaks" can be a hugely powerful check upon
governmental action.
336. JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 79.
337. S. AFR. CONST. § 42(3).
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individually to Parliament for the performance of their functions, ' 3 8
and must "provide Parliament with full and regular reports
concerning matters under their control. ' 39 The Constitution also
requires the National Assembly to provide for "mechanisms... to
ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of
government are accountable to it." In addition, the assembly must
"maintain oversight" of each "organ of state. ' °
South African officials make much out of this legislative
oversight function and its importance in security issues,
emphasizing the constitutional and statutory powers of the
parliament with respect to "investigation, recommendation and
supervision" vis-a-vis the security services, which include "approval
of Defence legislation and the Defence budget; and review of the
President's decisions to deploy the SANDF in critical functions.',1
With regard to the South African intelligence community, officials
also boast of having achieved "a system whereby Parliament asserts
its right to monitor and oversee the intelligence services , giving
South Africa "an intelligence service that is probably one of the most
transparent, most accountable and subject to the most supervision in
the world.'3 3 As one government minister put it, "[t]he basic issue
here is who guards the guardians." "Accountability to Parliament,"
he said, "is central to democracy. This is what we see in action
[today].
1. The Current Legislative Scheme
Much of South Africa's legislative oversight system is indeed
worth some boasting. The process of drafting the country's first
post-apartheid intelligence legislation in 1994, for example, was a
commendably bipartisan one which began in May 1994 with a series
of formal consultations involving cabinet officials, legislators from
the Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence, and representatives of
the intelligence services.34 Indeed, President Mandela went so far as
338. Id. § 92(2).
339. Id. § 92(3).
340. Id. § 55(2).
341. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE 1996, at 11.
342. House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 4149 (remarks of Kader Asmal).
343. Id. Col 4133 (remarks of D.P.A. Schutte); see also id. Col 4139 (remarks of Kader
Asmal) ("Never before have the activities of the intelligence community been
regulated clearly and in a forthright way by statute.").
344. Id. Col 4149 (remarks of Kader Asmal) (discussing Committee of Members of
Parliament on an Inspectors-General of Intelligence Bill).




to delegate much of the responsibility for supervising the drafting
process to his former oppressor and National Party predecessor,
Frederick W. de Klerk (who had become Executive Deputy President
in the first Mandela cabinet after the April 1994 elections, and who
in that capacity chaired the cabinet's Committee on Security and
Intelligence) 3'-a choice which must have helped build the security
forces' confidence in majority rule even as it annoyed the ANC's
rank-and-file.
The resulting legislation established a parliamentary committee
charged with overseeing intelligence affairs, comprised of eleven
members of parliament selected by the President. Of the eleven, nine
were chosen from among National Assembly members on the basis
of party-proportional representation and two came specifically from
parties "holding seats in Parliament but which are not [otherwise]
represented on the Committee. ' 4 7 This committee, the structure of
which was intended to provide "multi-party parliamentary
supervision of [intelligence] activities,"' was supposed to
ensure that fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitu-
tion are not contravened. It will initiate or review
legislation related to intelligence.... It will also, uniquely
in our situation, receive complaints from the public and re-
fer them to the appropriate structures such as the
Ombudsman, the Public Protector or the Human Rights
Commission. It will report to the President, the Ministers
and Parliament, on its activities and those of the intelli-
gence services.49
The committee's job, in other words, was to "be a watchdog over
intelligence functions. ' 0
346. See Senate Hansard 15 1994 Col 3013, 3022 (remarks of G.W. Koornhof and
Deputy Minister of Justice) (discussing multiparty negotiations that produced 1994
intelligence bills).
347. See § 2(2H3) of Committee of Members of Parliament on an Inspectors-General
of Intelligence Act 40 of 1994; see also House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col
3044 (remarks of J.E. Sosibo). Originally, the committee was to have had seven
members, but this was expanded to 11 in an effort to provide more vigorous
oversight-though the opposition Democratic Party would have preferred 13. See id.
Col 3047, 3049 (remarks of J. Selfe and Deputy Minister of Justice). Given the makeup
of the National Assembly after the April 1994 elections (and under South Africa's
previous "interim" Constitution), this expansion meant that five political parties were
likely to have representatives on the committee, rather than only three. See id. Col 4135
(remarks of D.P.A. Schutte).
348. Id. Col 4133 (remarks of D.P.A. Schutte).
349. Id. Col 4150 (remarks of Kader Asmal). See generally § 3 of Committee of
Members of Parliament on and Inspectors-General of Intelligence Act 40 of 1994
(listing statutory functions of committee).
350. House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov. 1994 Col 4150 (remarks of Kader Asmal).
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2. The Structural Weakness of Legislative Oversight in South Africa
The legislative oversight scheme is clearly an improvement
over the non-existent accountability mechanisms of the apartheid
era. In particular, providing opposition parliamentarians some small
window into the clandestine world of intelligence operations, as
required by section 199(8) of the new Constitution,nI represents real
progress. Nevertheless, this scheme is less robust than its
proponents would have one believe (especially when compared to
the often highly adversarial American approach to legislative
oversight of the security bureaucracy), and may have some difficulty
providing the sort of "jealous eye" needed to keep South Africa's
intelligence services in check. In fairness, these weaknesses are not
principally the fault of the 1994 oversight legislation itself, although
a committee structure that gave a greater role to opposition MPs
would strengthen the process considerably. 32 Rather, these
weaknesses are structural ones, tied to the nature of the British
parliamentary system upon which the South African legislative
scheme is still based and exacerbated by the particular ways in
which the post-apartheid state has chosen to organize democratic
representation.
For the first time in its history South Africa today enjoys a
system of judicially enforced constitutional rights the fundamental
rules of which trump the day-to-day electoral majorities of the
national legislature.3 3 The basic mechanism of governance under
South Africa's present Constitution, however, remains a
parliamentary system modeled on that of the United Kingdom. The
President of the Republic, who is vested with and exercises the
executive power of the South African government,; is elected by
and from among the members of the National Assembly35-with the
effect that in South Africa, as in other parliamentary regimes, the
party or coalition controlling the legislature forms the government
and sends its political leader into office as the head of that
351. S. AFR. CONST. § 199(8) ("To give effect to the principles of transparency and
accountability, multi-party parliamentary committees must have oversight of all
security services in a manner determined by national legislation or the rules and
orders of Parliament.").
352. See generally supra note 347 (discussing enlargement of committee membership).
353. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. § 8(1) ("The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds
the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and all organs of state."); id. § 167(4)
(giving the Constitutional Court the power to (a) "decide disputes between organs of
state in the national or provincial sphere;" (b) "decide on the Constitutionality of any
parliamentary or provincial Bill;" and (c) "decide that Parliament or the President has
failed to comply with a constitutional duty.").
354. Id. § 85(1H2).
355. Id. § 86(1).
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government.3 The President selects the Deputy President from the
membership of the National Assembly, as well as most of his cabinet
Ministers. The President may be removed by a two-thirds vote of
the Assembly for "a serious violation of the Constitution or the law,"
"serious misconduct," or the "inability to perform the functions of
office;" alternatively, the President may be dismissed by a majority
vote of the Assembly in the event that it passes a motion of no-
confidence in the government.
The bottom line, however, is that control of the government
automatically goes to the party (or coalition), that wins a majority in
the National Assembly: upon such a victory, the leadership of the
majority group becomes the leadership of the executive branch
and is, in effect, legislatively accountable only to its own party
rank-and-file. Very much unlike the freewheeling U.S. congres-
sional system-in which different parties can and often do
control the legislative and executive branches and party cohesion
in the legislature is notoriously loose-British-style parliamen-
tary regimes tend to leave politics almost wholly within the hands
of a disciplined majority party. As British Prime Minister John Major
discovered in May 1997, the loss of such a majority topples parlia-
mentary governments; short of that, however, party discipline tends
to be well enforced, "aisle-crossing" is rare, and legislative oversight
is an intrinsically weak vehicle.36
South Africa is no exception to this general rule. Indeed, if
anything, it might seem more afflicted than its British antecedent,
since South Africa follows a proportional-representation approach to
parliamentary democracy that is based upon party "lists." Though
South Africa once had a constituency-based system of governance,
the present Constitution takes a different course-in part on account
of its framers' desire to give small parties a way into the national
legislature and in part simply because its drafters were never able to
356. Unlike Britain, of course, the head of government in South Africa is also the
head of state-there being no monarch in whom formal nominal authority could
reside.
357. The Constitution permits the President to select "any number" of ministers from
the ranks of the Assembly, but no more than two from outside it. S. AFR. CONST. §
91(3).
358. Id. § 89(1).
359. The National Assembly can remove the Cabinet by passing a motion of no-
confidence that specifically excludes the President, or it can pass a more general
motion of no-confidence, which requires that the President, all cabinet members, and
any deputy ministers must resign. See id. § 102(1)-(2).
360. Cf. JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 132 (comparing U.S. and British intelligence
oversight schemes and concluding that British approach "seems a rather weak system
of accountability, at least compared to... [tihe American approach [which] empha-
sizes the Madisonian principle of checking power").
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devise an acceptable means of demarcating electoral
constituencies. " Whatever the wisdom of this decision in other
respects, however, it has had the unfortunate side-effect of
depriving members of the National Assembly of any formal ability
to resist proposals made by their party leadership. Parties, not their
individual members, are elected to parliament, and an individual
member takes his seat only by virtue of having been given, by his
party leadership, a position on the "party list" high enough that the
proportion of the popular vote the party has received still leaves a
spot unfilled after all those above him on the list have been seated.
Rather than enjoying a base of electoral support in a particular
constituency, therefore, the individual member is wholly dependent
upon party affiliation for his political future. To cross the party
leadership is to risk expulsion not simply from the party, therefore,
but from parliament itself.362 In such a system, aisle-crossing is not
simply rare, it is essentially impossible.
Unfortunately, the traditions of South African parliamentary
democracy-albeit, of course, a democracy limited until recently to a
small racial subset of the population-also bespeak some weakness
for a particularly unaccountable brand of parliamentary
majoritarianism. Party discipline within the National Party ("NP")
during the apartheid era, for example, was rigidly enforced, and
successive Nationalist prime ministers363 such as Hendrik Verwoerd
and B.J. Vorster ran the party's parliamentary caucus with an iron
hand.3" The secure parliamentary majority enjoyed by the NP, in
361. See Dion Basson & Gay McDougal, remarks at panel entitled "A Particular
Vision of Democracy: Electing a Parliament with Proportional Representation,"
University of Michigan School of Law (Mar. 21, 1997). Judge Basson serves on the
bench of the Labour Court of South Africa. Gay McDougal was a member of the
Independent Electoral Commission that supervised South Africa's 1994 elections.
362. This happened in early 1997, for example, with respect to Bantu Holomisa, who
lost both his ANC membership and his parliamentary seat for criticizing government
corruption.
363. The government was run by a prime minister-and nominally headed by a
ceremonial president-until 1984, when a new Constitution created the office of State
President, which P.W. Botha first occupied as the head of a racially segregated
tricameral parliamentary scheme. See generally HISTORY, supra note 12, at 469.
364. Within the National Party caucus on foreign affairs issues, for example, Deon
Geldenhuys has described "essentially a one-way flow of communications.., from
the prime minister and minister of foreign affairs to ordinary MPs," such that the
party ranks produce no "major policy input." DEON J. GELDENHUYS, THE DIPLOMACY
OF ISOLATION 59-67 (1984). Hendrik Verwoerd, for example-who served as prime
minister from 1960 until his assassination in 1966-demanded rigid party obedience,
running "a very tight ship" and "[keeping] everyone in line and in awe of the leader."
Deon J. Geldenhuys, interview with the author, Johannesburg (Aug. 5, 1988).
Verwoerd's successor, John Vorster, was less unblinkingly authoritarian within his
own cabinet, but still refrained from giving any significant power to the party rank
and file. For his part, P.W. Botha (who succeeded Vorster in 1978) returned somewhat
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turn, permitted the government enormous freedom to have its way
with South African law and politics. When, for example, it was
discovered that the SADF's invasion of Angola in 1975-76 had
actually been illegal, because the law then prohibited sending
conscript soldiers on missions beyond the Republic's borders, the
parliament simply passed a law permitting such deployments-and
made the law retroactive to one day before the illegal invasion had
commenced. 30 Even more dramatically, after the South African
courts repeatedly declared certain segregationist legislation invalid,
parliament increased the size of the Supreme Court's Appellate
Division to require the appointment of five additional judges and
almost doubled the size of the South African Senate (which made
such appointments) so as to ensure that the National Party could
guarantee the selection of sympathetic candidates. Not
surprisingly, the resulting Appellate Division bench was rather more
piant.
367
South Africa's new system of judicially enforced constitutional
rights will lessen the legislature's ability to repeat such maneuvers
in the post-apartheid era;36 so will statutory provisions (such as
those incorporated in the 1994 intelligence legislation) providing for
multi-party representation on oversight committees. And, of course,
there is yet little reason to attribute a National Party-style
parliamentary unscrupulousness to the ANC.3 Nevertheless, it
to the Verwoerdian management style, presiding at the helm of the State Security
Council and acquiring a reputation as Die Groot Krokodil ("The Great Crocodile") for
his irascible authoritarianism.
365. See Defence Amendment Acts 1 of 1976 and 35 of 1977 (amending § 103(3), (4)
of Defence Act 44 of 1957), in STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 457(1),
517, 525(1)-525(2), 621-25; see also House of Assembly Hansard 2 Feb 1976 Col 434-
570.
366. See generally Heubner, supra note 12, at 967 n.28 (discussing the court-packing
episode and citing, inter alia, Senate Act 53 of 1955, and W. Le R. De Vos, The Role of
the South African Judciary in Crisis Periods, 3 TYDSKRIF VIR DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG.
281 (1986)).
367. Id.; see also Heubner, supra note 12, at 969 n.37 ("[T]hroughout the apartheid era
the government quickly and unabashedly closed any loophole the judges managed to
find in the draconian laws.... [I]mmediate, effective, and scornful neutralization has
consistently followed the court's few valiant attempts to imbue the South African
regime with notions of basic rights.").
368. Cf. van der Vyver, supra note 9, at 818 ("The history of South African
constitutional law should also be seen to rule out the British system of entrusting
Parliament with almost incontestable powers and relying on the legislature's
commitment to convention and the sense of honor and propriety of its members not to
abuse those powers.").
369. In this context, however, it is worth remembering that the ANC also has a
history of being quite ruthless in the pursuit of its goals-and of being less than
forgiving to those within its ranks who express disagreement. See supra text
accompanying note 21.
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seems clear that "Legislative Oversight" means something rather
different-and, of necessity, less rigorous-in such a parliamentary
regime than it does in a separation-of-powers system such as that of
the United States. With government inherently going to the majority
party and individual members structurally incapable of challenging
their party leadership, there is simply very little even the most
conscientious legislator can do to contest the course chosen by the
party leadership.
South Africa's provision for parliamentary oversight of
presidential decision-making with respect to the use of military force
illustrates this difficulty. In contrast to the acrimonious debates in
the United States over the War Powers Resolution 370 and the
constitutional propriety of executive deployments of American
troops in harm's way overseas,3n the "war powers" process in South
Africa is functionally little different from an ordinary vote of no-
confidence. Under the new Constitution, any deployment of the
SANDF "(a) in co-operation with the police service; (b) in Defence of
the Republic; or (c) in fulfillment of an international obligation"
requires that the President (who is empowered to give such orders)
inform Parliament "promptly and in appropriate detail of-(a) the
reasons for the employment of the Defence force; (b) any place
where the force is being used; (c) the number of people involved;
and (d) the period for which the force is expected to be employed." 7
Parliament is thereafter free to pass a vote of no-confidence if it sees
fit, but this, of course, would have been true in any event: the
reporting provisions are no more than a clear-statement rule
committing the chief executive to a policy of disclosure to the
parliamentary majority he heads. Even if the legislature were not
already controlled by a parliamentary majority loyal to the politician
who had ordered the deployment, therefore, members of parliament
would be able to disapprove of that specific use of force only by
formally removing the entire government and precipitating new
general elections by passing a vote of no-confidence.373 As this
example suggests, in a system in which the government's
370. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1988).
371. See, e.g., Ford III, supra note 67.
372. S. AFR. CONST. § 201(2H3). If parliament is not sitting within seven days of the
commencement of any such operation, the President must make his § 201(3) report "to
the appropriate oversight committee." Id.
373. The President's power to declare a "state of national defence" lapses within
seven days unless formally approved by Parliament. Id. § 203(3). Even in this
eventuality, however, a well-disciplined parliamentary majority will enable the
government to survive any challenge. The only advantage to a specific-approval
requirement is that it may be somewhat easier politically to cast a vote specifically
against an improvident "state of national defence" than it would be to support a no-
confidence vote that would replace the government in its entirety.
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accountability to the legislature means little more than its
accountability to itself, the task of ensuring that the security services
have to learn to live with genuinely "hawk-eyed oversight
committee[s]"3 74 may be something of an uphill battle.
It was also somewhat problematic that the members of the
security oversight committees were selected for such service by the
President himself-the very figure whose executive apparatus these
committees are tasked with policing. With respect to the intelligence
oversight committee, for example, Kobus Jordann of the Democratic
Party ("DP") complained that
[w]hat [this] in fact means is that the Government of Na-
tional Unity would be policed by its own people .... We
cannot afford to have an intermingling of the legislative
authority and the executive authority-as we find to a
great extent in this legislation-in any form whatso-
ever.... [W]e believe that strong consideration should be
given to the possibility of the Chairman of the Committee
being chosen from a party which is not part of the Gov-
ernment of National Unity.
37-
ANC government officials, however, were not responsive to this
suggestion, declaring simply that it was a "myth that independence
only comes from people who are not in the Government.'376 The
provision for at least some opposition membership on the committee
did not leave the government entirely "policed by its own people,"
but-especially since it appeared that committee members would
have only a limited access to intelligence service "documents,
374. House of Assembly Hansard 11 Nov 1994 Col 4151-52 (remarks of L.T.
Landers) (describing "a hawk-eyed oversight committee" as "an essential cog in the
machine that provides the series of control and checks and balances of the intelligence
service").
375. Id. Col 4155 (remarks of J.A. Jordaan). It was apparently for this reason that
Jordaan's party supported the 1994 intelligence oversight legislation only as "an
interim measure." Id.
376. Id. Col 4159 (remarks of Kader Asmal). Asmal felt-and expressed rather
indelicately-that the failure of White liberals (such as the members of Jordaan's
Democratic Party) to do more to end the apartheid system showed that there was no
necessary connection between being the "Opposition" and being genuinely in
opposition. Id. The Minister was doubtlessly correct that there exists no such
inevitable connection. He was surely wrong, however, to expect that an official
selected by the President from among his own legislative supporters is likely provide
sharper-eyed oversight than an opposition parliamentarian. For Asmal, the key to the
committee's success was "what powers we give it." Id. He apparently attributed no
significance to its members' interest or industry in keeping the intelligence community
in check
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information, or premises"7-the appointments process did suggest
that it might be hard for the committee to watch over the intelligence
bureaucracy with a sufficiently "jealous eye."'378 Perhaps for this
reason, the statute was amended in July 1995 to provide for the
appointment of members of the Committee on Intelligence by the in-
house parliamentary leadership, with only the "concurrence" of the
President of the Republic.3 79 Given the nature of parliamentary
democracy, however, these officials would most likely be members
of the same political party or coalition that forms the government
itself; the "policed by its own people" problem has not been
eliminated.
3. The Power of the Purse
The comparison to American "war powers" oversight made
above also highlights another serious impediment to rigorous
parliamentary oversight of the security bureaucracy in South Africa;
limitations upon the legislature's power of the purse vis-a-vis the
government. It has long been a fundamental tenet of security
oversight in the United States, as George Mason put it in the
formative early years of the Republic, that "[tihe purse and the
sword ought never to go into the same hands whether legislative or
executive."380 In U.S. practice, even without the existence of hotly
contested statutory measures such as the War Powers Resolution,
377. See id. Col 4151 (remarks of Kader Asmal) (comparing Inspector-General's
"very wide access to documents, information or premises under control of the various
intelligence services, including intelligence sources and the methods used to obtain
information" with the "powers... of the committee of members of Parliament," which
were not so broad).
According to the oversight committee's authorizing statute, no service "shall be
obliged to disclose to the Committee" the "name or identity of any person or body
engaged in intelligence or counter-intelligence activities," or information that would
reveal the identity of an intelligence source or any "intelligence or counter-intelligence
method" the revelation of which would reveal either of the foregoing two types of
information. § 4(2)(a)(i)--(iii) of Committee of Members of Parliament on and
Inspectors-General of Intelligence Act 40 of 1994. This phrasing of the first exclusion
("name or identity of any person or body engaged in intelligence or counter-
intelligence activities") is strangely broad: it seems to authorize an intelligence service
to withhold from the committee information about the service's organizational
structure, the identities of its senior leaders, and perhaps even the name of the service
itself.
378. Cf. PALMER, supra note 39, at 108.
379. Under this legislation, the committee members were to be appointed by the
Speaker of the Assembly and the President of the Senate. See Committee of Members
of Parliament on and Inspectors-General of Intelligence Amendment Act 31 of 1995
(becoming effective July 21, 1995). The contemporary analogue to the pre-1997 Senate
is the National Council of Provinces.
380. PALMER, supra, note 39, at 115.
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the most basic power lawmakers enjoy over executive branch
adventurism is that of restricting the purposes for which federal
money may be spent-a tactic used repeatedly by Congress with
respect, for example, to military deployments and "covert action" by
intelligence agencies.3"' After all, as the late former CIA DirectorWilliam Colby once put it,
[iun order to persuade the CIA to abandon a proposed
covert action, an [Intelligence] Committee chairman needs
only to say to the [Director of Central Intelligence] at the
end of a briefing [on a presidential covert action finding]:
"Write down in your notebook $100 million, because-if
you go ahead-that is what is coming out of your CIA
budget next year.
382
In U.S. practice, the power of the purse-a power explicitly given to
the legislaturem and thus not subject to constitutional gainsaying of
the sort that bedevils the War Powers Resolution-is perhaps the
most important weapon the legislature possesses.
Even where formal limitations fail to become law-as was the
case, for example, with Senator George McGovern's attempt to force
the disclosure of the CIA's annual budget and Senator Stewart
Symington's attempt to cut off funds for that organization's "secret
war" in Laos in 1971-the proposal, debate and near-passage of such
measures can send unmistakable signals to the U.S. executive
branch that if it does not change course, worse will follow.
Sometimes, in fact, this can be all that is needed to check the
executive. As it turned out in 1971, however, President Richard
381. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S13424-25 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1993) (text of
amendment to defense appropriations bill providing that "funds appropriated or
otherwise made available in this or any other Act to the Department of Defense may
be obligated for expenses incurred only through March 31, 1994, for the operations of
United States Armed Forces in Somalia"); Appropriations Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-
377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1830 (1983) ("None of the funds provided in this Act may be used
by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military
equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any
group or individual.., for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of
Nicaragua ...."); 22 U.S.C. § 2293 note (reproducing § 118(a) of International Security
and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 [the "Clark Amendment"])
("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no assistance of any kind may be
provided for the purpose, or which would have the effect, of promoting or
augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of any nation, group, organization,
movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in
Angola....").
382. JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 135.
383. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.1 ("The Congress shall have Power to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States ....").
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Nixon neglected to heed Congress' shot across his bow, and the
failed McGovern and Symington efforts were shortly followed by a
successful bill sponsored by Senator Clifford Case that cut off all
funding for CIA and other U.S. government paramilitary operations
in Cambodia. These measures, indeed, were the opening salvos in
the U.S. "intelligence wars" of the mid-1970s, with Sen. Case's bill
serving as the first example of "a general and bipartisan revolt
against overweaning executive power."3 More recently, the U.S.
Congress was also able to send "signals" of noteworthy clarity to
Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton with regard, respectively,
to American military deployments in Lebanon and Somalia-signals
which contributed in no small way to the disengagement of U.S.
forces from their involvement in those countries' civil wars.m
In South Africa, too, it is said that "[b]ecause Parliament
provides the executive with funds on behalf of society, Parliament
also has a very important control function in order to ensure that
these funds are 9roperly used and that such funds are properly
accounted for."3  But unlike the United States, where the
Constitution specifies that the House of Representatives must
originate all spending bills and both houses of Congress play a role
in writing and re-writing such legislation,387 the South African
Constitution actually prohibits either the National Assembly or the
National Council of Provinces from initiating or preparing "money
Bills"3 (a "money Bill" is defined as "[a] Bill that appropriates
money or imposes taxes, levies or duties").389 Such bills may be
introduced into the National Assembly and thereafter amended by
Parliament according to the conventional procedures, 390 but the
Constitution denies Parliament formal responsibility for preparing
government budgets in the first instance. As with the Canadian
Security Intelligence Review Committee ("SIRC"), that country's
parliamentary oversight body, the South African committee lacks
U.S.-style line-by-line budget authority,91 and is rather the weaker
384. See JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 185-86.
385. See Ford III, supra note 67, at 657-58, 692-95.
386. Senate Hansard 2 Nov 1994 Col 2654 (remarks of Deputy Minister of Justice).
387. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as
on other Bills.").
388. S. AFR. CONST. § 55(1) (specifying that the National Assembly may initiate or
prepare legislation "except money Bills"); id. § 68(b) (specifying that the National
Council of Provinces may initiate or prepare certain types of legislation "but may not
initiate or prepare money Bills").
389. Id. § 77(1).
390. Id. §§ 73(1), 77(3).
391. Cf. JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 132 (comparing the SIRC to the U.S. legislative
oversight committees and concluding that the U.S. Congress is "stronger overall").
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for it. In conjunction with the government's ability to rely, almost by
definition, upon the support of a parliamentary majority and a
highly disciplined party rank-and-file, there would seem to be a near
identity between "the purse and the sword" in South Africa.
4. The Legislature as an Oversight Organ
Despite these concerns, it should be emphasized, this author
does not wholly mean to dismiss the impact of legislative oversight
upon the South African security services. As noted above, statutory
provisions (such as those written into the 1994 intelligence
legislation) which specifically provide a role for opposition
parliamentarians on security oversight committees, are a valuable
addition to South Africa's oversight system. An amendment to
South Africa's intelligence legislation in 1995 also somewhat
modified the parliamentary oversight system in order to enhance the
budgetary control of the parliamentary committee charged with
policing the intelligence apparatus.m Moreover, the hallowed
institution of parliamentary questions, in which members of
parliament are formally empowered to require top officials to give at
least some answer to prickly questions about the operations of their
ministries, can provide a useful service in bringing information to
the attention of Parliament and the public alike-a skill developed
into something of an art form by opposition parliamentarians both
under the apartheid regime and today.m
This author does not wish to suggest that the formidable powers
Congress enjoys vis-d-vis the U.S. security apparatus are invariably
exercised with admirable discretion. To the contrary, political
grandstanding and partisan manipulation are depressingly common,
with legislators sometimes preferring the pursuit of political gain to the
delicate balancing that lies at the heart of security oversight. Nor have
the U.S. security services always escaped from the process untainted, as
U.S.-style legislative oversight can encourage a degree of reliance and
dependence upon particular congressional factions or individual
legislators for funding and political protection.' Legislative oversight,
392. See Committee of Members of Parliament on and Inspectors-General of
Intelligence Act 31 of 1995.
393. Democratic Party leader Tony Leon, in fact, appears to have rejected President
Mandela's recent offer to join his coalition government in large part because such an
arrangement would have entailed an obligation to cease the DP's persistent
questioning of government officials. See Suzanne Daley, Mandela Fails in an Effort to
Broaden His Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1997, at A6.
394. Cf. INTELLIGENCE ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 255, at 117 (discussing
"Congressional Oversight" and warning of "politicalization of the Intelligence
Community").
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American style-vigorous to a fault and famously inhospitable to the
keeping of secrets-is an unattractive process probably enjoyed by
few of its protagonists.3
On the whole, however, these obvious faults do not stop the
U.S. approach from working remarkably well. Democracy, it has
been said, is a system of government that "as a guard against the
abuse of power, depends vitally on the kind of 'interference' ,396 by
other organs of government that the U.S. system seemingly goes out
of its way to encourage. And in its present U.S. incarnation,
legislative "interference" is an undeniably powerful check-indeed,
in some respects, the only check-upon the largest and most
powerful military and intelligence institutions in human history. As
a former staff member from the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence ("SSCI") once put it, "the most important form of
oversight goes unseen.... The CIA worries that Congress is looking
over its shoulder; therefore, it is less reckless. It makes them...
think twice before they act. 39 7 Thus does the inelegant U.S. approach
to security oversight keep the security services on their toes,
reminding us of Aeschylus' somber warning that "[tihere are times
when fear is good. It must keep its watchful place at the heart's
controls."3 98 Such oversight in a separation-of-powers regime is not
pretty, perhaps, but it can be quite effective.
Unfortunately, for some very important structural reasons, it is
probably the nature of legislative oversight in a parliamentary
regime to be somewhat less than vigorous-less vigorous, in fact,
than a troubled country with South Africa's ugly past is likely to
require. As the history of parliamentary questioning of P.W. Botha's
395. Nor, perhaps, is the legislative oversight paradigm necessarily equally well
suited to all democracies. Douglas Porch, for example, recounts the alarm of former
French intelligence chief Alexandre de Marenches at the thought of establishing a
parliamentary oversight committee in mid-1980s France: not only did France lack
anything approaching an American degree of bipartisan agreement on foreign policy,
but a multiparty parliamentary oversight committee might actually have put members
of the French Communist Party in positions overseeing French intelligence operations
against Eastern Bloc intelligence services such as the KGB. See generally PORCH, supra
note 127, at 465-66. South Africa, however, does not today find itself in an analogous
position.
396. JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 79; see also INTELLIGENCE ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 255, at 115 (describing "Congressional Oversight" of intelligence as involving
"not only the relations of the Intelligence Community with the organs of government,
but also the competition between the organs of government, specifically the White
House and Congress, as to who would oversee the Intelligence Community").
397. JOHNSON I, supra note 34, at 117.
398. AESCHYLUS, THE EUMENIDES (Richmond Lattimore trans. 1953), at lines 517-25
("There are times when fear is good. / It must keep its watchful place / at the heart's
controls. There is advantage / in the wisdom won from pain. / Should the city, should




apartheid-era National Party government by the Progressive Federal
Party (as the DP was formerly known) makes clear, even the
elicitation of embarrassing revelations (when this occurs) is far from
enough to derail the policies of a determined majority party.
Endeavoring to be the "conscience" of the ruling government can be
a valuable service at times, but it is no substitute for votes. For
legislative oversight to be taken seriously in the new South Africa,
the ANC will have to prove itself more willing to engage in real self-
investigation and less intolerant of intra-party dissent than it has
been in the past-and it will have to be more flexible in both of these
respects than majority parties in parliamentary systems usually tend
to be.
E. Judicial Oversight
This final category relates to "the establishment and
maintenance of institutions or procedures to ensure that the national
executive does not violate the Constitution or laws in its operation of
the security apparatus," and that the legislature, in its own pursuit of
national security, does not "enact laws that violate the Constitution."
As noted above, this is not an area of law and policy that has
traditionally received much attention from U.S. courts. Despite a
degree of activism in other areas which must to many foreign
observers often seem quite astonishing, the U.S. federal judiciary has
tended to shy away from national security issues, and when forced
to confront them has tended to defer to the claims of the executive
branch in national security litigation-implicitly concluding time
and time again that such matters are usually better resolved through
informal and "political" methods of dispute-resolution. The
potential weaknesses of legislative oversight in South Africa,
however--combined, to some extent, with the traditions of the
South African bench itself-suggest the possibility that the South
African judiciary may be able to usefully contribute to the process of
security oversight in the Republic.
In theory, at least, the South African judiciary would seem
well placed to provide impartial and independent security
oversight. The new South African Constitution provides that the
national judiciary is "independent and subject only to the
Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and
without fear, favour or prejudice."39 Other organs of state, in
fact, are constitutionally obliged to "assist and protect the courts
to ensure the[ir] independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility
399. S. AFR. CONST. § 165(2).
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and effectiveness., 411 Moreover, for the first time in its history,
South Africa now enjoys a system of judicial review for
constitutionality: at the top of the country's judicial hierarchy
resides the Constitutional Court, an institution of eleven judges that
"may decide only constitutional matters, and issues connected with
decisions on constitutional matters" but which is the highest
authority in the Republic on such points of law.40' More significantly
for present purposes, the Constitutional Court possesses the
authority to declare unconstitutional any bill originating in South
Africa's national or provincial parliaments4°2 upon, inter alia, the
application for such a declaration from one-third of the members of
the National Assembly within thirty days of a bill's adoption.0 3 The
President and Deputy President of the Constitutional Court judges
are appointed by the President of the Republic, but only after
"consultation" both with the Judicial Service Commission and with
the leaders of parties represented in the National Assembly. Other
members of the constitutional bench are also appointed from a list of
Commission nominees after consultation with the President of the
Court and the party leaderships. (Nothing appears to oblige the
President to listen to those with whom he "consults," but the
principle of consultation, at least, is constitutionally enshrined.).
414
Judges on the Constitutional Court are appointed for non-
renewable terms of twelve years.05 Other judges hold office
400. Id. § 165(4).
401. Id. § 167(1), (3)(a)-(b). The Constitutional Court also maintains exclusive
jurisdiction over "disputes between organs of state in the national or provincial sphere
concerning the constitutional status, powers or functions of any of those organs of
state." Id. § 167(4)(a).
402. Id. § 167(4)(b).
403. Id. § 80(1H2).
404. Id. § 174(3). The Judicial Service Commission is comprised of (a) the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeal; (b) the President of the Constitutional Court,
(c) Judge President selected by and from among the various Judges President of the
lower court divisions; (d) a government cabinet member; (e) two private attorneys and
two practicing advocates appointed by the President, (f) a law teacher; (g) six persons
designated by the National Assembly (of whom at least three must be opposition
parliamentarians); (h) four delegates to the National Council of Provinces; and (i) four
additional presidential appointees. Additionally, when the Commission considers
matters relating to a provincial or local division of the High Court, the Judge President
of that division and the provincial Premier become ad hoc members. Id. § 178(1).
405. Judges are, however constitutionally required to retire at the age of seventy. Id.
§ 176(1). Under the previous, interim Constitution that came into effect with the April
1994 elections, the judges of the Constitutional Court served for seven-year terms
without the possibility of renewal. See Bob Drogin, S. Africa's New Court Signifies
Change, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 15, 1995, at A14. Every court in existence when the new
Constitution took effect in early 1997 continued in existence subject to consistency
with the new document and subject to the possible repeal of any relevant authorizing
legislation. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, however, was renamed,
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indefinitely, "until they are discharged from active service in terms
of an Act of Parliament" -which the Assembly is permitted to do
only with a two-thirds vote and only upon a finding "that the judge
[in question] suffers from an incapacity, is grossly incompetent, or is
guilty of gross misconduct. ''* The lower levels of the judiciary,
however, are less insulated, with the magistrates-whose tribunals
are the lowliest to be explicitly mentioned in the Constitution ' 8-
actually being members of the civil service without protection from
salary changes, transfers, or demotions.4 At least at its highest
levels, however, the South African judiciary thus seems relatively
insulated from political pressures and thus potentially well-placed
to provide some oversight of the security bureaucracy.
1. A Tradition of Judicial Independence Squandered
It should not be forgotten that for many years, the South
African courts enjoyed a reputation for judicial independence. As
one observer put it,
[d]espite the lack of judicial review and of a justiciable bill
of rights, the [South African] judiciary was largely viewed,
for the first half of this century, as the only branch of
government to which all South African citizens could turn
with a reasonable expectation of justice.410
Relying upon the color-blind tradition of common-law
jurisprudence, South African judges initially acted as something of a
brake upon early segregationist legislation. Shortly after the National
Party came to power in 1948, for example, the Supreme Court set
aside the conviction of a non-White man for traveling in a Cape
Town railway coach, reasoning that it was "the duty of the courts to
hold the scales evenly between the different classes of the
community and to declare invalid any practice which, in the absence
becoming in its present incarnation the Supreme Court of Appeal-the country's
highest non-constitutional court. See S. AFR. CONST. Sched. 6, § 16.
406. S. AFR. CONST. § 176(2).
407. Id. § 177(1). Technically, the National Assembly does not remove the judge, but
rather adopts a resolution calling for his removal, at which point the President is
constitutionally obliged to comply. Id. § 177(2) ("The President must remove a judge
from office upon adoption of a resolution calling for that judge to be removed.").
408. Id. § 166(d). The Constitution authorizes Parliament to create other courts,
including "any court of a status similar to either the High Courts or the Magistrates'
Courts." Id. § 166(e).
409. Huebner, supra note 12, at 963-64.
410. Id. at 966.
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of the authority of an Act of Parliament, resulted in partial or
unequal treatment between different sections of the community.""
As this essentially procedural ruling suggests, however, such a
braking role could survive only so long as such discriminatory
measures were undertaken by lesser political authorities than the
all-powerful Parliament itself. Hobbled by the nature of traditional
British-style parliamentary democracy, the courts' independent
streak did not survive long into the apartheid era of National Party
rule. Parliament quickly found its answer to judicial obstructionism
in this respect, and with the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act
of 1953, it established a firm legal foundation for countrywide
transportation segregation by writing such a policy in parliamentary
ink.
4 1 2
The railway segregation issue, however, was just a skirmish; it
was not until 1955 that Parliament beat the courts wholly into
submission. In 1951, the National Party passed the Separate
Registration of Voters Act by a majority vote in both the House of
Assembly and the Senate. This bill sought to end the voting
privileges of Coloured (mixed-race) South Africans, which enjoyed
the protection inherent in being one of the few provisions under
existing South African law that could only be abolished a two-thirdsmajoity oteof bth" 413
majority vote of both houses. Accordingly, the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court promptly (and unanimously) declared theS 1 414
new Act invalid. An angry Nationalist Parliament responded by
passing the High Court of Parliament Act, which purported to give
the national legislation the power to review any decision of the
Appellate Division that invalidated an Act of Parliament-at which
point the Appellate Division declared that law to be invalid too. Not
to be outdone, however, the National Party settled the issue by
destroying the independence of the courts, passing the Appellate
Division Quorum Act, No. 27 of 1955, to increase the court's
quorum requirement by five judges. To ensure its control over the
appointment of the new judges who would thereby be required, the
National Party also passed an act nearly doubling the size of the
Senate so as to give the NP an unassailable majority in the body
responsible for appointing judges.4 15 Thereafter, a larger and more
pliant Appellate Division stuffed with Nationalist appointees had no
difficulty reaching the conclusion that a court could only invalidate
acts of Parliament for failure to follow proper legislative
411. HISTORY, supra note 12, at 394.
412. Id.
413. See Huebner, supra note 12, at 967 n.28.
414. See Minister of the Interior v. Harris, 1952 (4) SA 769 (A).




procedures. Thus did the unchecked National Party majority in
apartheid-era South Africa replace the rule of law with the rule
merely of lawmakers.
Faced by Nationalist majorities in Parliament willing to use
their judicially unaccountable legislative prerogatives subject only to
the limits of expediency, the courts lost their independence and ac-
quired a new reputation as apologists for the apartheid security
state-particularly after 1984, when the country's new
"tricameral" Constitution combined the offices of Prime Minister
and State President, giving NP leader P.W. Botha the power es-
417sentially to hand-pick members of the judiciary. Over time, as
the courts settled into their residual role of ensuring merely that
racist oppression be undertaken with a proper eye to legal formali-
ties, "public confidence in the judicial system.., steadily and
precipitously eroded. " 41"
By the 1980s, it was possible for one observer to conclude that
South African judges had "com[e] to be seen as willing and obedient
servants of a repressive legislature rather than impartial and
objective arbiters and dispensers of justice, stepping in to protect the
individual citizen from legislative and executive excesses.'419 The
situation seemed particularly bad with respect to the arena of
security oversight, where it was said that "loyalty to the status quo,
especially in times of social crisis, [was] the dominant characteristic
of the South African courts,"42 and the courts were guilty of nothing
less than "judicial dereliction."' South African judges, some
observers concluded, had "actively and determinedly reshaped
jurisprudence so as to grant the greatest possible latitude to the
executive to act outside conventional legal controls.,4 22
416. See Collins v. Minister of the Interior, 1957 (1) SA 552 (A).
417. Pursuant to § 10 of Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, all South African judges
were to be "appointed by the State President under his hand and the Seal of the
Republic of South Africa." See Huebner, supra note 12, at 963 n.6. When P.W. Botha
became both head of government and head of state in 1984, he thus inherited the
presidency's appointment power. See generally South Africa: Opening Up, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 29, 1994, at 44 (noting that post-apartheid system of selecting judges is "a big
change from the days when the minister of justice and national president simply
hand-picked new judges").
418. Huebner, supra note 12, at 966.
419. M.G. Cowling, Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in South Africa:
Articulating the Inarticulate Premise, 3 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 177, 181 (1987).
420. Dennis Davis & Hugh Corder, A Long March: Administrative Law in the Appellate
Division, 4 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 281, 296 (1988).
421. A.S. Mathews, The South African Judiciary and the Security System, 1 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 199, 201 (1985).
422. Nicholas Haysom & Clive Plasket, The War Against Law: Judicial Activism and
the Appellate Division, 4 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 303, 303 (1988).
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2. Reinventing the Judicial "Jealous Eye?"
Like the security services themselves, therefore, South Africa's
judiciary has some rather bad habits to unlearn if the country is to
overcome the legacies of its ugly past. The fact that the judiciary was
once able to exercise a degree of independence from the political
branches of government, however, may place it in a better position
than the security services in this respect: the bench has merely to
reclaim and build upon its past, whereas the coercive arms of South
African government power have really never known restraint. As
one official from the ANC-run Ministry of Justice put it recently,
there were indeed, over the years, certain "deviations [in which]
there were courageous interventions by the judiciary." The courts
were once jealous guardians of their own independence, never
succumbed to corruption, and may be able to draw upon traditions
of "judicial activism in the past" in ways that will prove "good for
today" by checking the excesses of South African poicymakers.423
Indeed, South Africa's Constitutional Court has already shown
signs of what may in time become a plucky independence from the
political arm, even on the weightiest of issues. Charged with judging
the new Constitution's compliance with a set of "constitutional
principles" adopted by the parties ahead of time, the Court actually
rejected the first draft document in September 1996 after its approval
by a two-thirds vote of the constitutional Assembly-sending South
Africa's first-ever majority-rule Constitution back to the drawing
board424 (it approved the second draft, to which no fewer than thirty-
nine changes had been made).4 5 As Stephen Ellmann has noted, this
clear effort to place the law before even the most important of
political concerns bodes well for the Court's future independence.26
423. Thui Madonsela, Deputy Director, Planning Unit, South African Ministry of
Justice, Remarks at the Michigan Journal of Race & Law Symposium, "Constitution-
Making in South Africa" (Mar. 21, 1997).
424. Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SALR
744 (CC)
425. Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa 1996, 1997 (2) SALR 97 (CC). See generally Deborah Fine, Court Hears Argument
for Rejecting Certification of Cohstitution, BUS. DAY, Nov. 19, 1996 (describing the
opposition to the certification of the Constitution for failure to comply with
constitutional principles).
426. Stephen J. Ellmann, Remarks at the Michigan Journal of Race & Law Symposium,
"Constitution-Making in South Africa" (Mar. 21, 1997). Heinz Klug and Nicholas
Haysom, speaking at the same conference, both described this first certification
judgment as having been a clear effort at judicial institution-building by the fledgling




Ironically, at least with regard to security oversight, it may
actually be advantageous that the new Constitution allows so much
of the existing judiciary to continue in place: if the South African
courts are in any way to provide the "jealous eye" of security
oversight urged upon constitutional democracies by David
Palmer,427 it is perhaps for the best that the bench not too quickly be
replaced with appointees sympathetic to the new ANC
government. 2' An "unrepresentative judiciary" may face political
problems of legitimacy vis-a-vis ordinary South Africans,29 but this
may actually be an advantage with respect to security oversight to
the extent that judges' ideological (and perhaps racial) distance from
the political masters of the security establishment encourages the
bench to view claims of security necessity with a somewhat
skeptical eye. With luck, by the time the bench becomes (as it must)
more genuinely representative of the South African people,43 this
habit of skepticism will have taken root and the courts' long-
dormant tradition of feisty independence will have been revived.
3. A Case Study: Domestic Intelligence Surveillance
Today, the South African courts have already begun to acquire
a role, albeit still a small one, in overseeing the security apparatus. In
a break with the entirely unaccountable practices of the past,
wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, and searches and seizures of
personal property for purposes of intelligence collection and law
enforcement are undertaken in the new South Africa pursuant to the
Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992. Under
section 3 of this statute, only the South African Police Service, the
427. Cf. PALMER, supra note 39, at 108.
428. In this respect, it is perhaps worth noting that veteran anti-apartheid activist
and ANC stalwart Albie Sachs wrote an article in 1990 that "articulated profound
distrust... for [the idea of] a justiciable bill of rights [in South Africa]." Sachs did not
think it proper to "entrust the judiciary with the power of implementing a bill of
rights, at least not until-'later years when the foundations of a stable new nation will
have been laid..I..' " instead, Sachs proposed to give the enforcement of rights
merely to "specialized commissions 'that operate under the overall supervision of the
people's representatives in Parliament.' " Van der Vyver, supra note 9, at 765 n.76
(quoting Albie Sachs, Towards a Bill of Rights in Democratic South Africa, 6 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 1, 3-4 & 16-17 (1990)). Sachs, who would thus have preferred to leave the
business of restraining the ANC government to nothing more than its own scruples, is
presently a justice on South Africa's Constitutional Court.
429. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Seeking Pluralism in Judicial Systems: The
American Experience and the South African Challenge, 42 DUKE L.J. 1028, 1032-33 (1993).
430. Cf. Huebner, supra note 12, at 962 (noting that negotiated nature of South
African transfer of power will ensure only slow change in demographics of judiciary
because most current judges will probably remain on the bench until mandatory
retirement at age 70).
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SANDF, and the National Intelligence Agency (the domestic spying
organization) may lodge applications for such monitoring with a
judge specially designated to hear such issues.31 Interceptions are
permitted if the judge is convinced that a "serious offence that
cannot be properly investigated in any other manner" "has been or is
being or will probably be committed," or where "the security of the
Republic is threatened."432 Permission for such interception is
usually given only for a three-month period, but this is subject to
extension for successive periods of three additional months upon
renewed application .4  This form of judicial oversight is also
embodied in section 5(2) of the Intelligence Services Act, which
permits a properly designated judge to grant an application for
covert physical entry upon specified premises when he is convinced
that
information which has or could probably have a bearing
on the functions of the [National Intelligence] Agency or
the [South African Police] Service as contemplated in
section 2 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994,
can be obtained on any premises and such information is
of substantial importance to the Agency or the Service in
the discharge of its functions... [or] is required by the
Agency or the Service for the proper discharge of its
434
functions ....
In providing an abbreviated procedural mechanism for
domestic intelligence gathering, the South African judicial approval
process for covert domestic intelligence collection somewhat
resembles the scheme established in the United States by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), pursuant to which a secret
court of specially designated judges (the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, or "FISC") was established in Washington, D.C.
to entertain applications for electronic surveillance and physical
search warrants for intelligence purposes.435
431. See Senate Hansard 11 Mar 1995 Col 279-80 (remarks of Minister of Justice in
response to Question 65).
432. See § 3(b) of Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992; see also
Senate Hansard 11 Mar 1995 Col 279-80 (remarks of Minister of Justice in response to
Question 65) (describing Act as permitting interception in cases of "serious [criminal]
offenses or where the security of the Republic is threatened").
433. See, e.g., Senate Hansard 15 Nov 1994 Col 3016 (remarks of P.H. Groenwald)
(describing Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act).
434. See § 5(2)(a)-(b) of Intelligence Services Act 38 of 1994. This act also provides
for an ordinary duration of three months for a judicial permission-to-enter, with the
possibility of successive three-month extensions upon renewed application. Id. § 5(4).
435. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1829 (1994). This statute authorizes the Chief Justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court to "designate seven district court judges from seven of the
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As with its secretive American counterpart, however, it is quite
hard for an outsider to assess the success of South Africa's judicial
surveillance-approval scheme as a check upon overreaching by the
security forces. In response to parliamentary questions, Justice
Minister Dullah Omar revealed that 406 applications (including
applications for the renewal of pre-existing permissions) were
received by the designated judge in 1994; of these, 396 were granted.
In 1995, 246 of 279 applications were approved.436 By contrast, the
American FISC processed 697 FISA applications in 1995 3 _-though it
is impossible to make any real comparison because the FISA process
is restricted to interceptions undertaken solely for intelligence
purposes, whereas most of the South African permissions are
reportedly for law enforcement purposes.38 In terms of rates of
application approval, however, the South African process-with an
approval rate apparently on the order of ninety-four percent439-is
arguably somewhat more rigorous than its U.S. analogue, which has
reportedly never flatly rejected a government application for intelligence-
related domestic surveillance (though "[s]ome have been revised...
[and] [s]ome have been withdrawn and resubmitted with additional
information . .. .,,).440
United States judicial circuits who shall constitute a court which shall have jurisdiction
to hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere
within the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a). A three-judge court of review is given
jurisdiction to review any denials of applications made by these judges; if the
application is denied by this panel, the government may take the case to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Id. § 1803(b). In 1994, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was
also given jurisdiction over similar applications for physical searches of specific
locations undertaken for foreign intelligence purposes. Id. § 1822(c).
This process, however, is not the only way the U.S. government can undertake
domestic electronic surveillance, however: this requirement for court approval does
not apply in wartime, see id. § 1811, and in any event the President, through the U.S.
Attorney General may authorize non-court-approved electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes "for periods of up to one year" if its target is "the
contents of communications transmitted by means of communications used
exclusively between or among foreign powers" or "the acquisition of technical
intelligence, other than the spoken communications of individuals, from property or
premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power" and there is "no
substantial likelihood" that such surveillance will acquire "the contents of any
communication to which a [statutorily defined] United States person is a party .. " Id.
§ 1802(a)(1).
436. Senate Hansard 14 May 1996 Col 711-12 (remarks of Minister of Justice in
response to Question 300). The Minister of Justice also said that 615 applications were
received in 1993, of which six were still in force in May 1996. Id.
437. McGee & Duffy, supra note 67, at 11.
438. See Senate Hansard 15 Nov 1994 Col 3022 (remarks of Deputy Minister of Justice).
439. This figure is an average of Dullah Omar's figures recounted above.
440. Royce Lamberth, Intelligence on the FISA Court, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at
18. Judge Lamberth, who presently sits on the FISC, defended his court's practices in
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In any event, the data presently available is too scanty to permit
many conclusions about South Africa's surveillance court. To the
extent that these surveillance procedures represent a small step
toward a more robust system of security oversight capable of at least
partly making up for the structural weaknesses of legislative
oversight in South Africa, they are to be applauded. Where the
South African surveillance court seems less wholesome, however, is
in the breadth of its jurisdiction. In the United States, the FISA
process observes a strict distinction between collecting information
for "intelligence" purposes and its collection for purposes of "law
enforcement." The highly abbreviated procedures for obtaining
judicial approval of surveillance apply only to "foreign intelligence
information, '"44' and FISA mandates that the target of such
surveillance must be either a foreign government or an agent
thereof.442 For law enforcement intelligence, America's security
apparatus must go through the much more difficult process of
obtaining a warrant from the conventional courts, a requirement
enforced by rigid "exclusionary rules" that generally bar the
this respect, arguing that "the attorney general is conscientiously doing her job, as is
her staff," so that surveillance applications are usually done properly. Id.
Usually, however, the FISC is criticized for its seeming deference to the
executive branch. See, e.g., McGee & Duffy, supra note 67, at 12 ("The courts
sometimes sends an application back for more work, saying it hasn't met the legal test
for authorization. But the court has never formally rejected an application. Not
once."); see also BAMFORD, supra note 240, at 466 ("[T]he federal government has never
lost a case before the court.... Given the fact that the top secret court has never said
no to the government, it would be difficult to conclude that it has become anything
other than a rubber stamp."). Ironically, reports Bamford, the process of approval
used in the United States prior to the creation of the FISA court-which involved the
review of applications by an interagency panel made up of the Secretaries of Defense
and State, and chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence-apparently did
sometimes reject surveillance proposals. Id. at 467.
441. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (defining "[f]oreign intelligence information" as (1)
"information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to,
the ability of the United States to protect against... (A) actual or potential attack or
other grave hostile acts," (B) "sabotage or international terrorism," or (C) "clandestine
intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an
agent of a foreign power," or (2) "information with respect to a foreign power or
foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary
to-(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or (B) the conduct of
the foreign affairs of the United States").
442. Id. § 1805(a)(3), (requiring judge to issue order permitting electronic
surveillance upon finding that "there is probable cause to believe that... the target of
the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power" and
"each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being
used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power"); id. §
1824(a)(3) (providing same rule for physical searches); id. § 1801(a)-(b) (providing
definitions of "[f]oreign power" and "[a]gent of a foreign power"); see also BAMFORD,
supra note 240, at 369-72 (describing process of obtaining EISA approval from
intelligence tasking requests from specific agency through FISC approval).
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admission into evidence of information not obtained through proper
warrant procedures.44
The South African surveillance court, however, has an infinitely
broader jurisdiction. Where the American system reserves the
relatively permissive FISA process for foreign-targeted "intelligence"
collection, South Africa freely uses its surveillance court to approve
wiretapping and physical searches for criminal investigative
purposes as well. Indeed, most of the applications approved by the
South African court are for law enforcement purposes,444 and there
exists no American-style exclusionary rule in South African law.445
Moreover, as we have seen,446 even those South African surveillance
approvals that actually are for "intelligence" purposes are available
to the National Intelligence Agency in its pursuit of "domestic
intelligence," a term wedded to South Africa's breathtakingly broad
conception of "national security. 447 It may not be much of an
exaggeration, therefore, to conclude that while the South African
judiciary is a check upon unlawful domestic surveillance, there is
hardly anything that would qualify as unlawful surveillance so long
443. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (finding that exclusionary rule is
aspect of incorporated Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches
and seizures). Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ...."). This
exclusionary rule has not escaped criticism on grounds of constitutional doctrine. See
e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Against Exclusion (Except to Protect Truth or Prevent Privacy
Violations), 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 457, 459 (1997) ("The Fourth Amendment
generally does not require, does not call for, does not even invite, the exclusion of
evidence as a remedy for an unconstitutional search or seizure."). Whatever its faults
as a matter of legal doctrine and policy propriety, however, the exclusionary rule
remains an important part of American criminal law and a powerful weapon against
overeager law enforcement.
444. See Senate Hansard 15 Nov 1994 Col 3022 (remarks of Deputy Minister of
Justice).
445. Z.M. Yacoob, comments to the author at the University of Michigan Law
School, Mar. 22, 1997. Zac Yacoob was a member of the Panel of Independent
Constitutional Experts who advised the Constitutional Assembly as it drafted South
Africa's present Constitution.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 136-138.
447. See § 1 of National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 (defining "domestic
intelligence" as "intelligence on any internal activity, factor or development which is
detrimental to the national stability of the Republic, as well as threats or potential
threats to the constitutional order of the Republic and the safety and the well-being of
its people"); id. § 2(1)(a) (defining NIA functions with respect to collection and
analysis of "domestic intelligence" in order to "identify any threat or potential threat to
the security of the Republic or its people").
As if this were not enough, moreover, it is worth remembering that South
African law permits searches and surveillance where such activity merely "could"
produce information that is "of substantial importance to the Agency or the Service in
the discharge of its functions." § 5(2)(a) of Intelligence Services Act 38 of 1994.
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as the government is willing to request it, in secret, from the
designated judge.
4. An Inevitable Judicial Role in Oversight Issues
Although these surveillance rules must therefore be seen as
something of a misstep-as too hasty an effort to paste judicial
oversight onto what is essentially an ugly apartheid-era tradition of
unlimited government intrusion into the lives of its citizens-the
present constitutional scheme in South Africa seems likely to
involve the courts increasingly in security oversight issues. The
enormously expansive "fundamental rights" protected by the new
Constitution may have great bearing upon security oversight issues,
and they positively cry out for judicial interpretation.
At first glance, the Constitution seems to place absolute
restrictions upon the exercise of government power. It provides that
"[the Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the
executive, the judiciary, and all organs of state.""4 8 In exercising its
legislative authority, Parliament is bound by nothing other than the
Constitution, but by this document it is bound absolutely. 449 The
Constitution is "the supreme law of the Republic," and therefore all
"law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the duties
imposed by it must be performed."4" ° Indeed, the organs of state are
prohibited from "assum[ing] any power or function except those
conferred on them in terms of the Constitution."451
448. S. AFR. CONST. § 8(1). Provisions of the Bill of Rights also bind all natural and
juristic persons "if, and to the extent that, [these provisions are] applicable [to such
persons], taking into account the nature of the right and of any duty imposed by the
right." Id. § 8(2).
449. Id. § 44(4) ("When exercising its legislative authority, Parliament is bound only
by the Constitution, and must act in accordance with, and within the limits of, the
Constitution."). Generally, the Constitution may only be amended through
supermajority votes by the National Assembly and (if the change affects the country's
various provinces or alters the National Council of Provinces) by the National Council
of Provinces, and with the assent of the President.
While normally such a vote in the National Assembly requires the support of
two-thirds of the members, § 1 of the Constitution-the section proclaiming that the
Republic is founded upon the principles of "[hiuman dignity, the achievement of
equality and advancement of human rights and freedoms," "[nion-racialism and non-
sexism," "[slupremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law," and "[u]niversal adult
suffrage," id. § 1-may not be amended without at least a 75% vote. Constitutional
amendments affecting only a particular province or provinces, moreover, cannot be
approved without the assent of the relevant provincial legislature or legislatures. See
id. § 74.
450. Id. § 2; see also id. § 237 ("All constitutional obligations must be performed
diligently and without delay.").
451. Id. § 41(1)(f).
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The rights thereby guaranteed, however, are enormously broad
and varied. These rights include: a highly comprehensive anti-
discrimination right;" a right to conduct religious observances at
state institutions;,0 a right to exercise the freedom of "artistic
creativity;"' ' 4 a right to "make political choices [and to hold] free, fair
and regular elections for any legislative body established in terms of
the Constitution;"" a right to leave and re-enter the Republic;456 a
right "to choose [one's] trade, occupation or profession freely, '117 a
right "to an environment that is not harmful to [one's] health or
well-being; 458 a right "to have access to adequate housing" and
health care services;4- and a right "to receive education in the
official language or languages of their choice in public educational
institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. ' "
Children even have a constitutional right to "a name and a
nationality from birth" and to "family care, parental care, or
appropriate alternative care when removed from the family
environment."461
Significantly, however, not all of this extensive collection of
"constitutional rights" is equally enforceable against the
government, and none of these rights would seem to enjoy
genuinely unqualified protection. To a great extent, the
constitutional scheme embodies the idea of what some scholars have
called "second generation" rights. The Bill of Rights thus lists many
protections or obligations which it is actually expected that the
government will be unable to honor, at least "in the near future," but
which have been included in order formally to exhort officials
toward better governance.46 2 Even by their own terms, moreover, the
rights contained in South Africa's Bill of Rights are explicitly
limitable. Section 36(1) of the Constitution (part of the Bill of Rights
452. See id. § 9(3) ("The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth.").
453. Id. § 15(2).
454. Id. § 16(1)(c).
455. Id. § 19(1H2).
456. Id. § 21(2H3).
457. Id. § 22.
458. Id. § 24(a).
459. Id. §§ 26(1), 27(1).
460. Id. § 29(2).
461. Id. § 28(1).
462. See generally van der Vyver, supra note 9, at 783-84 n.125 (discussing "second
generation" rights and recounting arguments, inter alia, of Richard Bilder, Rethinking
International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions, 1969 WiS. L. REV. 172, 176).
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itself) provides a broad "limitation-of-rights" clause, pursuant to
which
[t]he rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited... [by]
law[s] of general application to the extent that the
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors
including-
(a) the nature of the right;
(b)the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d)the relation between the limitation and its purpose;
and
(e) [whether there are] less restrictive means to achieve
463the purpose.
The Constitution also explicitly empowers the courts, in applying
the provisions of the Bill of Rights, to "apply, or where necessary,
develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give
effect to that right" and to "develop rules of the common law to limit
the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance with section
463. S. AFR. CONST. § 36(1); see also id. § 7(2)-(3) (noting that while "[tihe state must
respect, protect, promote, and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights," those rights are
subject to "limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill").
Moreover, the Constitution also provides that in an emergency declared
pursuant to § 37 of the Constitution, certain rights may be freely abridged in the
interest of public order. In contrast, certain rights are explicitly "non-derogable." See
id. § 37(5)(c). The broad right to "equality," for example, is "non-derogable" only with
respect to the categories of "race, colour, ethnic or social origin, sex, religion or
language." The right to freedom and security of the person is similarly non-derogable
only with respect to the right not to be tortured or suffer "cruel, inhuman or
degrading" punishment and the right "not to be subjected to medical or scientific
experiments without [one's] informed consent." Id. §§ 12(1)(d)-(e), (2)(c), 37(5)(c).
The list of non-derogable rights does not include the right "not to be deprived of
freedom arbitrarily or without just cause." See id. §§ 37(5)(c), 12(1)(a). In the event at
least of detention without trial "in consequence of a derogation of rights resulting from
a declaration of a state of emergency," however, the government is obliged to notify
the detainee's family and to publish the name of the detainee. Furthermore, "[a] court
must review the detention as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 10 days
after the date the person was detained, and the court must release the detainee unless
it is necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and order." Id. § 37(6)(e).
According to Professor Christina Murray of the University of Cape Town, who
served as an advisor to the constitutional Assembly which drafted that document, the
Constitution's table of "non-derogable" rights was meant only to delimit the
government's powers to abridge rights in a formal state of emergency-and was not
intended to create a hierarchy of "derogable" and "non-derogable" protections with
any meaning or application in other contexts. Christina Murray, remarks to the author
at University of Michigan, Mar. 22, 1997.
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36(1)." 4" These are, of course, loopholes of potentially enormous
size, Such provisions-along with broadly written guarantees
permitting access to the courts for citizens who believe their
constitutional rights to have been "infringed or threatened"'46"
highlight the substantial role the courts will have to play in
delineating the specific parameters of governmental power and
constitutional protection in post-apartheid South Africa.
South Africa's plethora of enumerated "rights"-and the
variability of the degree to which they will be enforceable against
the government-will necessitate the development of an elaborate
jurisprudence of graduated constitutional protection in every area of
government endeavor. Indeed, the Constitution positively cries out
for judicial activism in the definition and delimitation of
constitutional rights. According to Leon Wessels, who served as
deputy chairman of the constitutional Assembly that wrote South
Africa's present Constitution, some of the Constitution's
imprecision was intentional. On some constitutional issues, he said,
the political bargaining process in the Assembly simply broke down,
and-preferring a measure of "constructive ambiguity" to the
danger of derailing South Africa's precarious transition process by
trying to make the document clear in all its particulars-the
negotiating parties drafted constitutional language with
"constructive ambiguity" sufficient to permit agreement.4" Dion
464. S. AFR. CONST. § 8(3); see also id. § 39(1) (authorizing the court interpreting the
Bill of Rights to "consider international law [and]... foreign law," and "when
developing the common law or customary law... [to] promote the spirit, purpo[se],
and objects of the Bill of Rights"); id. § 173 ("[T]he Constitutional Court, Supreme
Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power... to develop the common
law, taking into account the interest of justice.").
465. Id. § 38. Indeed, the Constitution guarantees citizens "the right to have any
dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing
in a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial forum." Id. § 34.
South Africans "ha[ve] the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in
the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights." Id. § 38. The Constitution also
requires that persons be permitted to appeal to the Constitutional Court "from any
other court" when an appeal is "in the interest of justice and with leave of the
Constitutional Court"-and that they even be permitted "to bring a matter directly to
the Constitutional Court" without prior judicial disposition. Id. § 167.
In 1996, in the first case of its kind in South Africa, a man named Ntandazeli
Fose applied directly to the Constitutional Court for R200,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages on account of allegedly being tortured by the Vanderbijlpark Riot
and Related Crimes Investigation Unit in May 1994. See Mungo Soggot, Security
Minister Faces Torture Case, Africa News, Sept. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, World
Library, AFRNWS File.
466. Leon Wessels, Remarks at the Michigan Journal of Race & Law Symposium,
"Constitution-Making in South Africa" (Mar. 21, 1997). Speaking at the same
conference, Nicholas Haysom, President Mandela's legal advisor, has suggested that
such "creative ambiguity" was necessary if South Africa were to have any
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Basson, formerly an advisor to the Constitutional Assembly and
presently a judge on the Labour Court of South Africa, similarly
recalls that when negotiations broke down on a particular issue, the
parties simply wrote vague language in anticipation that the courts
could sort out the details later."' The judiciary, therefore, cannot
escape a significant role in patching holes in this framework of
fundamental law and in deciding what real meaning to give to the
various items on South Africa's extraordinary laundry list of rights
and constitutional "governing principles."
Many of the rights specifically enumerated in the South African
Constitution would seem to have little relevance from the
perspective of security oversight; some, however, are likely to have
real significance. Quite irrespective of the statutory enactment of
judicial protections in the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition
Act or the Intelligence Services Act, for example, the constitutional
right to privacy explicitly includes the right not to have one's home
or property searched or one's communications "infringed."" 8 Other
enumerated rights-for example, the rights to freedom of
movement, assembly, and access to "any information held by the
state" 69-also have clear relevance to security oversight. More
broadly, although Chapter 11 of the Constitution includes a list of
governing principles for the South African security forces, it is quite
uncertain what significance these principles will have.470
As the South African courts set about trying to build a workable
jurisprudence of constitutional scrutiny upon the wide but
Constitution. Many provisions that today seem "less than ideal," he said, were
included in order, to keep the process from breaking down.
467. Dion Basson, Remarks at the Michigan Journal of Race & Law Symposium,
"Constitution-Making in South Africa" (Mar. 21, 1997). As recounted at the same
conference by Leon Wessels and by Roelf Meyer (formerly the National Party
government's chief negotiator at the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum that produced
South Africa's interim Constitution and presently Secretary-General of the National
Party), time pressures also played a role in limiting the parties' ability to arrive at
genuine agreements on certain issues. Wessels agreed, describing the resulting process
as one of "legislation by exhaustion."
468. S. AFR. CONST. § 14.
469. Id. § 32(1).
470. What does it mean, for example, to write into a Constitution that security policy
"must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as
equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a
better life?" S. AFR. CONST. § 198(a) (emphasis added). And what does it mean that the
Constitution requires the security service to both "teach" and "act" in accordance with
law, including customary international law? Id. § 199(5). Generally, however,
customary international law which is inconsistent with the Constitution or an act of
parliament is not binding on the government. Id. § 232. If such commandments are not
strictly enforceable against the government (as one suspects must be the case), might
such principles serve as general principles to guide judges' evaluation of security
issues that do make their way before the courts?
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somewhat unsteady foundation provided by their country's Bill of
Rights, judges are likely to acquire a role in security oversight far
greater than that assumed by the judiciary in most other countries-
including, certainly, the United States.
III.THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY OVERSIGHT?
South Africa's breathtakingly ambitious project of political,
economic, and legal transformation is in many respects, of course,
still in its infancy. With respect to security oversight issues, the
government has shown itself genuinely committed to serious
institutional reform: to the creation of a system of institutional
controls that will enable South Africa's fractious political culture to
enjoy the benefits of a strong and capable security apparatus without
repeating the disastrous errors and abuses of the past. Without
detracting from the enormous progress South Africa has already
made in this respect, however, it may be useful to offer at least a few
suggestions for the future.
A. Recommendations
1. Legislative Oversight Issues
In the preceding pages, this author has suggested that South
Africa's present system of party-list proportional-representation
parliamentary governance, whatever its other virtues, has some
significant weaknesses with respect to security oversight. This said,
however, it is no doubt also true that such a system must be taken as
a fact of life in modem South Africa: this bridge has been crossed,
and one should probably not expect much consideration to be given
to a return to constituency-based politics-let alone to a system that
would provide independent political bases for the legislature and
the national executive.
Even within a parliamentary scheme, however, it may be
possible to improve the prospects of a meaningful parliamentary
"check" or "balance" upon the power of the majority-run security
apparatus. Much, in fact, has already been done in this respect, and
this author applauds the mandatory involvement of opposition
parliamentarians in the oversight committee framework and the
seventy-five percent supermajority voting requirement imposed for
the appointment of inspectors-general and the Public Protector. Such
innovations-which are admirably consistent with the "multiparty"
and "consensus"-based approach to governance pioneered by the
Government of National Unity ("GNU") after the elections of April
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1994-should be jealously protected, and strengthened where
possible.
The role of the oversight committees should, for example, be
strengthened with increased line-by-line budget authority over
security functions, and the role of opposition members within the
committee framework increased through the adoption of
parliamentary rules of procedure somewhat analogous to the GNU's
style of consensual policymaking--or to the loose member-
empowering procedures of the U.S. Senate, where the institutions of
the "filibuster" and the "cloture vote" encourage a much more
consensus-driven approach than the more majoritarian and party-
disciplined U.S. House of Representatives.4n Such changes would
not alter the bedrock reality of parliamentary rule; if "push" were
really to come to "shove," an ANC majority would probably be able
to have its way subject only to checks imposed by the bench or the
ballot box. But writing a more consensus-based approach to
governance into the law and procedure of parliamentary rule today
will help ensure that such a political culture can survive tomorrow-
after the glow of South Africa's remarkably amicable transition has
faded.
2.The Surveillance Court
As discussed above, South Africa's present procedures for the
judicial authorization of clandestine domestic surveillance and
physical searches of property are inadequate: the virtually unlimited
government right-to-spy these rules seem to permit is inappropriate
for a modern constitutional democracy dedicated to the rule of law,
to the judicial enforcement of constitutional rights, and to the
avoidance of the sort of abuses that characterized its recent past.
4
7
Because South Africans have a constitutional right "not to have...
their property searched... [or] the privacy of their communications
infringed,"7 -and because neither the Interception and Monitoring
Prohibition Act nor the Intelligence Services Act provide for the kind
471. See, e.g., CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 187-222
& 691-756 (1989) (explaining different procedural regimes of House and Senate).
472. Among developed democracies also possessing a domestic intelligence service
dedicated to providing national leaders with domestic "information in the political,
social, and economic domains" acquired in part by "surveillance, infiltration of
political groups and trade unions, opening mail, [and] tapping telephones" is France,
whose Renseignements G~n~raux ("RG") has precisely such a function. In 1990, the
RG was revealed to have been involved in a number of abuses of power and which
was decried in the French parliament as "a permanent threat to democracy." See
PORCH, supra note 127, at 422-30.
473. S. AFR. CONST. § 14.
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of judicial balancing envisioned in the limitation of rights rule of
section 36(1) of the new Constitution-these statutes may also be
unconstitutional.
It is important, therefore, that the jurisdiction of South Africa's
surveillance court be redefined. Ideally its jurisdiction should be
limited to "intelligence" matters, leaving the covert collection of
"law enforcement" information through privacy-invasive means to
formal warrant-application procedures in the regular courts and
subjecting it to some form of exclusionary rule. To the extent that
such abbreviated judicial procedures are still permitted to authorize
government surveillance, a "foreign power" nexus analogous to that
written into the U.S. FISA process could be enacted-lest South
Africa's overbroad working definition of "national security" be
taken to justify any spying the security forces decide would be
useful. Short of such a "foreign power" requirement, there should at
least be imposed a relatively demanding threat-to-public-order
standard to help ensure that only something rather more urgent
than the NIA's curiosity is permitted to justify such invasive
activity. In any event, the Constitution would also seem to impose
the requirement that any authorization for domestic surveillance
pass muster under the "limitation of rights" provisions of section
36(1): while the rigor of the constitutional test required for
clandestine "intelligence" and "law enforcement" collection might
well be understood to vary according to the circumstances presented
in each case, the Constitution apparently requires that some explicit
balancing take place-just as the U.S. Constitution requires
surveillance and search applications to be grounded in a showing of
"probable cause."'7 4 If the South African Bill of Rights is to have any
meaning, such section 36(1) balancings must be undertaken by a
judge, not merely by the government functionaries who decide
whether or not to apply for surveillance authorization.475
As a general matter, moreover, it is hard not to agree with the
suggestion of some opposition parliamentarians that it would be
safer if the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act and
Intelligence Services Act were modified to require that applications
for such judicially approved surveillance be presented to a panel of
474. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
475. Deputy Minister of Intelligence Services Joe Nhlanhla said upon his swearing-
in during early 1995 that South Africa's "new security doctrine would evolve from
needs of the people and their inherent right to privacy and security." New Deputy
Intelligence Minister Says Era of Spying Is Over, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Feb. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File. Jurisdictional
adjustments to the surveillance-authorization process are needed in order to ensure
that the truth of this statement does not depend merely upon the NIA's goodwill.
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jurists rather than a single judge.476 Such a change would lessen the
likelihood of the institutional "capture" of the designated judge by
the intelligence agencies whose representatives appear repeatedly
before him and might also, in time, serve to better acquaint the
judiciary as a whole with security oversight problems and the
constitutional balancing issues that they raise.
3. Other Oversight Organs
Little can be said at this point about the role of organs such as
the inspectors-general, the Auditor-General, the Public Protector,
and the Human Rights Commission in South Africa's security
oversight scheme except to exhort government officials to ensure
that these positions are filled by persons of integrity who are
provided with the resources necessary to do their job-and that
these officers are encouraged to view abuses of power in the security
arena as matters well within their jurisdictions.
With respect to South Africa's new "Special Investigating
Units" and "Special Tribunals," however, the point made above with
respect to the surveillance court must be reiterated: the right of
privacy enjoyed by all South Africans requires that any searches or
seizures undertaken under the authority of such bodies be explicitly
tied to the balancing test articulated in section 36(1) of the
Constitution. The authorizing statute should be amended to this
effect, and a process instituted whereby individuals affected by such
a search can challenge its constitutional propriety. Such a
requirement would, of course, somewhat impair the vaunted
"efficiency" of the "Special Tribunal" process. As Americans learned
long ago, however, many such procedural impediments are the
price a society must pay for having a genuine commitment to
constitutionally guaranteed rights.
476. See Senate Hansard 15 Nov 1994 Col 3020 (remarks of J. Selfe) (arguing that in
this respect, "two heads are better than one"); id. Col 3019 (remarks of P. Powell)
(discussing Senator Selfe's proposal for enlargement of judicial panel). The American
FISC bench, by contrast, consists of seven federal judges picked by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court to serve for staggered, non-renewable terms of up to seven years-
though the FISC judges initially consider applications only in single-judge panels. See
18 U.S.C. § 1803(a), (d); BAMFORD, supra note 240, at 370-71. (Interestingly, the
normally entirely secret FISC once actually published one of its opinions. See In re
Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Physical Search of Non-




4. The Role of the Judiciary
a. A New Jurisprudence of 'Warning?"
Given the problems inherent in other forms of security
oversight in South Africa-especially those associated with the
weaknesses of legislative supervision in a parliamentary regime that
does not cleanly distinguish between the majority party and the
government-it may be time for the South African courts to begin to
expand small judicial beachheads such as the surveillance court into
a more significant role in security oversight. This suggestion,
however, returns us to one of the central conundrums of national
security law discussed previously. As we have seen, security
oversight is, at its core, the process of achieving a balance between
liberty, on the one hand, and the expedient pursuit of security, on
the other. But if the precise point and character of this balance shifts
as a country's political culture and its security environment develop
over time, formal legal dispute resolution-which tends to produce
binary win/lose determinations and to fix its results into
precedential stone-may be an awkward and often unsuitable way
to approach many problems of national security law. How, then, is it
possible usefully and more broadly to employ the judiciary in the
security oversight arena?
To some extent courts, the new South African Constitutional
Court among them, already know how to do this. As Heinz Klug has
argued, the Court has already played an important role in the
process of post-apartheid political transition by being
"constructively ambiguous" in its rulings. Legal disputes, in Klug's
characterization, are seldom fully answered in a firm "yes/no"
fashion by the Court. Rather, between its somewhat vaguely written
opinions and its efforts to leave many issues aside in narrowing the
legal questions to be considered, the Court can ensure that even
losing parties are seldom wholly shut out.47 Despite repeated losses
challenging the new Constitution's provisions dividing power
between South Africa's national and provincial tiers of government,
for example, the Inkatha Freedom Party has yet to become so
disenchanted with the Court that it will fail to bring further
challenges. 47 ' This is only a partial answer, however, because
narrowed though they be in subject matter by such a cautious
477. Heinz Klug, Remarks at the Michigan Journal of Race & Law Symposium,
"Constitution-Making in South Africa" (Mar. 21, 1997).
478. See, e.g., Fine, supra note 425 (discussing IFP and DP challenge to second draft
of Constitution after initial rejection by Constitutional Court); Suzanne Daley, SA's
New Beginning, SOWETAN, June 12, 1996.
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court-and however much the law may develop by evolutionary
increments as "lines are pricked out by the ,gadual approach and
contact of decisions on the opposing sides' -- conventional legal
decisions are still binary yes/no judgments, the results of which are
recorded as binding law for lower courts and controlling precedent
for the future. Might there be a way for courts to be more flexible
still?
One possible answer may be in the development of a constitu-
tional "warnings" jurisprudence analogous to that sometimes
employed, for example, in Japanese law in circumstances where tra-
ditional win/lose determinations are felt to be inappropriate. It is
the practice of the Japanese Supreme Court sometimes to engage in
"constitutional prodding-declaring the need for appropriate con-
stitutional behavior but stopping, if possible, short of the formal
invocation of coercive legal authority" in such a way as to permit the
political authorities to modify their behavior without the awkward
necessity of a formal legal finding of right or wrong.480 This, for ex-
ample, occurred in a series of cases involving dramatic disparities in
voting power between urban and rural districts in elections for the
Japanese National Diet.481 These discrepancies, which resulted from
long-outdated political district demarcations that were retained be-
cause of the advantages they gave to the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party's rural constituents, seemed clearly to violate the equality pro-
visions of the Japanese Constitution. Rather than simply declaring
the districting plans unconstitutional (or borrowing from American
jurisprudence and involving judges themselves in redrawing the
districts),' 82 however, the Japanese Supreme Court preferred to issue
what one scholar has termed "warnings of unconstitutionality." 3
These "rhetorical shot[s] across the government's bow" were in-
tended to permit the government to at least partially redress the
problem "without the unpleasant necessity of the Supreme Court
479. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 112 (1911) (discussing development
of legal doctrine with respect to scope of government's police power and "elsewhere
in law").
480. Christopher A. Ford, The Indigenizaton of Constitutionalism in the Japanese
Experience, 28 CASEW. RES. J. INT'L L. 3, 48 (1996) [hereinafter Ford IV].
481. See generally id. at 47-4 9.
482. Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (ruling that an electoral district may
be challenged on constitutional equal protection grounds if the court finds its shape
"so irrational that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters" by race).
483. See Toshihiko Nonaka, The Significance of the Grand Bench Decision Concerning
Proportional Representation in the House of Representatives and Related Issues, 18 LAW IN
JAPAN 134, 141-42 (David Nelson trans. 1986).
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actually having to invalidate a law (or worse, the results of an elec-
tion)."'
What significance does this idea of a "warnings jurisprudence"
have for South Africa? As we have seen, the hugely expansive
provisions of constitutional rights written into the new South
African Constitution-and the varying degree to which they are
likely to be enforceable against the government-will require the
courts to acquire an unprecedented quasi-policymaking role with
respect to security oversight issues. It will fall to judges to find the
law's proper path through South Africa's dense thicket of
constitutional verbiage, and to authorize the curtailment of
constitutional rights where a careful balancing of "the nature of the
right" against the "the importance of the purpose [and] ... the
nature and extent of the limitation" indicates that such restriction is
necessary.4' As we have also seen, however, it is the nature of
security oversight law to require a continual process of delicate,
circumstance-driven balancing, as the requirements of liberty are
weighed against the demands imposed by pursuit of that security
necessary for liberty's survival.
Such balancings are highly contextual things: the "right"
answer in one case is not always the right answer in another. As we
have seen, this makes national security issues somewhat resistant to
useful embodiment in "hard" case precedent of the sort that
characterizes most judicial determination. Not limited by a "case or
controversy" requirement of the sort that requires U.S. courts to take
cognizance only of full-blown legal disputes between adversarial
parties and shun the issuance of merely advisory opinions,486
484. Ford IV, supra note 480, at 47. As Johan van der Vyver has also noted in his
own search for jurisprudential models suitable for post-apartheid South Africa,
German law employs a somewhat analogous doctrine by "affording the legislature
time to remedy a situation that has been found to be unconstitutional." Van der Vyver,
supra note 9, at 314 (citing Ipsen, Constitutional Review of Laws, in MAIN PRINCIPLES OF
THE GERMAN BASIC LAW 132-33 (1983)). This is an approach which the U.S. courts
themselves have used on at least one occasion, though with less than complete
success. Compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1954) (requiring "a prompt
and reasonable start toward full compliance" with the desegregation decision, and
instructing lower courts to enforce the decision "with all deliberate speed") with
Griffin v. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1963) ("The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has
run out .. "). Both the German and the American "all deliberate speed" approaches,
however, are predicated upon an actual formal finding of unconstitutionality: only the
remedy is left to the political process.
485. S. AFR. CONST. § 36(1).
486. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11 (1975) ("Congress may not... require
this Court to render opinions in matters which are not 'cases or controversies.' ")
(citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937)). This "case or
controversy" rule of U.S. federal court jurisdiction has its origins in the U.S.
Constitution itself, which provides that "[t]he Judicial Power shall extend," inter alia,
to "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [or] the Laws of the
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however, there would seem to be no constitutional bar to the
development of a wide-ranging jurisprudence of constitutional
value-balancing in the interests of security oversight by the South
African Courts. Accordingly, there exists no reason why such a
jurisprudence could not usefully employ "warnings" of
unconstitutionality as one means by which the courts prod the
political branches of government back into line without having to
write rigid win/lose determinations into precedential stone.
b. A CIPA Analogue?
With respect to security oversight, however, one thing that such
a jurisprudence would require is the development of a workable
system for protecting national security information introduced in
court and a clear constitutional rule reconciling the imposition of
such restrictions with the Constitution's guarantee of a right of
"access to... any information held by the state."487 The procedures
used to govern the judicial approval of surveillance and search
applications under the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act
might prove a useful model in some (very limited) respects, but
those procedures involve only a single, specially designated judge in
a court whose proceedings are inherently secret. What South Africa
needs, by contrast, is a statute both to facilitate the use of secret
information in ordinary courts in ordinary cases and to protect any
such information thus introduced. In the United States, this function
is fulfilled in criminal proceedings by the Classified Information
Procedures Act ("CIPA"), 4" but no such provisions apply to civil
litigation, leaving the government with a politically embarrassing
but legally all-powerful "state secrets" trump card with which to
stymie requests for information from opposing litigants. Because the
South African courts may play a much broader role in oversight
issues than does (or can) the U.S. federal judiciary-and because the
United States" and to "Controversies between two or more States." U.S. CONST., art.
III, § 2, cl. 1. It has been interpreted to require that appellants in U.S. federal court
have a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962), sufficient to make their dispute into "a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts."
Haworth, 300 U.S. at 241.
By contrast, the South African Constitution would seem to permit courts to
hear cases where the infringement of rights has been merely "threatened" and give
citizens a cause of action to pursue the judicial resolution of "any dispute that can be
resolved by the application of law." S. AFR. CONST. §§ 34, 38.
487. S. AFR. CONST. § 32(1).
488. Pub. L. No. 96-456, Oct. 15, 1980, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
App. 3, §§ 1-15).
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South African Constitution provides not only a general right of
access to information held by the state but also a specific right to
"any information that is held by another person and that is required
for the exercise or protection of any right" that is not limited in
applicability to criminal procedures -South Africa would seem to
require an analogue to the American CIPA designed to be used
throughout the court system and in all types of litigation.
c. The Concept of "National Security"
Finally, in a much more general sense, South Africa's post-
apartheid government would do well to retreat a bit from its expan-
sive conception of "national security." As explained previously, a
sweeping vision of "security" encompassing virtually every aspect
of society can produce a dangerous tendency to assume that it is
therefore the business of the "security forces" to involve themselves
in all such matters. We have already seen how the ANC's sweeping
view of "national security" threatens to give the NIA carte blanche to
spy on all South Africans at will under the provisions of the Inter-
ception and Monitoring Prohibition Act and the Intelligence Services
Act. And, of course, one should not be permitted to forget what
happened the last time officials in Pretoria developed an all-
encompassing "total" vision of "national security." Such conceptual
over-reaching is a mistake the post-apartheid state should not per-
mit itself to make.
Since the habits and mores of democratic South African
governance and security oversight are today still being set, it should
not be difficult to confine this vision of domestic "national security"
jurisdiction to such traditional concepts as defending the Republic's
borders against attack or infiltration, enforcing its laws, preventing
and coping with public violence and disorder, detecting and
countering the clandestine activities of foreign intelligence services,
preventing terrorism and domestic subversion, and planning and
conducting military operations pursuant to lawful constitutional
authority. Such an old-school vision of "national security" is hardly
a constricted one, and as the above account of contemporary South
African security challenges should suggest, even such a narrowed
view would certainly leave the post-apartheid security forces with a
great deal of work. Nor, of course, would such a traditional view of
security in any way prevent the ANC government from
concentrating its energies upon the socioeconomic advancement of
its constituents: being unable to call economic and social problems
"national security" issues hardly prevents their redress. It is time for
489. S. AFR. CONST. § 32(1).
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the ANC's sweeping rhetoric of liberation and transformation to
take a back seat, at least in this respect, to the more sober speech of
governance.
CONCLUSION: A PARTING WORD
South Africa is today setting the patterns by which it will live in
the future. If South Africans are to take advantage of the "window of
opportunity" they still enjoy in establishing the habits and mores
necessary to a working security oversight regime, therefore, now is
the time to act with conspicuous restraint and prudence. In many
respects, in fact, it is this process of moral and cultural education
that is the most important element of security oversight: without it,
all the clever legal draftsmanship and carefully crafted legal doctrine
in the world cannot prevent a repeat of past abuses. "Liberty," as
Judge Learned Hand stated, "lies in the hearts of men and women;
when it dies there, no Constitution, no law, [and] no court can save
it .... ,490 For a variety of reasons, as outlined above, South Africa
may indeed have to rely heavily upon the care and perspicacity of its
judiciary in resolving the dilemmas of security oversight in the post-
apartheid state. The fundamental responsibility for learning the
lessons of the past and preventing future abuses of power, however,
must be understood to lie elsewhere.
[A] society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no
court can save;.., a society where that spirit flourishes, no
court need save; [and] in a society which evades its
responsibility by thrusting upon the courts [alone] the
nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.49'
If South Africa can win this battle for the hearts and minds of
its citizens, security bureaucrats, uniformed servicemembers, and
public officials, the legal and institutional challenges of
consolidating and improving the security oversight system will be
comparatively simple. The challenge of security oversight, in other
words, is a challenge for everyone.
490. HAND, supra note 245, at 189-90.
491. LEARNED HAND, THE CONTRIBUTION OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY TO
CIVILIZATION (1942).
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